Roy’s [Roy, A., 1952. Safety first and the holding of assets. Econometrica 20 (3), 431–449] safety first criterion advocates the minimization of the probability of outcomes below a certain “disaster” level. This paper examines safety first theoretically and experimentally. We find that safety first plays a crucial role in decision-making, inducing choices that cannot be explained by, and even contradict, risk-aversion, Prospect Theory, and loss-aversion in general. Yet, safety first alone cannot explain individual choice. Therefore, we propose an expected utility – safety first (EU–SF) model where decisions are made based on a weighted average of the safety first criterion and standard expected utility maximization. We experimentally estimate these relative weights, and discuss their economic implications.

The empirically documented Pareto wealth distribution at high wealth levels implies rather extreme wealth inequality. Is this inequality primarily due to differential talent, or is it due to luck? The answer to this question has profound political, social, and philosophical implications, as well as implications regarding market efficiency. We address this question theoretically and with a unique investment experiment with equal initial endowments and real out-of-pocket money. We show that the empirically observed Pareto distribution implies that luck, rather than differential investment talent, is the main force driving inequality at high wealth levels.

The most commonly employed paradigms for decision making under risk are expected utility, prospect theory, and regret theory. We examine the simple heuristic of maximizing the probability of being ahead, which in some natural economic situations may be in contradiction to all three of the above fundamental paradigms. We test whether this heuristic, which we call probability dominance (PD), affects decisions under risk. We set up head-to-head situations where all preferences of a given class (expected utility, original or cumulative prospect theory, or regret theory) favor one alternative yet PD favors the other. Our experiments reveal that 49% of subjects' choices are aligned with PD in contradiction to any form of expected utility or prospect theory maximization; 73% are aligned with PD as opposed to preferences under risk aversion and under original and cumulative prospect theory preferences; and 68% to 76% are aligned with PD contradicting preferences under regret theory. We conclude that probability dominance substantially affects choices and should therefore be incorporated into decision-making models. We show that PD has significant economic consequences. The PD heuristic may have evolved through situations of winner-take-all competition.