We estimate the relation between stock option (ESO) grants to the top five executives and future earnings to examine whether incentive alignment or rent extraction by top managers explains option granting behavior. The future operating income associated with a dollar of Black-Scholes value of an ESO grant is $3.71. To understand the source of these positive payoffs, we parse out ESO grant values into components predicted by economic determinants of option grants, governance quality, and a residual grant value. The payoffs to ESOs appear to be driven predominantly by the economic determinants of option grants and not poor governance quality.

Increasing the conformity between accounting earnings and taxable income has been proposed to improve financial reporting and curtail aggressive tax planning. We find, however, that increasing conformity results in earnings that are less informative. Our inquiry exploits a unique sample of firms forced to change from the cash method to the accrual method for tax purposes, thereby increasing their book-tax conformity. We find that these firms experienced a decrease in earnings informativeness compared to control firms unaffected by the change. To our knowledge, this is the first evidence of tax law changes affecting the informativeness of accounting earnings.

Harris and Kemsley (J. Account. Res. (1999) 275) suggest that shareholder-level dividend taxes on retained earnings are fully impounded into stock prices at the top statutory rate. Harris and Kemsley base their empirical tests on Ohlson (Contemp. Account. Res. (1995) 661) with the addition of dividend taxes. We analyze Harris and Kemsley's extended Ohlson model and evidence. We show that the model, tests, and results in Harris and Kemsley are non-diagnostic regarding dividend tax capitalization.

ABSTRACT This paper develops a unified framework to synthesize the growing stream of positive research on the role of individual decision makers in shaping observed accounting phenomena. This line of research recognizes two central ideas in behavioral economics. First, individual behavior depends not only on economic incentives and accessible information but also on individual preferences, abilities, experiences, and other characteristics. Second, the constraints that structure human interactions encompass both formal institutions (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions) and informal institutions (e.g., norms, conventions, rituals). Our review covers a broad set of individuals who are of interest in accounting research: managers, directors, audit partners, analysts, standard setters, politicians, judges, journalists, loan officers, financial advisors, and investors. We aim to understand the systematic effects of individual characteristics on a wide spectrum of accounting phenomena, including financial reporting, disclosure, tax planning, auditing, and corporate social responsibility. We highlight the importance of personal characteristics not only for an individual's own behavior but also for others' perceptions. Our review mainly focuses on archival research in accounting and provides some thoughts about opportunities for archival empiricists going forward. We also, when feasible, highlight opportunities for future field, survey, and experimental research. A central takeaway from our review is that individual‐level factors significantly improve our ability to explain and predict accounting phenomena beyond firm‐, industry‐, and market‐level factors.

We compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1996–2003 with two samples of firms not accused of fraud. We measure equity incentives in a variety of ways and employ a battery of empirical tests. We find no consistent evidence that executive equity incentives are associated with fraud. These results stand in contrast to assertions by policy makers that incentives from stock-based compensation and the resulting equity holdings increase the likelihood of accounting fraud.

We survey companies and find that many use incorrect tax rate inputs into important corporate decisions. Specifically, many companies use an average tax rate (the GAAP effective tax rate, ETR) to evaluate incremental decisions, rather than using the theoretically correct marginal tax rate. We find evidence consistent with behavioral biases (heuristics, salience) and managers' educational backgrounds affecting these choices. We estimate the economic consequences of using the theoretically incorrect tax rate and find that using the ETR for capital structure decisions leads to suboptimal leverage choices and using the ETR in investment decisions makes firms less responsive to investment opportunities.

ABSTRACT We analyze survey responses from nearly 600 corporate tax executives to investigate firms' incentives and disincentives for tax planning. While many researchers hypothesize that reputational concerns affect the degree to which managers engage in tax planning, this hypothesis is difficult to test with archival data. Our survey allows us to investigate reputational influences and, indeed, we find that reputational concerns are important—69 percent of executives rate reputation as important and the factor ranks second in order of importance among all factors explaining why firms do not adopt a potential tax planning strategy. We also find that financial accounting incentives play a role. For example, 84 percent of publicly traded firms respond that top management at their company cares at least as much about the GAAP ETR as they do about cash taxes paid and 57 percent of public firms say that increasing earnings per share is an important outcome from a tax planning strategy. JEL Classifications: D83; G31, M41. Data Availability: Survey responses are confidential. Other data are available from public sources identified in the paper.