In this article, we show that firms can become conservative in innovation when their directors face job insecurity. We find that after the staggered enactment of majority voting legislation that strengthens shareholders’ power in director elections, firms produce fewer patents, particularly exploratory patents, and fewer forward citations. This effect is stronger for directors facing higher dismissal costs or threats and for firms with greater needs for board expertise and is mitigated by institutional investors’ expertise in innovation. Overall, our results suggest that heightened job insecurity induces director myopia, which leads to a reduction in investment in risky, long-term innovation projects.

Motivated by a theoretical model, we examine for 43 countries whether it is policy or policy uncertainty that affects technological innovation more. Innovation activities, measured by patent-based proxies, are not, on average, affected by which policy is in place. Innovation activities, however, drop significantly during times of policy uncertainty measured by national elections. The drop is greater for more influential innovations (citations in the right tail, exploratory rather than exploitative innovations) and for innovation-intensive industries. We use close presidential elections and ethnic fractionalization to address endogeneity concerns. We uncover the mechanism underlying the main result by showing that the number of patenting inventors decreases with policy uncertainty. Political compromise, we conclude, encourages innovation.

The 2008 Apex Oil court decision reduced the circumstances under which specific environmental cleanup obligations were dischargeable in Chapter 11, potentially affecting the securities prices, credit conditions, and pollution practices of corporations not in Chapter 11. We discover that among financially stressed firms with those specific environmental liabilities, bond and stock prices dropped after Apex. Moreover, those firms (1) experienced a tightening of credit conditions (e.g., paying higher risk premia on debts and receiving lower bond ratings), (2) intensified pollution prevention activities, and (3) reduced the emissions of pollutants causing environmental damages no longer dischargeable in Chapter 11. These findings hold among firms nationwide, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit court, which issued the Apex decision, suggesting that Apex had a nationwide impact.

Using a series of advanced tests from White's (2000) “Reality Check” to correct for data-snooping bias, we assess the out-of-sample performance of various portfolio strategies relative to the naive 1/N rule. When we analyze 16 basic portfolio strategies, 126 learning strategies, and nearly 2,000 extended strategies, we find that some strategies outperform the 1/N rule in conventional tests that do not account for data-snooping bias. However, after we use the new tests that control for such bias, we find that none or very few of these strategies outperform the 1/N rule. Thus, our finding underscores the necessity to control for data-snooping bias when making asset allocation decisions.

Firms with higher R&D intensity subsequently experience higher stock returns in international stock markets, highlighting the role of intangible investments in international asset pricing. The R&D effect is stronger in countries where growth option risk is more likely priced, but is unrelated to country characteristics representing market sentiments and limits-of-arbitrage. Moreover, we find that R&D intensity is associated with higher future operating performance, return volatility, and default likelihood. Our evidence suggests that the cross sectional relation between R&D intensity and stock returns is more likely attributable to risk premium than to mispricing.

This paper investigates the effect that employee treatment schemes have on corporate innovation performance. We find that firms with better employee treatment schemes produce more and better patents through improving employee satisfaction and teamwork. Additional tests suggest that our main findings cannot be attributed to job security, unionization, reverse causality, and omitted variables. We also find that firms with better employee treatment schemes produce patents that enhance market valuation and facilitate better future operating performance. Collectively, our findings show that treating employees well benefits firms and shareholders, for well treated employees are encouraged to create intellectual property.

Using a new trademark-based product market competition measure and a novel trademark-merger data set over the period 1983–2016, we show that companies facing greater product market competition are more likely to be acquirers. We further show that postmerger, compared to their nonacquiring peers, acquirers consolidate their product offerings by discontinuing more existing product lines and developing fewer new product lines. Using a quasi-experiment based on bids withdrawn due to exogenous reasons helps us establish the causal effect of deal completion on product-market consolidation. We conclude that acquisitions create product market synergies by cutting overlapping product offerings to achieve cost efficiency.

Firms can become less innovative following a sudden cash “inflow.” Specifically, multinational firms that were eligible to repatriate (and indeed repatriated) cash to the United States under the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) generate less valuable patents than otherwise similar firms. They also explore more. This effect only exists among firms in less competitive industries, firms with lower institutional ownership (IO), and firms with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs); this effect is mainly driven by the reduction in the value of U.S.-originated patents. Our evidence suggests that, without appropriate governance, a cash windfall may lead managers to engage in riskier innovation strategy, which can destroy value.

We identify a positive causal effect of healthy working environments on corporate innovation, using the staggered passage of U.S. state-level laws that ban smoking in workplaces. We find a significant increase in patents and patent citations for firms headquartered in states that have adopted such laws relative to firms headquartered in states without such laws. The increase is more pronounced for firms in states with stronger enforcement of such laws and in states with weaker preexisting tobacco controls. We present suggestive evidence that smoke-free laws affect innovation by improving inventor health and productivity and by attracting more productive inventors.

We propose firm-level innovation performance to be an important determinant of corporate creditworthiness and examine this relation from the perspective of bond investors. We find that firms' default probabilities are negatively related to the quantity, impact, originality, and generality of their patent portfolios. Moreover, bonds issued by more innovative firms have lower issuance premiums and lower realized excess returns. Our findings are further supported by instrumental regressions that use monetary and time costs of innovation, and by difference-in-differences tests based on exogenous shocks from state-level R&D tax credits.