Most studies of the welfare economics of groundwater have focused mainly on the dichotomy between optimal control of groundwater use and no control at all. This article argues that, under circumstances that generally prevail in semiarid zones, assigning property rights to groundwater and permitting the market to determine the allocation of water use can lead to a second-best solution. An argument is made that if potential users would be allowed to Coase-bargain with incumbent users on the issuance of new groundwater rights, the second-best solution is elevated to a Pareto-optimal solution. This article is also a tale of two states: water law and performance in New Mexico and Arizona.

The view that the inflationary process experienced in the United States over the last 10 years can be largely attributed to increasing concentration in the private sector has once again regained a degree of prominence. We offer calculations showing the effect of increasing concentration in the consumer price index. The results indicate that the act of reducing concentration, if successful is likely to have little impact on the consumer price index.

The view that the inflationary process experienced in the United States over the last 10 years can be largely attributed to increasing concentration in the private sector has once again regained a degree of prominence. We offer calculations showing the effect of increasing concentration in the consumer price index. The results indicate that the act of reducing concentration, if successful is likely to have little impact on the consumer price index.