Paul H. Malatesta, Rex Thompson, Government Regulation and Structural Change in the Corporate Acquisitions Market: The Impact of the Williams Act, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), pp. 363-379

This paper presents a model of stock price reactions to partially anticipated events. The model formalizes the intuition that stock price reactions reflect both the economic importance of events and the extent to which events are surprises. Unbiased estimates of the economic importance of partially anticipated events must combine stock price reactions to events with stock price movements in periods when no event occurs. The model is used to estimate the value of acquisition attempts made by frequently acquiring firms. For a sample of thirty active acquirers, the evidence indicates that acquisition attempts were profitable investment projects.

This paper tests the hypothesis that the expected return premium on the market portfolio is always non-negative. A violation of this lower bound restriction provides evidence against a broad class of risk-based equilibrium models in favor of bubble behavior. Our tests utilize information variables, identified in prior literature, that predict time variation in market return premia. We employ out-of-sample forecasts and bootstraps generated with parameters that are consistent with non-negativity but closest to the estimated parameters. We find statistically reliable evidence against non-negativity for the excess return on the value-weighted market index. The most negative out-of-sample prediction was −2.01% in September 1973.

Abstract. This study examines the volume of trading in the stock of 34 Canadian companies that initiated a policy of regular cash dividends during the period 1972–1982. Using a time‐series methodology linked to changes in Canadian tax legislation, we test whether the volume of trading surrounding first‐time dividend adoptions declined after 1978, a year when tax legislation changed the taxation of dividends toward tax neutrality for investors in high tax brackets. We observe a significant trading volume decline after 1978, which we interpret as implying that fewer investors wanted to dispose of initial dividend stocks after 1978. The result is inconsistent with dividend irrelevance theories and possibly points to tax clientele relevance in Canada. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent le volume de titres négociés pour 34 sociétés canadiennes ayant mis en place une politique de versement périodique de dividendes en espèces durant la période 1972–1982. À l'aide d'une méthodologie de séries chronologiques liée aux changements apportés à la législation fiscale canadienne, les auteurs vérifient si le volume des titres négociés dans le contexte de l'adoption initiale de cette politique de dividendes a décliné après 1978, année au cours de laquelle le fisc a modifié l'imposition des dividendes pour pencher vers la neutralité fiscale pour les investisseurs appartenant aux tranches d'impôt élevées. Ils observent un déclin appréciable du volume de titres négociés après 1978, déclin qui suppose, selon eux, qu'un moins grand nombre d'investisseurs ont voulu se défaire de telles actions après 1978. Ce résultat s'oppose aux théories de la non‐pertinence du dividende et pourrait indiquer la pertinence de la «clientèle fiscale» au Canada.

ABSTRACT We examine empirical implications of models of differential information that formalize the following intuition: securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions. The implication that beta risk for low information firms should decline as information increases is confirmed with several data sets. We find such a decline over the first several periods subsequent to initial public offerings and initial listings. There is also an abrupt risk decline at the first annual earnings announcement.

The authors examine empirical implications of models of differential information that formalize the following intuition: securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions. The implication that beta risk for low information firms should decline as information increases is confirmed with several data sets. The authors find such a decline over the first several periods subsequent to initial public offerings and initial listings. There is also an abrupt risk decline at the first annual earnings announcement.

Abstract In October 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in an effort to reduce selective disclosure of material information by firms to analysts and other investment professionals. We find that the information asymmetry reflected in trading costs at earnings announcements has declined after Regulation FD, with the decrease more pronounced for smaller and less liquid stocks. Return volatility around mandatory announcements is also lower but overall information flow is unchanged when mandatory and voluntary announcements are combined. Thus, the SEC appears to have diminished the advantage of informed investors, without increasing volatility.

We investigate the implication of clientele theories that changes in dividend policy should result in a marked increase in trading volume as shareholder clienteles change. With 192 firms announcing their first cash dividend we document both an increase in trading volume and firm value around the announcement date. We integrate these results to distinguish between the volume response to good news about the future and clientele adjustments to a change in dividend policy. Our results suggest that volume increases primarily in response to the signal about future earnings contained in the dividend. Clientele adjustments are small.

Methodology, Exact distributions of test statistics

Business combinations, Regulatory changes, Net benefits of estimated future acquisition activity, Regulation