in 1960, the first birth control pill, afforded U. S. women unprecedented freedom to plan childbearing and their careers. This paper uses plausibly exogenous variation in state consent laws to evaluate the causal impact of the pill on the timing of first births and extent and intensity of women's labor-force participation. The results suggest that legal access to the pill before age 21 significantly reduced the likelihood of a first birth before age 22, increased the number of women in the paid labor force, and raised the number of annual hours worked.

This paper explores financial reporting incentives created by an economy's institutional structure. The underlying premise of our analysis is that a country's legal/judicial system, securities laws, and political economy create incentives that influence the behavior of corporate executives, investors, regulators and other market participants. Further, such incentives ultimately shape the properties of reported accounting numbers. We empirically analyze relations between key characteristics of country-level institutions and the asymmetric recognition of economic gains and losses into earnings (i.e., conditional conservatism). We also provide evidence on channels through which specific institutions manifest their influence on observed conservatism.

Contrary to arguments that poison pills degrade firm performance, we find that operating performance modestly improves during the 5-year period after pill adoption. Performance improvements are present in a wide range of firms, and are independent of adoption year and whether the firm is R&D intensive. Although recent arguments suggest that the protection offered by pills is strongest when combined with a staggered board, the performance changes also are unrelated to board structure. This evidence undermines the widely held view that poison pills have systematically negative effects on firm performance.

We construct an index of firms' external finance constraints via generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of an investment Euler equation. Unlike the commonly used KZ index, ours is consistent with firm characteristics associated with external finance constraints. Constrained firms' returns move together, suggesting the existence of a financial constraints factor. This factor earns a positive but insignificant average return. Much of the variation in this factor cannot be explained by the Fama-French and momentum factors. Cross-sectional regressions of returns on our index and other firm characteristics show that constrained firms earn higher returns and that the financial-constraints effect dominates the size effect.

We present strong evidence that option trading volume contains information about future stock prices. Taking advantage of a unique data set, we construct put-call ratios from option volume initiated by buyers to open new positions. Stocks with low put-call ratios outperform stocks with high put-call ratios by more than 40 basis points on the next day and more than 1% over the next week. Partitioning our option ignals into components that are publicly and nonpublicly observable, we find that the economic source of this predictability is nonpublic information possessed by option traders rather than market inefficiency. We also find greater predictability for stocks with higher concentrations of informed traders and from option contracts with greater leverage.

We develop a model of reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion where “gain-loss utility” is derived from standard “consumption utility” and the reference point is determined endogenously by the economic environment. We assume that a person's reference point is her rational expectations held in the recent past about outcomes, which are determined in a personal equilibrium by the requirement that they must be consistent with optimal behavior given expectations. In deterministic environments, choices maximize consumption utility, but gain-loss utility influences behavior when there is uncertainty. Applying the model to consumer behavior, we show that willingness to pay for a good is increasing in the expected probability of purchase and in the expected prices conditional on purchase. In within-day labor-supply decisions, a worker is less likely to continue work if income earned thus far is unexpectedly high, but more likely to show up as well as continue work if expected income is high.

From 1940 to 1990, a 10% increase in a metropolitan area's concentration of college-educated residents was associated with a 0.8% increase in subsequent employment growth. Instrumental variables estimates support a causal relationship between college graduates and employment growth, but show no evidence of an effect of high school graduates. Using data on growth in wages, rents, and house values, I calibrate a neoclassical city growth model and find that roughly 60% of the employment growth effect of college graduates is due to enhanced productivity growth, the rest being caused by growth in the quality of life. This finding contrasts with the common argument that human capital generates employment growth in urban areas solely through changes in productivity.

Three incentives for hiring auditing services have been proposed in the literature: (1) to signal outsiders about the company's prospects, (2) to provide a potential source of loss recovery for investors (insurance), and (3) to reduce agency costs. The objective of this study is to examine the potential for the first two (signaling and insurance) to interact while controlling for agency costs. We conduct an experiment in which highly experienced financial analysts provide stock price estimates for a company that is under financial stress. We manipulate, between participants, the signal provided by the audit opinion (going‐concern modification, yes/no) and the ability of investors to recover losses from auditors. The key finding is that the effect of the going‐concern opinion on investor value judgements is moderated by the extent to which the auditor provides an insurance function. Specifically, the negative effect of a going‐concern opinion on the analysts' stock price estimates is reduced by the extent that the environment treats the auditor as an insurer.

Do external finance constraints affect the timing of large investment projects? Simulations of a model with fixed capital-stock adjustment costs establish the hypothesis that external finance constraints lower a firm's investment hazard: the probability of undertaking a large project today as a function of the time since the last project. Hazard model estimation that controls for productivity and adjustment costs supports this hypothesis. Small firms that distribute cash to shareholders have higher hazards than small firms that do not; very small firms have lower hazards than small firms; small stand-alone firms have significantly lower hazards than small segments of conglomerates.