We compare the performance of Islamic and conventional stock returns in Saudi Arabia in order to determine whether religious preferences can create segmented financial markets consistent with investor recognition effects. We sample the daily stock returns of all Saudi firms from September 2002 through 2015 and find Islamic stocks (recognized) have a broader investor base, are more liquid (Amihud, 2002) and exhibit lower idiosyncratic risk (Ang et al., 2006) than conventional (neglected) stocks, which support the segmentation of Islamic and conventional stocks in the Saudi market. Furthermore, the segmentation of Islamic stocks from less-recognized conventional stocks significantly affects how information is incorporated into asset prices in predominantly Islamic markets. Islamic stocks exhibit greater integration with local and global macroeconomic factors (Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2009) and have higher systematic turnover (Loughran and Schultz, 2005) than conventional stocks. Our results provide new evidence on the impact of the corporate decision to comply with religious and social norms on asset pricing in emerging markets, the evolving Islamic financial markets, and markets where other significant implicit, or cultural, barriers may exist.

In this study, we analyze employee litigation and other work-related complaints to examine if the judicial process favors firms that engage in lobbying. We gather data for 27,794 employee lawsuits (after their initial court hearings) filed between 2000 and 2014 and test the relationship between employee allegations and firms' lobbying strategies. We find that employee litigation increases the number of labor-related bills in our sample. We document that an increase in employee lawsuits may drive firms into lobbying to change policy proposals. We also find robust evidence that case outcomes are different for lobbying firms compared to non-lobbying rivals, which may protect shareholder wealth in the long run. Our results suggest lobbying activities may make a significant difference in the effects of employee lawsuits. Our findings highlight the benefit of building political capital to obtain biased outcomes in favor of politically connected firms.

In this paper, we investigate the influence of CEO political orientation on corporate lobbying efforts. Specifically, we study whether CEO political ideology, in terms of manager-level campaign donations, determines the choice and amount of firm lobbying involvement and the impact of lobbying on firm value. We find a generous engagement in lobbying efforts by firms with Republican leaning-managers, which lobby a larger number of bills and have higher lobbying expenditures. However, the cost of lobbying offsets the benefit for firms with Republican CEOs. We report higher agency costs of free cash flow, lower Tobin's Q, and smaller increases in buy and hold abnormal returns following lobbying activities for firms with Republican managers, compared to Democratic and Apolitical rivals. Overall, our results suggest that the effects of lobbying on firm performance vary across firms with different managerial political orientations.

Using political corruption conviction data from the U.S. Department of Justice, we examine the impact of local corruption on firms’ debt maturity structure while exploring both demand-side and supply-side explanations. Our results support the demand-side story and indicate that firms in high corruption areas utilize less short-term debt to mitigate liquidity and refinancing risks. Consistent with this, we find the effect is more pronounced among firms with smaller size, lower asset redeployability, and higher volatility. Our findings remain robust to the inclusion of an array of controls expected to influence debt maturity preferences as well as time, industry, and state fixed effects. Moreover, a seemingly unrelated regression approach, instrumental variables regression, propensity score matching, placebo analyses, and alternative corruption measures corroborate our findings. Altogether, our results indicate that firms alter their debt maturity choices in response to local corruption to limit refinancing risk and the uncertainty created by corrupt government officials.

In this study, we examine the impact of class action litigation shocks on corporate innovation. Our experimental design is based on an unanticipated court ruling that reduces the risk of shareholder class action lawsuits for firms located within the jurisdiction of the US Ninth Circuit. Innovation output by firms headquartered in this area increased significantly after this decision compared with that of firms elsewhere. This result is consistent with our trading hypothesis, which states that the threat of litigation leads to managerial myopia. The increase in innovation is more pronounced at high-tech firms and firms operating in a competitive environment. Other measures of ex ante litigation risk indicate that firms with the greatest litigation risk experience the greatest increase in innovation after this decision. We conclude that a reduction in the threat of class action litigation leads firms to increase innovation.

This paper contributes to the growing literature on the effect of religion on corporate decision making. We posit that contingent payment in mergers and acquisitions not only violates Islamic law but also results in several agency issues by creating an incentive for managers to participate in long-term value-destroying behavior during earnout periods. Our empirical results, using regression as well as difference-in-difference estimation, show that target managers significantly manage earnings upward by cutting discretionary expenses during earnout periods. As compared to a sample of matched non-earnout M&A, acquisitions with earnout clauses are followed by significantly lower long-term abnormal returns. Our arguments and results have significant economic and legal consequences on cross-border M&A and could be used to facilitate worldwide economic integration.

We examine whether reputable intermediaries provide valuable certification which help corporate issuers of Islamic bonds lower their cost of capital. Our focus on Islamic bonds is motivated by the fact that besides information risk, investors also face unique Shariah non-compliance risk. Based on a sample of 3462 Islamic bond tranches issued in Malaysia from 2001 to 2014, we find certification by reputable Shariah advisors and Shariah committees is associated with a significantly lower average bond spread, as is information certification by reputable lead arrangers. Our results thus support the certification hypothesis.

We provide a joint non-parametric test to gather insights on the boundaries of applicability of Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) models. We find that a non-trivial class of models cannot price the U.S. stock market equally weighted portfolio, implying non-monotonic SDFs, especially over the last 50/60 years in (recessionary) periods characterized by higher market volatility. Stocks responsible for this rejection mostly belong to the smallest NYSE market cap decile, are characterized by high idiosyncratic risk, and typically cannot be priced via SDF models where the aggregate level of risk aversion is bigger then 9 or 10. Excluding these stocks increases the ability to explain the cross-section of returns without impairing the ability to span the mean–variance frontier.