[This paper investigates whether replacing a standard that employs a vague, verbal disclosure threshold with a standard that employs a more stringent, numerical threshold mitigates the aggressiveness of reporting decisions. Two experiments were performed in a tax setting. The results indicate that (1) when a verbal standard is in place, tax practitioners use the latitude inherent in a verbal standard to support aggressive reporting decisions, and (2) when a numerical standard is in place, tax practitioners use instead the latitude available in assessing evidential support to justify an aggressive reporting decision. This shift in incentive effect is pronounced enough to render reporting decisions made under the numerical standard as aggressive as reporting decisions made under the verbal standard. These results indicate that replacing verbal thresholds with numerical thresholds may not diminish the aggressiveness of reporting decisions.]

We report on an experiment in which experienced auditors (1) determine whether to allow a client to adopt an aggressive reporting method when the auditors have an incentive to do so, and (2) justify aggressive reporting by their interpretations of financial accounting standards. In the experiment, the appropriate reporting method depends upon whether an amount can be "reasonably estimated" as that term is used in an applicable accounting standard. The accounting standard relevant to determining the appropriate reporting method was manipulated between subjects (thus varying whether judging that an amount can be reasonably estimated would justify an aggressive or conservative method), as was engagement risk. The results indicate that the auditors responded to moderate engagement risk by permitting the aggressive reporting method and justified their choice with aggressive interpretations of accounting standards. When faced with high engagement risk, the auditors responded by requiring conservative reporting and justified their choice with conservative interpretations of accounting standards.

Dichev, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (DGHR, in this issue) survey chief financial officers (CFOs) to elicit their views on earnings quality, broader trends in financial reporting, and the prevalence of earnings management. They provide some interesting insights on these issues. We discuss how CFOs' incentives in the financial reporting process are likely to affect what we can learn from them about earnings quality. We also discuss how DGHR's methodological choices regarding survey sample and question design affect their inferences, including what we can infer about the prevalence and magnitude of earnings management.

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 5 requires accrual of contingent losses which are deemed probable. This disclosure criterion is intended to be applied uniformly across a variety of contexts. We performed an experiment which examined whether audit managers' interpretations of the SFAS No. 5 probability expressions are influenced by one contextual feature, event base rate. Counter to the intention of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), interpretations of the expression probable were positively associated with event base rate. Résumé. Le SFAS n o 5 exige l'imputation à l'exercice des pertes éventuelles qui sont jugées «probables». La règle ainsi établie veut que ce critère de présentation d'information soit appliqué uniformément dans des contextes très divers. Les auteurs procèdent à une expérience dans le cadre de laquelle ils examinent si la façon dont les responsables de mission interprètent la gamme de probabilités, au sens du SFAS n o 5, est influencée par une caractéristique contextuelle, la fréquence relative de l'événement. Contrairement au résultat visé par le FASB, les interprétations du terme «probable» sont en relation positive avec la fréquence relative de l'événement.

We report the results of two experiments that provide evidence that investors' risk judgments are affected by the numerical format used to describe outcomes within accounting disclosures. Consistent with prior research in psychology, investors assess higher risk in response to dollar-formatted disclosures than to equivalent percentage-formatted disclosures. Consistent with the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad and Wright 1994), this effect is moderated when investors have both (1) awareness that management has discretion over format, and (2) sufficient cognitive capacity to consider its implications. Our results provide insight about the effects of current disclosure formats and suggest implications for managers who choose formats, investors who interpret formatted information, and regulators who consider whether to further prescribe the formats that are used in financial disclosures.

This paper reports the results of an experiment that examines the influence of uncertainty about the probability that a future loss will occur ("ambiguity") on auditors and financial statement users' judgments about appropriate reference to contingent losses in audit reports. Application of Einhorn and Hogarth's (1985) ambiguity model suggests that, with respect to losses of tow (high) probability, both auditors and users will act as if an ambiguous probability of loss is higher (lower) than a precise probability of the same magnitude, thus demonstrating a conservative (unconservative) reaction to ambiguity. In addition, since auditors may jeopardize client relations when they unnecessarily make audit report reference to contingent losses, auditors may react less conservatively to ambiguity than do users. The results of the experiment support these predictions.

This paper reports the results of an experiment that examines the influenceof uncertaintyabouttheprobabilitythatafuturelosswilloccur (ambiguity) on auditors' and financial statement users' judgments about appropriate reference to contingent losses in audit reports. Application of Einhorn and Hogarth's (1985) ambiguity model suggests that, with respect to losses of low (high) probability, both auditors and users will act as if an ambiguous probability of loss is higher (lower) than a precise probability of the same magnitude, thus demonstrating a conservative (unconservative) reaction to ambiguity. In addition, since auditors may jeopardize client relations when they unnecessarily make audit report reference to contingent losses, auditors may react less conservatively to ambiguity than do users. The results of the experiment support these predictions.

Accountants making judgments with respect to a particular set of standards are increasingly aware of standards from other reporting regimes that offer additional or conflicting guidance. In fact, IFRS encourages reliance on out‐of‐regime standards when IFRS lacks guidance. This paper reports the results of two experiments which provide evidence that auditors in such circumstances are vulnerable to contrast effects , whereby reporting judgments under IFRS are systematically influenced away from the accounting treatment supported by standards from another regime (U.S. GAAP ). Contrast effects are observed (i) when out‐of‐regime standards are considered before making a reporting judgment under IFRS , and (ii) when out‐of‐regime standards are applied as local GAAP for a subsidiary of a foreign parent that reports under IFRS . We also find that contrast effects are reduced when auditors believe IFRS lacks guidance. These results have implications for financial statement preparers and auditors in the current incomplete‐convergence environment.

Investments that are classified as Level 2 within the fair value hierarchy account for approximately 92 percent of US banks' fair value assets. We report an experiment that examines how experienced auditors apply current PCAOB guidance when auditing portfolios of these assets. We hypothesize and find that, depending on how overstatement is distributed within a portfolio, current PCAOB guidance leads auditors to make adjustments that are predictably larger or smaller than the aggregate overstatement in the portfolio. Auditors are more likely to follow PCAOB guidance when doing so leads to lower audit adjustments and higher client income. We also predict and find that auditors identify some patterns of overstatement as indicative of management bias, but not others. However, management-bias assessments do not affect auditors' adjustment decisions as standards imply they should, even when auditors are prompted to consider management bias. Together, these results highlight a potential deficiency in current auditing guidance that managers could exploit by strategically locating overstatements within securities with larger book values or by spreading those overstatements across many securities within a portfolio. We suggest changes to current PCAOB guidance which may reduce these effects.