ABSTRACT We investigate how the availability of traded credit default swaps (CDSs) affects the referenced firms’ voluntary disclosure choices. CDSs enable lenders to hedge their credit risk exposure, weakening their incentives to monitor borrowers. We predict that reduced lender monitoring in turn leads shareholders to intensify their monitoring and demand increased voluntary disclosure from managers. Consistent with this expectation, we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and forecast more frequently when traded CDSs reference their firms. We further find a stronger impact of CDS availability on firm disclosure when (1) lenders have higher ability and propensity to hedge credit risk using CDSs, and (2) lender monitoring incentives and monitoring strength are weaker. Consistent with an increase in shareholder demand for public information disclosure induced by a reduction in lender monitoring, we find a stronger effect of CDSs on voluntary disclosure for firms with higher institutional ownership and stronger corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that firms with traded CDS contracts enhance their voluntary disclosure to offset the effect of reduced monitoring by CDS‐protected lenders.

We explore whether cognitive constraints and behavioral biases impede the processing and interpretation of soft information in private lending. Using data from a credit union's internal reporting system, we delineate three constraints and biases likely to affect lending decisions: limited attention, task-specific human capital and common identity. We find that soft information leads to worse loan quality when loan officers are busy or before weekends and around national holidays; when they have prior sales experience; and when both the officers and borrowers are men. We provide evidence of non-agency-related costs in the use of soft information in lending decisions.

We explore whether the introduction of transparent reporting rules increases credit standard harmonization within a bank. We exploit the new loan-level reporting rules imposed on banks that borrow from the European Central Bank using repurchase agreements collateralized by their asset-backed securities. We compare credit terms of similar mortgages issued by a bank across a country's regions and find that harmonization increases following the adoption of the new reporting rules. Learning and regulatory scrutiny constitute mechanisms underlying this economic effect. We also show that harmonization leads to more favorable lending terms to borrowers and higher loan quality for banks. Overall, these findings suggest that transparent reporting rules incentivize banks to improve their internal decision-making and thereby reduce regional divergence in their credit standards.

We examine the role of dynamic covenant threshold values in syndicated loan agreements. We document that 45% of syndicated loans specify dynamic covenant thresholds in earnings-based covenants and that these changing thresholds typically become tighter over the life of a loan. We find that covenants with a tight trend provide an important signaling mechanism that meets the needs of borrowers that experience an inferior financial performance at loan initiation but expect future performance improvements. Specifically, we find that these covenants provide underperforming borrowers with a grace period by requiring less restrictive initial thresholds. At the same time, they allow these borrowers to credibly convey information to lenders about their future prospects via gradually more demanding subsequent thresholds. Our empirical evidence also suggests that while lenders entering into tight threshold trend covenant contracts receive weaker covenant protection over the grace period, they benefit from having stronger control rights in subsequent periods.

We investigate whether a borrower's media coverage influences the syndicated loan origination and participation decisions of informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures, and interest spreads. In syndicated loan deals, information asymmetries can exist between lenders that have a relationship with a borrower and less informed, nonrelationship lenders competing to serve as lead arranger on a syndicated loan, and also between lead arrangers and less informed syndicate participants. Theory suggests that the aggressiveness with which less informed lenders compete for a loan deal increases in the sentiment of public information signals about a borrower. We extend this theory to syndicated loans and hypothesize that the likelihood of less informed lenders serving as the lead arranger or joining a loan syndicate is increasing in the sentiment of media-initiated, borrower-specific articles published prior to loan origination. We find that as media sentiment increases (1) outside, nonrelationship lenders have a higher probability of originating loans; (2) syndicate participants are less likely to have a previous relationship with the borrower or lead bank; (3) lead banks retain a lower percentage of loans; and (4) loan spreads decrease.

A few highly successful firms (“superstar firms”) have captured large market shares and earned massive profits in recent decades. We examine whether superstar firms are associated with a greater likelihood of financial distress for firms exposed to them in product markets. Building on recent research, we identify superstars as firms with the highest markups in the industry and whose industry markup share increases over time. We then measure, with product similarity scores, a firm’s overall product market exposure to superstars. We document that firms with greater exposure are more likely to file for bankruptcy. We examine why superstar exposure is associated with bankruptcy and show that firms with the greater superstar exposure exhibit weaker financial performance and greater riskiness. Furthermore, we show that the association between superstar exposure and the likelihood of bankruptcy strengthens when superstars have greater market power.

We document a novel trend in syndicated lending where some participants voluntarily waive their rights to borrowers' private information. We posit that “public-side” lending emerged to facilitate broad lender participation in the syndicated loan market by mitigating concerns about the leakage of borrowers' private information into public securities markets. In line with this proposition, we find that public-side lending facilitates the loan market participation of lenders for which maintaining robust information barriers is particularly costly. Furthermore, while public-side lending increases within-syndicate information asymmetry, our findings indicate that it does not materially increase interest spreads and is associated with lower coordination costs among syndicate participants. Collectively, we document how debt contracting practices evolved to address frictions associated with the protection of borrowers’ private information and the related changes in loan contracting equilibria.

ABSTRACT We investigate how the tone of sell-side debt analysts' discussions about debt-equity conflict events affects the informativeness of debt analysts' reports in debt markets. Conflict events such as mergers and acquisitions, debt issuance, share repurchases, or dividend payments potentially generate asset substitution or wealth expropriation by equity holders. We document that debt analysts routinely discuss these conflict events in their reports. More importantly, discussions about conflict events that we code as negative are associated with increases in credit spreads and bond trading volume. Consistent with the informational value of debt analysts' discussions in secondary debt markets, we find that negatively coded conflict discussions predict higher bond offering yields in the primary bond market. In additional analyses, we measure the tone of debt analysts' discussions based on their disagreement with the tone of equity analysts' discussions and find that the informativeness of debt analysts' reports is higher when our coding indicates that conflict events are viewed negatively by debt analysts but positively by equity analysts. JEL Classifications: G12, G14, G32, M49.