This study reports on an experiment conducted to assess the influence of different affective mood states on auditors’ ability to resist obedience pressure to commit or overlook unethical acts in six audit contexts. Obedience pressure from superiors to comply with unethical directives is of particular concern in public accounting, given the hierarchical structure of audit teams and the power imbalance in superior–subordinate relationships. One hundred and seventy audit seniors from two large international public accounting firms participated in an experiment. Three different moods were induced in participants through work‐related trigger events: one positive active mood state (arousal) and two negative passive mood states (fear and insignificance). These mood states were anticipated to influence auditors’ expressed willingness to comply with their superiors’ unethical directives as set forth in our ethical scenarios. Our results indicate that low levels of arousal and high levels of fear and insignificance influenced compliance intentions. Our results also indicate overall high levels of expressed willingness to comply with superiors’ unethical directives. Implications of our findings for understanding the antecedents of unethical conduct within the accounting profession and for future research are discussed.

This study provides evidence on how auditors' use of decision aids affects jurors' evaluation of auditor legal liability, based on an experiment in which actual jurors responded to a hypothetical audit lawsuit. The results suggest that decision aids can have positive, negative, or neutral effects on auditors' legal liability, depending on how auditors use the decision aid and the reliability of the decision aid. For high-reliability aids, jurors attributed more responsibility for an audit failure to the auditor when the auditor overrode the recommendation of a decision aid than when the auditor did not use the decision aid. However, jurors attributed lower responsibility to an auditor who relied on the recommendation of a highly reliable decision aid, even though the aid turned out to be incorrect. In contrast to the high-reliability conditions, auditors' use of the decision aid had virtually no impact on jurors' liability judgments when the reliability of the decision aid was low.