This study examines the association between abnormal returns and five alternative proxies for the market's assessment of unexpected quarterly earnings. We examine the role that measurement error potentially has in multiple regression tests of abnormal returns (occuring around the time of earnings announcements) on an unexpected earnings proxy and other non-earnings variables. The results indicate a potential measurement error interpretation of such multiple regression tests. We examine three procedures which reduce, to an unknown degree, the measurement error problem. Our procedures appear to be more (less) effective at reducing measurement error for small (large) firms and recent (non-recent) forecasts.

Abstract Examines how stockholders' returns of 13 of the largest American money-center and regional banks were affected by disclosures made during 1987 regarding decisions to place Brazilian loans on a nonaccrual basis and to increase loan loss reserves to recognize the higher probability of default and the lower present value of future interest and principal.

This study shows that corporate innovation efficiency (IE) as measured by patents filed or cited divided by R&D expenditures improves credit ratings, but this occurs gradually. This gradual response implies that credit rating agencies (CRAs) impose in the near term a higher borrowing cost on innovative firms than their performance and risk characteristics would justify. We predict and confirm that the gradual improvement of credit ratings in response to IE is amplified for firms with more downside risk, with more financial constraints, and with increased sales or cash flows in the years following the IE. These results suggest a predictable response of CRAs to contemporaneous IE information based on economic factors relevant to credit analysis rather than a response based on CRAs' inefficient or biased use of innovation information.

The study explores the incremental explanatory power of replacement cost earnings variables (derived from ASR 190 data) with respect to explaining cross sectional differences in security returns. As such, the study is a natural extension of previous research, including analyses of the effect of security returns of ASR 190 data at the time of disclosure, investigations of cross sectional relationships between security returns and historical cost earnings, and studies of multiple signals. The basic finding is that pre-holding gain net income provides no incremental explanatory powerm given knowledge of historical cost earnings. However, the converse does not hold. Taken together, the findings are consistent with the contention that pre-holding gain net income is a garbled version of historical cost earnings. The basic finding is robust under several extensions of the initial research design. The research design incorporates a two-stage approach which permits a determination of the incremental explanatory power of collinear variables. The findings are in contrast to those of a previous study by Easman et al. (1979). The nature of the difference in research design inducing the difference is identified. Potential reasons for the difference in findings are provided.

We examine the role of CEO social capital as an important driver of the widespread practice of real earnings management (REM). Using the number of social connections to outside executives and directors to measure CEO social capital, we first find that well-connected CEOs associate with higher levels and volatilities of REM. The positive relation between REM and CEO network size is stronger when the CEO connects with more informed and influential persons, and when a more severe misalignment of interests can occur. Second, we find a contagion of REM among well-connected CEOs in an industry. Third, the level of REM induced by a large CEO social network associates negatively with future operating performance. This result is consistent with social capital circulating REM-related information ex-ante and increasing the power and influence for the CEO to deviate from optimal operating policies ex-post. Social capital shields the well-connected executive in the takeover and labor markets despite possible suboptimal future operating performance. While the prior literature finds that CEO social capital reduces accrual earnings management, our findings suggest a dark side of CEO social capital: it induces excessive levels and volatilities of REM costly to the firm in the long run while imposing relatively low personal risk on the top executive.

Abstract Reviews the book "Corporate Financial Disclosure in the UK and the USA," by George J. Benston.

This study tests whether the information processing costs of analysts vary positively with the environmental performance information available on the firms they follow. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that these costs increase when analysts process a wider array of environmental performance ratings. Specifically we find that as the number of environmental performance ratings increases, analysts cover fewer firms in their portfolio, provide fewer earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast revisions, and make less timely forecast revisions. Two additional tests confirm that our results relate to environmental performance information and not to confounding factors. First, the “shock” of the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 implemented for California firms in 2012 increases analyst information processing costs incremental to the main effect of environmental performance ratings. Second, analyst information processing costs increase further in the year a firm covered by an analyst provides a CSR report for the first time. Our results have implications for firm managers considering voluntary environmental disclosure and investors deciding on what stocks to include in their socially responsible portfolios because when processing costs are high, analysts will provide less information or less timely information, resulting in more gradual price discovery in capital markets.