AN important question in contemporary 1AILeconomics is whether or not the real wage clears the labor market. Its answer has bearing on issues as diverse as the nature of unemployment, the efficacy of fiscal and monetary policies, and the incidence of income taxes. Unfortunately, consensus as to the correct answer seems to be lacking. While much of modern macroeconomic theory allows for the possibility that the real wage fails to equate the supply and demand of labor (Barro and Grossman, 1971; Korliras, 1975), much analysis is based on the assumption of equilibrium in the labor market (Patinkin, 1965). The purpose of the present paper is to carry out an econometric test for which view of the labor market is more appropriate. Although the model we build is very aggregative and much too crude to be used as a basis for policy, we believe that it provides a first step in making operational the theoretical literature on disequilibrium macro models. Our tentative conclusion is that the hypothesis of a labor market in continuous equilibrium must be rejected. In section II we describe briefly some earlier work on modelling the aggregate supply and demand for labor. It is shown that prior studies either assume equilibrium in the labor market, or deal with disequilibrium inadequately. In section III we specify the disequilibrium model. Section IV contains a discussion of estimation problems, an interpretation of the results, and a comparison with an equilibrium version of the model. A concluding section has a summary and an agenda for future research. II. Antecedents

Легко прийти к поспешному заключению, что широко распространенное использование эмпирических методов является наглядным признаком пренебрежения мастерством, проявляемого менеджерами. В этой статье авторы, наоборот, доказывают, что эмпирические методы стоят в ряду наиболее эффективных средств для принятия оптимального решения. Они исследуют, как могут строиться и оцениваться хорошие эмпирические методы. В статье приводится также иллюстративное применение анализа. Метод моделирования используется для определения относящихся к делу свойств ряда альтернативных оценочных эмпирических методов и для сравнения их характеристик как руководящих принципов для принятия решений в однопродуктовой монополистической фирме.

The planned level of output is an important variable in modelling Centrally Planned Economies and the present paper discusses several disequilibrium models in which the plan level is an endogenous variable. A key relationship in such a model is the plan-adjustment equation which is the counterpart of the usual price-adjustment equation employed in models of free economies. Seemingly minor differences in assumptions lead to markedly different econometric models. The coherency properties of these are studied and several likelihood functions are derived. The most complex of the models includes both endogenous plan levels and endogenous prices.

THE Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), a government regulatory agency for member Savings and Loan Associations (SLA), provides advance loans (advances) to members. Advances are considered a major policy tool for the FHLBB in stabilizing deposit, mortgage, and housing markets. Indeed, the FHLBB has characterized advances as providing 'a central credit resource, capable of expanding and contracting to meet the needs of its member institutions for housing credit.' Debt issues in the government agency capital market are the primary source for FHLBB funds.2 The quantity of advances outstanding has grown from $5.3 billion at year-end 1968 to $32.7 billion at year-end 1978, and with considerable variation in between. A key issue in evaluating the role of advances has been whether or not the FHLBB uses nonprice rationing in allocating advance loans. Without nonprice rationing, the FHLBB sets the interest charge for the advances and member SLAs determine the quantity of loans they wish to borrow. In this case, an appraisal of FHLBB policy is relatively straightforward and can be based on the level of the advances rate. With nonprice rationing, in contrast, an appraisal of FHLBB policy is more complicated because the unobserved availability of advances must also be considered. The relevance of this issue is underscored by a recent report of the existence of nonprice rationing.3 Existing econometric models of the advances market treat the question of nonprice rationing in different ways. Hendershott (1977) has the quantity of advances determined by SLA demand without regard to interest rates, so there is neither price nor nonprice rationing. As a consequence, advances policy is viewed as purely passive. Kearl and Rosen (197-4) have the quantity of advances determined by a FHLBB reaction function, again with no role for interest rates, so they have a pure nonprice rationing system. In the MPS model (see Gramlich and Jaffee (1972)) both the quantity and interest rate for advances are set exogenously by the FHLBB, which then implies a combination of interest rate and nonprice rationing. Finally, Silber (1973), in the most sophisticated of the studies, has two versions, one with interest rate and one with nonprice rationing. The version with interest rate clearing has a FHLBB reaction function determining the interest rate and an SLA demand function determining the quantity. The version with nonprice rationing has the FHLBB determine the quantity of advances and no equation for the interest rate, in much the same spirit as Kearl and Rosen. The treatment of rationing in these models is not satisfactory. First, the models specify a priori the presence or absence of rationing, but without providing a test of the hypothesis that rationing takes place. Second, among the rationing models, the specifications are deficient in assuming either that only rationing occurs (Kearl and Rosen, and Silber) or that price and nonprice rationing always occur together (the MPS model). In this paper we develop a model based on optimizing behavior on the part of the FHLBB. Whether market clearing or nonprice rationing behavior obtains in a given time period depends on both economic conditions and the nature of the FHLBB's objective function. As a polar case, the general model collapses into an ordinary market clearing simultaneous equation model and we are able to offer statistical evidence as to which model is to be preferred. In section II.A we develop a market clearing model and in II. B a rationing model. A geometric interpretation is given in section II.C. Section III provides the empirical specification for impleReceived for publication November 6, 1978. Revision accepted for publication July 12, 1979. * We are indebted to NSF Grant SOC77-07680 and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for support, to Naoyaki Yoshino for helpful comments, and to David Romer for expert research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Econometric Society Meetings, Vienna, September 1977. 1 FHLBB Journal, April 1972, p. 24. 2 See Jaffee (1976) for a recent survey of FHLBB structure and policies. 3 Wall Street Journal, May 4, 1979, p. 18.

Journal Article Walras, Leontief, and the Interdependence of Economic Activities: Comment Get access James M. Henderson, James M. Henderson Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Richard E. Quandt Richard E. Quandt Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 69, Issue 4, November 1955, Pages 626–631, https://doi.org/10.2307/1881999 Published: 01 November 1955

Horse racing data permit interesting tests of attitudes toward risk. The present paper studies a new sample of racetrack results from Atlantic City, New Jersey. The questions examined are: (1) Are the market odds the best data for predicting the order of finish? (2) Do horses go off at odds that reflect their true probability of winning? (3) Is there any evidence that late bettors have better information than early bettors? It is found that market odds predict the order of finish well, but that ‘favorites’ are good bets and ‘long shots’ are poor ones. The data suggest that there does exist an ‘informed’ class of bettors and that bettors are on the whole neither risk neutral nor risk averse.