Over the past decade, a substantial literature on methods for the estimation of discrete choice dynamic programming (DDP) models of behavior has developed. However, the implementation of these methods can impose major computational burdens because solving for agents' decision rules often involves high dimensional integrations that must be performed at each point in the state space. In this paper we develop an approximate solution method that consists of: (1) using Monte Carlo integration to stimulate the required multiple integrals at a subset of the state points, and (2) interpolating the non-simulated values using a regression function. The overall performance of this approximation method appears to be excellent.

We develop an equilibrium model of the US labor market, fit to Panel Study of Income Dynamics data from 1968–96. Our main innovation is a finer differentiation of types of labor than in prior work (i.e., by occupation, education, gender, and age). This lets us fit wage and employment patterns better than simpler models. We obtain a good fit to wages and occupational choices over the 29-year period while also explaining college attendance rates. We use the model to assess factors driving changes in the wage structure. Occupational demand shifts and shifts in demand for college labor and female labor within occupations are key factors.

We evaluate the effect of child care versus maternal time inputs on child cognitive development using single mothers from the NLSY79. To deal with nonrandom selection of children into child care, we exploit the exogenous variation in welfare policy rules facing single mothers. In particular, the 1996 welfare reform and earlier state-level policy changes generated substantial increases in their work/child care use. We construct a comprehensive set of welfare policy variables and use them as instruments to estimate child cognitive ability production functions. In our baseline specification, we estimate that a year of child care reduces child test scores by 2.1%.

In recent decades, U.S. foreign trade grew much faster than GDP, but there is no consensus why. Notably lacking is an understanding of the role of multinational corporations (MNCs), which mediate over half of world trade. We use Bureau of Economic Analysis data on U.S. MNCs to study the rapid growth of MNC-based trade from 1983 to 1996. Using a model of U.S. MNCs and Canadian affiliates, we decompose this growth by source. Tariff reductions can largely explain increases in arms-length MNC-based trade. But intra-firm trade growth is attributed mostly to “technical change.” We present additional evidence suggesting just-in-time production facilitated intra-firm trade.

Carl Bonham and Richard Cohen (1995) are quite correct in noting the errors in our paper (Keane and Runkle, 1990), which were caused by our ignorance of cointegration. We stand chagrined. However, Bonham and Cohen are overstating their case when they claim that Keane and Runkle's results do not support the empirical validity of the rational-expectations hypothesis (p. 289). Bonham and Cohen focus on our tests of price-forecast rationality conditioned on past oil prices and Ml, which they claim are the core of our paper and provide our most stringent tests of rationality. Those particular tests account for only two paragraphs of our 20-page paper-obviously, these tests do not provide the core results of our paper. Rather, the main result of our paper is that individual price forecasts are unbiased and rational, conditioned on the forecaster's own past errors. No previous researchers had ever found even this limited support for the rational-expectations hypothesis. These core results are unaffected by the cointegration issues noted by Bonham and Cohen. Given that caveat, however, note how few of our results are actually overturned by Bonham and Cohen. Although our test statistics for determining whether forecasters properly condition on Ml growth are incorrect, Bonham and Cohen reach the same conclusion that we do: price forecasts conditioned on Ml growth are rational. Bonham and Cohen do reach different conclusions about forecast rationality than we do when they condition on oil price changes. But they themselves show that forecasters were only irrational in conditioning on oil prices after 1973 (their table 2, rows 5 and 6). To call such forecasting failure irrationality may or may not be correct. We think that Bonham and Cohen's results merely confirm the widespread view that forecasters did not completely understand the effects that oil price shocks would have on the economy because such large oil price shocks had never been seen before. Although Bonham and Cohen overturn only one of our original tests, they do provide additional evidence against forecast rationality with their tests that condition on interest-rate spreads and the unemployment rate. We have no doubt that a search over a large number of conditioning variables will uncover some instances in which forecast rationality is rejected. But conducting such a search will also incorrectly bias tests toward rejecting rationality. Since our original paper, we have also examined the rationality of earnings forecasts made by individual stock analysts-a group that has even more incentive than economic forecasters to make accurate predictions. Although all previous studies in that literature had found individual earnings forecasts to be irrational, we found (Keane and Runkle, 1994) that analysts' forecasts are rational. This additional research provides further support for the paper criticized by Bonham and Cohen.

This paper tests the rationality of individual price forecasts in a panel of professional forecasters. Here, unlike in most previous studies, rationality is not rejected. The results here differ because (1) using individual forecasts avoids aggregation bias, (2) comparison of forecasts to initial data avoids bias due to data revision, (3) the professional forecasters have economic incentives to state their expectations accurately, and (4) a new covariance matrix estimator consistent when forecast errors are correlated across individuals is used.

This paper develops generalized method‐of‐moments tests for the rationality of earnings per share forecasts made by individual stock analysts. We fail to reject the hypothesis of rationality as long as we take into account two complications: (1) the correlation in a given period of analysts' forecast errors in predicting earnings for firms in the same industry and (2) discretionary asset write‐downs, which affect earnings but are intentionally ignored by analysts when they make earnings forecasts. Our results challenge earlier work by De Bondt and Thaler and by Abarbanell and Bernard that found irrationality in analysts' forecasts.

This paper provides structural estimates of a dynamic model of schooling, work, and occupational choice decisions based on eleven years of observations on a sample of young men from the 1979 youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market Experience (NLSY). The authors find that a suitably extended human capital investment model can in fact do an excellent job of fitting observed data on school attendance, work, occupational choices, and wages in the NLSY data on young men and also produces reasonable forecasts of future work decisions and wage patterns.

This paper analyzes the evolution of inequality in Poland during the economic transition that began in 1989-1990. Using microdata from the Household Budget Surveys, we find that, after a brief spike in 1989, income and consumption inequality actually declined to below pretransition levels during 1990-1992 and then increased gradually, rising only moderately above pretransition levels by 1997. In sharp contrast, inequality in labor earnings increased markedly and consistently throughout the 1990-1997 period. We find that social transfer mechanisms, including pensions, played an important role in mitigating increases in both overall inequality and poverty. We argue that, from a political economy perspective, transfer mechanisms were well designed to reduce political resistance to market-oriented reforms in the early years of transition, paving the way for rapid growth. Finally, we provide cross-country evidence from the transition economies that is consistent with our interpretation of the Polish experience and is also consistent with recent work in growth theory suggesting that redistribution that reduces inequality can enhance growth.