We determine the optimal lifecycle purchasing strategy for deferred income annuities (DIAs)—which are distinct from single-premium income annuities (SPIAs)—for an individual who wishes to maximize the expected utility of his/her annuity income at a fixed time in the future. In contrast to the vast portfolio-choice literature for SPIAs, we focus on the stochasticity of the DIA’s payout yield and address concerns that rates are currently “too low” to justify irreversible annuitization. We assume a mean-reverting model for payout yields and show that a risk-neutral consumer who wishes to maximize his/her expected retirement income should wait until yields reach a threshold—which lies above historical averages—and then purchase the DIA in one lump sum. In contrast, a risk-averse consumer who is concerned the payout yield will remain below average for an extended period and worries about losing mortality credits while waiting, should employ a barrier purchasing strategy, as in the portfolio choice problem under transaction costs. We illustrate how this insight is applied in the context of annuitization. In fact, the optimal behavior of a risk-averse consumer resembles an asymmetric dollar-cost averaging strategy, with a portion of the DIA-budget spent even while payout rates are below historical averages. As part of our analysis we offer an easy-to-use asymptotic approximation for the optimal purchasing strategy (threshold) and provide some numerical examples to illustrate the concept.

We find that higher stock lending fees predict significantly lower future returns after controlling for shorting demand for US stocks during the period 2007–10. These results suggest that active institutional investors on the supply side play an important role in the return predictability of fees and they not only respond to demand but also price in additional information around earnings news announcements. Overall, we find evidence that stock lenders are informed and, together with short sellers, contribute to the price discovery process.

Average stock returns for North America, Europe, and Asia Pacific increase with the book-to-market ratio (B/M) and profitability and are negatively related to investment. For Japan, the relation between average returns and B/M is strong, but average returns show little relation to profitability or investment. A five-factor model that adds profitability and investment factors to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) largely absorbs the patterns in average returns. As in Fama and French, 2015, Fama and French, 2016, the model's prime problem is failure to capture fully the low average returns of small stocks whose returns behave like those of low profitability firms that invest aggressively.

We examine how banks use loan sales to manage liquidity during periods of marketwide stress and the associated spillovers to market prices. We track the dynamics of loan share ownership in the secondary market using data from a U. S. supervisory register of syndicated loans. Controlling for loan quality using loan-year fixed effects, we find that banks reliant on wholesale funding were more likely to exit syndicates through sales during 2007/08. This effect is stronger for banks dependent on short-term funding and holding fewer liquid securities. In addition, secondary market prices decrease significantly more for loans funded by liquidity-strained banks.

We examine how banks use loan sales to manage liquidity during periods of marketwide stress and the associated spillovers to market prices. We track the dynamics of loan share ownership in the secondary market using data from a U.S. supervisory register of syndicated loans. Controlling for loan quality using loan-year fixed effects, we find that banks reliant on wholesale funding were more likely to exit syndicates through sales during 2007/08. This effect is stronger for banks dependent on short-term funding and holding fewer liquid securities. In addition, secondary market prices decrease significantly more for loans funded by liquidity-strained banks. Received November 16, 2015; editorial decision January 9, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

Our analysis of how banks’ responses to asset price changes can result in procyclical leverage reveals that, for banks with a binding regulatory leverage constraint, absent differences in regulatory risk weights across assets, procyclical leverage does not occur. For banks without a binding constraint, fair value and bank regulation both can contribute to procyclical leverage. Empirical findings based on a large sample of U.S. commercial banks reveal that bank regulation explains procyclical leverage for banks relatively close to the regulatory leverage constraint and contributes to procyclical leverage for those that are not. We also show that fair value accounting does not contribute to procyclical leverage.

We study data from an organization in which fund managers privately share and discuss detailed investment recommendations. Buy recommendations generate positive abnormal returns, and sell recommendations result in negative abnormal returns. In the context of these results, we explore an important economic question: Why do skilled investors share profitable ideas with others? Evidence suggests that the managers in our sample share to receive feedback on their ideas and to attract additional arbitrageur capital to the securities they recommend in order to correct mispricings.