Following surprise independent director departures, affected firms have worse stock and operating performance, are more likely to restate earnings, face shareholder litigation, suffer from an extreme negative return event, and make worse mergers and acquisitions. The announcement returns to surprise director departures are negative, suggesting that the market infers bad news from surprise departures. We use exogenous variation in independent director departures triggered by director deaths to test whether surprise independent director departures cause these negative outcomes or whether an anticipation of negative outcomes is responsible for the surprise director departure. Our evidence is more consistent with the latter.

From 1998 to 2011, U.S. firms held more cash on average (but not at the median) than similar foreign firms (foreign twins) did. The average difference in cash holdings does not increase after 2008, and it is driven by highly R&D-intensive U.S. firms. Because there are almost no similarly R&D-intensive foreign firms, mean comparisons involving these U.S. firms are not reliable. Without these U.S. firms, neither U.S. multinational firms nor purely domestic U.S. firms hold more cash than their foreign twins do. Country characteristics have negligible explanatory power for differences in cash holdings between U.S. firms and their foreign twins.

We provide estimates of holdings of highly rated securitization tranches of U.S. bank holding companies before the credit crisis and evaluate hypotheses that have been advanced to explain them. Whereas holdings exceeded Tier 1 capital for some large banks, they were economically trivial for the typical bank. Banks with high holdings were not riskier before the crisis using conventional measures, but they performed poorly during the crisis. We find that holdings of highly rated tranches were correlated with a bank's securitization activity. Theories unrelated to the securitization activity, such as "bad incentives" or "bad risk management," are not supported in the data.

This article explores the fundamental factors that affect cross-country stock return correlations. Using transactions data from 1988 to 1992, the authors construct overnight and intraday returns for a portfolio of Japanese stocks using their NYSE-traded American depository receipts and a matched-sample portfolio of U.S. stocks. They find that U.S. macroeconomic announcements, shocks to the yen/dollar foreign exchange rate and Treasury bill returns, and industry effects have no measurable influence on U.S. and Japanese return correlations. However, large shocks to broad-based market indices (Nikkei Stock Average and Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Index) positively impact both the magnitude and persistence of the return correlations.

Data-driven lending relies on the calibration of models using training periods. We find that this type of lending is not resilient in the presence of economic conditions that are materially different from those experienced during the training period. Using data from a small business fintech lending platform, we document that the small business credit supply collapsed during the COVID-19 crisis of March 2020 even though the demand for loans doubled relative to pre-pandemic levels. As the month progressed, most lenders significantly reduced or halted their lending activities, likely due to the heightened risk of model miscalibration under the new economic conditions.

We investigate why only some banks use regulatory arbitrage. We predict that banks wanting to be riskier than allowed by capital regulations (constrained banks) use regulatory arbitrage, while others do not. We find support for this hypothesis using trust-preferred securities issuance, a form of regulatory arbitrage available to almost all U.S. banks from 1996 to Dodd-Frank. We also find support for predictions that constrained banks are riskier, perform worse during the crisis, and use multiple forms of regulatory arbitrage. We show that neither too-big-to-fail incentives nor misaligned managerial incentives are first-order determinants of this type of regulatory arbitrage.

[This article investigates the dynamic relation between market-wide trading activity and returns in 46 markets. Many stock markets exhibit a strong positive relation between turnover and past returns. These findings stand up in the face of various controls for volatility, alternative definitions of turnover, differing sample periods, and are present at both the weekly and daily frequency. The relation is more statistically and economically significant in countries with high levels of corruption, with short-sale restrictions, and in which market volatility is high.]

We investigate whether domestic investors have an edge over foreign investors in trading domestic stocks. Using Korean data, we show that foreign money managers pay more than domestic money managers when they buy and receive less when they sell for medium and large trades. The sample average daily trade-weighted disadvantage of foreign money managers is 21 basis points for purchases and 16 basis points for sales. There is also some evidence that domestic individual investors have an edge over foreign investors. The explanation for these results is that prices move more against foreign investors than against domestic investors before trades.

Despite the dramatic reduction in explicit barriers to international investment activity over the last 60 years, the impact of financial globalization has been surprisingly limited. I argue that country attributes are still critical to financial decision‐making because of “twin agency problems” that arise because rulers of sovereign states and corporate insiders pursue their own interests at the expense of outside investors. When these twin agency problems are significant, diffuse ownership is inefficient and corporate insiders must co‐invest with other investors, retaining substantial equity. The resulting ownership concentration limits economic growth, financial development, and the ability of a country to take advantage of financial globalization.