We examine the link between the excess value of a diversified firm and the value of its internal capital market. Subsidies to small financially constrained segments with good relative investment opportunities significantly increase excess value, while transfers of resources from segments with good relative investment opportunities significantly decrease excess value. Of interest is that subsidies to small financially constrained segments with poor relative investment opportunities also significantly increase excess value. However, there is little evidence that this result depends on the diversity of a firm's investment opportunities. We conclude that financing constraints drive the relationship between the internal capital market and firm value.

Diversified firms trade at a discount relative to comparable portfolios of stand-alone firms. One explanation is that these firms have inefficient internal capital markets. We examine the link between firm value and the value of internal capital markets using a new form of corporate restructuring called tracking stock. We present a model that illustrates that the announcement effect of a tracking stock equity restructuring conveys information about the market’s assessment of the value of a firm’s internal capital market. We develop a measure of the profitability of the internal capital market, and we find a strong positive relation between it and tracking stock announcement effects, a finding consistent with our model.

We explore how asymmetric information in financial markets affects outcomes in product markets. Difference-in-difference tests around brokerage house merger/closure events (which increase asymmetric information through reductions in analyst coverage) indicate worse industry-adjusted sales growth for shocked firms than for their peers. Our results are consistent with Bolton and Scharfstein's (1990) tradeoff between investor agency concerns and predation risk. Further support is found in stronger treatment effects among firms with ex ante greater agency concerns, financing constraints, asymmetric information, and those operating in ex ante more competitive (fluid) product market spaces. Our results are concentrated in industries where we can clearly identify either net firm entry or exit.

We present evidence that insured deposit financing shields banks from the full costs of market discipline. Moody's downgrades, indicators of increasing risk, are associated with negative abnormal equity returns that are increasing in the bank's reliance on insured deposits. Moreover, banks raise their use of insured deposits following increases in risk. These findings cast doubt on the ability of capital market participants to effectively discipline bank behavior within the current regulatory environment. More generally, our findings highlight the potential for regulation to undermine market discipline in regulated industries.

Does corporate governance affect the timing of large investment projects? Hazard model estimates suggest strong shareholder governance may deter managers from pursuing large investments. Controlling for investment opportunities, firms with good governance experience longer spells between large investments. However, in the presence of financial constraints or strong CEO incentives (high delta (δ)), we find no such timing differences. Finally, these higher investment hazard firms exhibit significantly negative long-run operating and stock performance. Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that poor governance associates with overinvestment.

We study at-the-market (ATM) equity offerings, which are direct share issuances sold in the secondary market that forgo underwriters and “dribble-out” shares over time rather than raising them all at once. Enabled in 2008, their use has increased dramatically, and in 2016, their incidence and total proceeds were, respectively, 63% and 26% of those for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Determinants of firms’ choice between ATMs and SEOs are consistent with the costly certification hypothesis of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994). We also find that 65% of ATM proceeds are used to stockpile cash compared to 84% of SEO proceeds.

Unlike seasoned equity or public debt offerings, bank loan financing elicits a significantly positive announcement return, which has led financial economists to characterize bank loans as “special.” Here, we find that firms announcing bank loans suffer negative abnormal stock returns over the subsequent three years. In the long run, bank loans appear no different from seasoned equity offerings or public debt issues. Our evidence suggests that larger loans (relative to borrower equity) are followed by worse stock performance. We also find that lender protection is negatively related to borrower performance, suggesting the lender is somewhat shielded from the poor performance.

We examine the usefulness of other comprehensive income (OCI) to debt investors in nonfinancial companies. Motivated by Merton's (1974) real options framework, we construct a measure of incremental OCI volatility, designed to capture the effect of OCI on overall firm asset volatility, which is a primary driver of credit risk in Merton's (1974) model. We find that the volatility of incremental OCI influences the likelihood of default, credit ratings, and the cost of debt. Overall, our evidence suggests that creditors use information from OCI in their assessment of firm credit risk and in pricing debt contracts.

Prior studies conclude that firms’ equity underperforms following many individual sorts of external financing. These conclusions naturally raise significant questions about market efficiency and/or about the techniques used to measure long-run “abnormal returns.” Rather than concentrating on a single security type or issuance, we examine long-run performance following any and all sorts of security issuances. Initial financing events do not associate with underperformance; however, subsequent financings do. Our results suggest that negative post-issuance returns have nothing to do with the specific type of security issued, and everything to do with the number of types of securities issued.

We document a capital supply channel in peer effects, for the case of SEOs. Firms accelerate their SEOs – they have higher SEO hazards – when more of their peers conducted an SEO within the prior six months. The effect is stronger among older yet constrained firms than among younger yet unconstrained firms. It is also stronger after Russell index shocks that likely reduce indexer demand for a firm's equity. We document evidence of a potential underlying mechanism; information conveyed by underwriters that recently marketed SEOs of peers, thus reducing asymmetric information costs.