This paper examines the effects of stock splits on bid‐ask spreads for NYSE‐listed companies. Percentage spreads increase after splits, representing a liquidity cost to investors. These spread increases are directly related to decreases in share prices following splits and can explain part, but not all, of the observed increase in return variability after splits. The evidence thus suggests a liquidity cost of stock splits that must be weighed against any other perceived benefits of splits. Such a liquidity cost may validate that stock splits are a signal of favorable information about the firm.

This paper examines the effects of stock splits on bid-ask spreads for NYSE-listed companies. Percentage spreads increase after splits, representing a liquidity cost to investors. These spread increases are directly related to decreases in share prices following splits and can explain part, but not all, of the observed increase in return variability after splits. The evidence, thus, suggests a liquidity cost of stock splits that must be weighed against any other perceived benefits of splits. Such a liquidity cost may validate that stock splits are a signal of favorable information about the firm.

This study of financing decisions by U.S. corporations examines the issuance of long term debt, issuance of short term debt, maintenance of corporate liquidity, issuance of new equity, and payment of dividends. Given costs and imperfections inherent in markets, a firm's financial behavior is characterized as partial adjustment to long run financial targets. Individual firm data are used so that speeds of adjustment are allowed to vary by company and over time. The results suggest that financial decisions are interdependent and that firm size, interest rate conditions, and stock price levels affect speeds of adjustment.

This study of financing decisions by U.S. corporations examines the issuance of long term debt, issuance of short term debt, maintenance of corporate liquidity, issuance of new equity, and payment of dividends. Given costs and imperfections inherent in markets, a firm's financial behavior is characterized as partial adjustment to long run financial targets. Individual firm data are used so that speeds of adjustment are allowed to vary by company and over time. The results suggest that financial decisions are interdependent and that firm size, interest rate conditions, and stock price levels affect speeds of adjustment.

This paper presents new evidence on performance persistence for U.S. private equity (buyout and venture capital) funds. We use high quality cash-flow data from Burgiss's large sample of institutional investors (as of December 2020) which allows us to examine how persistence has changed over more than three decades of fundraising. Venture capital (VC) performance remains remarkably persistent across funds raised by the same general partner (GP). In contrast, buyout funds' performance persistence becomes noticeably weaker over time. The patterns are different when we restrict the analysis to information that would have been available to investors – interim performance on the previous fund at the time a new fund is raised – rather than using final, or latest, performance. We find little evidence of persistence for buyouts, especially post-2000. We continue to find persistence for VC funds though it declines post-2000. The differences are driven by interim performance reported at the time of fundraising being only moderately correlated to final performance and GPs avoiding fundraising when interim performance is poor. Finally, we look at GPs who introduce new fund styles and find that performance is noticeably lower for buyouts (but not VC). Exploring the reasons for these divergent trends in persistence between buyout and VC is a promising area for future research.

This paper focuses on funds of funds (FOFs) as a form of financial intermediation in private equity (both buyout and venture capital). After accounting for fees, FOFs provide returns equal to or above public market indices for both buyout and venture capital. While FOFs focusing on buyouts outperform public markets, they underperform direct fund investment strategies in buyout. In contrast, the average performance of FOFs in venture capital is on a par with results from direct venture fund investing. This suggests that FOFs in venture capital (but not in buyouts) are able to identify and access superior performing funds.

We study the performance of nearly 1,400 U.S. buyout and venture capital funds using a new data set from Burgiss. We find better buyout fund performance than previously documented—performance has consistently exceeded that of public markets. Outperformance versus the S&P 500 averages 20% to 27% over a fund's life and more than 3% annually. Venture capital funds outperformed public equities in the 1990s, but underperformed in the 2000s. Our conclusions are robust to various indices and risk controls. Performance in Cambridge Associates and Preqin is qualitatively similar to that in Burgiss, but is lower in Venture Economics.

In empirical studies of differences between firms which are acquired and those which are not, researchers typically divide firms into two groups‐acquired and nonacquired. In this paper, we argue that cash takeovers may be sufficiently different from noncash acquisitionst hat failure to distinguish between them may lead to inappropriateg eneralizations. We provide evidence from the mid 1970s that three categories of firms can be distinguished:n onacquireda, cquiredi n a cash takeover, and acquired in an exchange of securities.