We track the dividend initiation (DI) decisions from a sample of 6,588 firms that went public during the period 1979–2005 and find that 873 of them initiated dividends. Our primary objective is to determine whether information signaling can explain the DI decision. We find that variables suggested by the dividend-signaling models of John and Williams (1985) and Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) are significant determinants of the DI decision and the associated announcement-period stock price effect. We also find support for the residual, agency, tax, clientele, transaction costs, catering, and life-cycle explanations of dividend policy.

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives.

Using hand-collected data on CEO noncompete agreements (NCAs), we find that NCAs are less common when CEOs expect to incur greater personal costs from reduced job mobility and more common when firms expect to suffer greater economic harm if departing CEOs leave to work for a competitor. Additionally, turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger when CEOs have NCAs. Finally, total compensation and incentive pay are higher if CEOs have more enforceable NCAs. Our identification strategy exploits staggered state-level changes in NCA enforceability. Overall, our findings suggest that restrictions on job mobility have important implications for how CEOs are monitored and compensated.

We evaluate the link between chief executive officer (CEO) industry tournament incentives (ITIs) and the product-market benefits of corporate liquidity. We find that ITIs increase the level and marginal value of cash holdings. Furthermore, ITIs strengthen the relation between excess cash and market-share gains, especially for firms that face significant competitive threats. Additionally, for firms with excess cash, higher ITIs lead to increased research and development (R&D) expenses, capital expenditures, and spending on focused acquisitions as well as reduced payouts. Overall, our findings suggest that ITIs increase the value of cash by incentivizing CEOs to deploy cash strategically to capture its product-market benefits.

Using a product markets perspective to investigate the decision to vertically disintegrate, we find that vertical divestitures are more likely in response to positive industry demand shocks, favorable industry financing conditions, and lower parent firm relative productivity and are less likely when the potential for contracting problems is high. Conditional on vertical divestitures, equity carve-outs are more likely in environments in which relationship-specific investments are more prevalent and when the need for external funds is high, while spin-offs are more likely in larger industries and in industries that experience positive demand shocks. Our examinations of announcement-period wealth effects and changes in operating performance indicate that vertical divestitures are motivated by efficiency considerations.

We examine the effect of financial advisor reputation on wealth gains in corporate takeovers. In view of the adversarial nature of a takeover, we construct a measure of the relative reputation of the advisor. We document that the absolute wealth gain as well as the share of the total takeover wealth gain accruing to the bidder (target) increases (decreases) as the reputation of the bidder's advisor increases relative to that of the target. We also find that the total wealth created in the takeover is positively related to the reputation of bidder and target advisors. While bidder advisor reputation is positively related to the probability of bid success in our sample, we also present some evidence to suggest that bidders with better advisors are more likely to withdraw from potentially value-destroying takeovers.

We study the impact of the financial condition of firms on firms’ ability to produce safer products that result in fewer recalls. Using a variety of tests, including two quasi-natural experiments that result in exogenous negative industry cash-flow shocks, we find that firms with higher leverage or distress likelihood have a greater probability of a product recall. These firms also face more frequent and severe recalls. Further, firms with more debt due at the onset of the financial crisis experience a greater likelihood and frequency of recalls. We conclude that a firm’s financial condition has real effects that impact product safety.

This study provides insights into the forces and constraints that shape analyst research coverage along country and sector dimensions and the impact of the structure of an analyst's portfolio on forecast accuracy. We find that analyst specialization by country and sector is sensitive to the extent to which firms within a country or sector and firms across country‐sectors are exposed to common economic forces, the potential for revenue generation, and broker culture. Our tests indicate that existing research on the relation between analyst portfolio structure and forecast accuracy may suffer from an endogeneity bias. We use our analysis of analyst specialization to develop controls for this bias. Once we employ these controls, we find that country diversification is associated with superior forecast accuracy. However, the relation between sector diversification and forecast accuracy is context‐specific. Specifically, sector diversification enhances forecast accuracy in an international context, while it detracts from forecast accuracy in a domestic U.S. context.

We analyze the role of “directors from related industries” (DRIs) on a firm's board. DRIs are officers and/or directors of companies in the upstream/downstream industries of the firm. DRIs are more likely when the information gap vis-à-vis related industries is more severe or the firm has greater market power. DRIs have a significant impact on firm value/performance, especially when information problems are worse. Furthermore, DRIs help firms handle industry shocks and shorten their cash conversion cycles. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms choose DRIs when the adverse effects due to conflicts of interest are dominated by the benefits due to DRIs' information and expertise.