We examine the role of concurrent information in the striking increase in investor response to earnings announcements from 2001 to 2016, as measured by return variability and volume following Beaver (1968). We find management guidance, analyst forecasts, and disaggregated financial statement line items are more frequently bundled with earnings announcements, and each of these items explains part of the increase in market response. Furthermore, collectively, these concurrent information releases explain a substantial fraction of the increase in market response to earnings announcements since 2001. This is in contrast to the decline in market response to management guidance issued separately from earnings and the much smaller increase in market response to analyst forecasts issued separately from earnings over this time. The findings indicate that information arrival at earnings announcement dates has increased significantly over the past two decades, and that key components of this are increased disclosures by management of guidance and financial statement line items and forecasts by analysts.

This paper examines whether firms manipulating their reported financial results make suboptimal investment decisions. We examine fixed asset investments for a large sample of public companies during the 1978–2002 period and document that firms that manipulate their earnings—firms investigated by the SEC for accounting irregularities, firms sued by their shareholders for improper accounting, and firms that restated financial statements—over-invest substantially during the misreporting period. Furthermore, following the misreporting period, these firms no longer over-invest, consistent with corrected information leading to more efficient investment levels. We find similar patterns for firms with high discretionary revenues or accruals. Our findings suggest that earnings management, which is largely viewed as targeting parties external to the firm, can also influence internal decisions.

We document that property-casualty insurers with small positive earnings understate loss reserves relative to insurers with small negative earnings. Furthermore, loss reserves are managed across the entire distribution of earnings, with the most income-increasing reserve accruals reported by small profit firms, and the most income-decreasing reserve accruals reported by firms with the highest earnings. We analyze this pattern separately for public, private, and mutual companies, and find that public companies and mutuals manage loss reserves to avoid losses, but that private companies do not. We also find evidence of reserve management to avoid losses by financially healthy and distressed firms.

This study examines the relation between analysts' incentives to cover firms and the extent of their intangible assets. Because intangible assets typically are unrecognized and estimates of their fair values are not disclosed, absent analyst coverage firms with more intangible assets likely have less informative prices. Accordingly, we expect analysts have greater incentives to cover firms with more intangible assets and, thus, predict they have higher analyst coverage. As predicted, we find that analyst coverage is significantly greater for firms with larger research and development and advertising expenses relative to their industry, and for firms in industries with larger research and development expense. We also predict and find that analyst coverage is increasing in firm size, growth, trading volume, equity issuance, and perceived mispricing, and is decreasing in the size of the firm's analysts' brokerage houses and the effort analysts expend to follow the firm. These findings indicate that analyst coverage depends on private benefits and costs of covering a firm. We also test hypotheses related to analyst effort. We predict and find that analysts expend greater effort to follow firms with more intangible assets, after controlling for other factors associated with analyst effort. Our evidence indicates that intangible assets, most of which are not recognized in firms' financial statements, are associated with greater incentives for analysts to cover such firms, and greater costs of coverage. An open question is whether financial statement recognition of intangible assets could more efficiently provide information about such assets to investors.

We examine bankruptcy within business groups. Groups have incentives to support financially distressed subsidiaries, as the bankruptcy of a subsidiary may impose severe costs on the group as a whole. This is in part because, in several countries, bankruptcy courts often “pierce the corporate veil” and hold groups liable for their distressed subsidiaries’ obligations as if they were their own. Using a large cross-country sample of group-affiliated firms, we show that, by reallocating resources within the corporate structure, business groups actively manage intra-group credit risk to prevent costly within-group insolvencies. Moreover, we document that recent regulatory changes in the approval and disclosure of related party transactions are costly for business groups in that they constrain their ability to shield their subsidiaries from credit-risk shocks. Our study informs the current regulatory debate on related party transactions by highlighting an important cost of anti-self-dealing regulation.