ABSTRACT Using the transition of U.S. firms from annual reporting to semi-annual reporting and then to quarterly reporting over the period 1950–1970, we provide evidence on the effects of increased reporting frequency on firms' investment decisions. Estimates from difference-in-differences specifications indicate that increased reporting frequency is associated with an economically large decline in investments. Additional analyses reveal that the decline in investments is most consistent with frequent financial reporting inducing myopic management behavior. Our evidence informs the recent controversial debate about eliminating quarterly reporting for U.S. corporations. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; G30; G31.

ABSTRACT Liquidity transformation, a key role of banks, is thought to increase fragility, as uninsured depositors face an incentive to withdraw money before others (a so‐called panic run). Despite much theoretical work, however, there is little empirical evidence establishing this mechanism. In this paper, we provide the first large‐scale evidence of this mechanism. Banks that engage in more liquidity transformation exhibit higher fragility, as captured by stronger sensitivities of uninsured deposit flows to bank performance and greater levels of uninsured deposit outflows when performance is poor. We also explore the effects of deposit insurance and systemic risk.