This paper measures the effects on stock proces of corporate investments in 5% or more of another company's equity securities. Such investments initiate a process that may end with a takeover, targeted repurchase, takeover by a third party, or sale of the shares. The total valuation effect of the investment for acquiring and target firms includes returns at disclosure of the investment position, the outcome announcement, and related intervening events. For example, the positive return for target firms at initial disclosure of the investment more than offsets the negative return at a targeted repurchase.

This article compares the market value of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) to the discounted value of their corresponding cash flow forecasts. For our sample of 51 HLTs completed between 1983 and 1989, the valuations of discounted cash flow forecasts are within 10 percent, on average, of the market values of the completed transactions. Our valuations perform at least as well as valuation methods using comparable companies and transactions. We also invert our analysis by estimating the risk premia implied by transaction values and forecast cash flows, and relating those risk premia to firm and industry betas, firm size, and firm book-to-market ratios.

ABSTRACT This article compares the market value of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) to the discounted value of their corresponding cash flow forecasts. For our sample of 51 HLTs completed between 1983 and 1989, the valuations of discounted cash flow forecasts are within 10 percent, on average, of the market values of the completed transactions. Our valuations perform at least as well as valuation methods using comparable companies and transactions. We also invert our analysis by estimating the risk premia implied by transaction values and forecast cash flows, and relating those risk premia to firm and industry betas, firm size, and firm book‐to‐market ratios.

This article compares the market value of highly leveraged transactions to the discounted value of their corresponding cash flow forecasts. For the authors' sample of 51 highly leveraged transactions completed between 1983 and 1989, the valuations of discounted cash flow forecasts are within 10 percent on average of the market values of the completed transactions. Their valuations perform at least as well as valuation methods using comparable companies and transactions. The authors also invert their analysis by estimating the risk premia implied by transaction values and forecast cash flows and relating those risk premia to firm and industry betas, firm size, and firm book-to-market ratios.

This paper examines the effect of unionization on the profitability of firms. Abnormal monthly common stock returns for a sample of 253 NYSE-listed firms are estimated for the month in which the union petitions for an election and for the month in which the National Labor Relations Board certifies the election outcome. The results suggest that unionization, on average, is associated with a reduction in equity value. When unions win an election, the average loss associated with the unionization drive is 3.8 percent of equity value. When unions lose an election, there is an average net reduction of 1.3 percent in the equity value of the firm.

This paper examines the effect of unionization on the profitability of firms. Abnormal monthly common stock returns for a sample of 253 NYSE-listed firms are estimated for the month in which the union petitions for an election and for the month in which the National Labor Relations Board certifies the election outcome. The results suggest that unionization, on average, is associated with a reduction in equity value. When unions win an election, the average loss associated with the unionization drive is 3.8 percent of equity value. When unions lose an election, there is an average net reduction of 1.3 percent in the equity value of the firm.

This study compares the market value of firms that reorganize in bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management's published cash flow projections. We estimate firm values using models that have been shown in other contexts to generate relatively precise estimates of value. We find that these methods generally yield unbiased estimates of value, but the dispersion of valuation errors is very wide-the sample ratio of estimated value to market value varies from less than 20% to greater than 250%. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that the variation in these errors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders' incentives to overstate or understate the firm's value.

This paper reviews much of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control. The evidence indicates that corporate takeovers generate positive gains, that target firm shareholders benefit, and that bidding firm shareholders do not lose. The gains created by corporate takeovers do not appear to come from the creation of market power. With the exception of actions that exclude potential bidders, it is difficult to find managerial actions related to corporate control that harm shareholders. Finally, we argue the market for corporate control is best viewed as an arena in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources.

This paper examines the effects of unexpected inflation on the returns to the common stock of companies with different short-term monetary positions, and different long-term monetary positions, and different amounts of nominal tax shields. Unlike most previous studies of the effects of nominal contracting, we distinguish between expected and unexpected inflation in our tests. Surprisingly, over the 1947-79 period there is little evidence that stockholders of net debtor firms benefit from unexpected inflation relative to the stockholders of net creditor firms. We conclude that wealth effects caused by unexpected inflation are not an important factor in explaining the behavior of stock prices.