Many time series exhibit “long memory”: Their autocorrelation function decays slowly with lag. This behavior has traditionally been modeled via unit roots or fractional Brownian motion and explained via aggregation of heterogeneous processes, nonlinearity, learning dynamics, regime switching, or structural breaks. This paper identifies a different and complementary mechanism for long‐memory generation by showing that it can naturally arise when a large number of simple linear homogeneous economic subsystems with short memory are interconnected to form a network such that the outputs of the subsystems are fed into the inputs of others. This networking picture yields a type of aggregation that is not merely additive, resulting in a collective behavior that is richer than that of individual subsystems. Interestingly, the long‐memory behavior is found to be almost entirely determined by the geometry of the network, while being relatively insensitive to the specific behavior of individual agents.

At the settlement time of the VIX Volatility Index, volume spikes on S & P 500 Index (SPX) options, but only in out-of-the-money options used to calculate the VIX, and more so for options with a higher and discontinuous influence on VIX. We investigate alternative explanations of hedging and coordinated liquidity trading. Tests including those utilizing differences in put and call options, open interest around the settlement, and a similar volatility contract with an entirely different settlement procedure in Europe are inconsistent with these explanations but consistent with market manipulation. Large transient deviations in prices demonstrate the importance of settlement design.

We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives’ behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively around government intervention during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that banks with materialistic CEOs have significantly more downside tail risk relative to banks with non-materialistic CEOs.

Private equity firms that are listed on stock exchanges commit to extensive public disclosures. By contrast, unlisted private equity firms communicate privately with partner investors. We examine the reporting quality of portfolio companies that are backed by listed and unlisted private equity firms worldwide. We find that portfolio companies that are backed by listed private equity firms report lower abnormal accruals, recognize losses faster, and experience higher post-IPO stock returns. These findings are stronger for smaller and European portfolio companies and those that receive direct private equity investments. Overall, our findings suggest that the public reporting model of listed private equity firms leads to greater capital market benefits than the private reporting model of unlisted private equity firms.

Promotion decisions for professors are critical for any university and this is especially true when promotion also involves the granting of tenure. In this paper, we report the number of publications for Finance professors promoted to Associate or Full Professor at schools similar to the University of Georgia and also at the Top 10 Finance Departments. We also provide evidence on citations of the individuals' research. Our data reveal similarities in terms of the total number of articles published (between 6 and 8 for promotion to Associate Professor), the number of articles published in Finance “A” journals (about 3), and the number of citations between peer and aspirant schools. We find evidence that Associate Professors at Top 10 Departments have slightly more “A” articles and receive more citations to their work than those at lower ranked institutions. We find similar results for those promoted to Full Professor – similar publication records but with more “A” publications and citations for those in Top 10 Departments. Our paper provides up-to-date information on some of the factors considered for promotion of Finance professors. However, the much more difficult part of promotion decisions is determining the impact of past research and the potential for future contributions. In addition, teaching, service, and other departmental contributions are key to the promotion decision.

The authors have been editors of the Journal of Corporate Finance for nineteen years and are now stepping down. Here we offer some observations from our years as editors of the Journal. We hope they are useful to the new editors, the publisher, referees and authors. Thank you to all those who helped us in our task as editors.

From 1973 to 2014, the common stock of U.S. banks with loan growth in the top quartile of banks over a three-year period significantly underperformed the common stock of banks with loan growth in the bottom quartile over the next three years. After the period of high growth, these banks have a lower return on assets and increase their loan loss reserves. The poorer performance of fast-growing banks is not explained by merger activity. The evidence is consistent with banks, analysts, and investors being overoptimistic about the risk of loans extended during bank-level periods of high loan growth.

Tighter bank lending standards could increase firms' post-hedging currency exposure by reducing firms' ability to fund hedging (funding channel) and/or by constraining counterparties' capacity to facilitate hedging (capacity channel). We find that tighter lending standards materially increase firms' exposure. In addition, we find no support for a funding-channel effect as firms' internal liquidity does not mitigate the impact of lending standards on exposure, indicating that the impact is through the capacity channel. Finally, we find a negative association between lending standards and aggregate transactions in currency derivatives, bolstering support for a capacity-channel effect. Our results have implications for firms' hedging policy and the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission.

We investigate the impact of debt covenants on acquisition characteristics. We find that acquirers with covenants pay lower merger premiums, make more focused acquisitions, and engage in acquisitions with higher synergy gains and higher acquirer returns around deal announcement, relative to those without. All these results are more pronounced with stricter debt covenants. Additionally, acquirers with covenants pay with a lower share fraction. In particular, capital covenants, which restrict debt issuance, are positively related to the share fraction, while performance covenants, which affect the stock of equity capital, result in a lower share fraction of payment. All our results hold only for acquirers who have not violated covenants, reemphasizing the importance of debt covenants and the threat they entail on corporate policies even before nearing violation states. Results also, generally, hold for badly governed firms, suggesting that creditors' monitoring role through debt covenants and borrower's effective corporate governance are substitutes.

We introduce firm and worker heterogeneity into a model of innovation†driven endogenous growth. Individuals who differ in ability sort into either a research activity or a manufacturing sector. Research projects generate new varieties of a differentiated product. Projects differ in quality and the resulting technologies differ in productivity. In both sectors, there is a complementarity between firm quality and worker ability. We study the co†determination of growth and income inequality in both the closed and open economy, as well as the spillover effects of policy in one country to outcomes in others.