This paper documents a close link between mispricing and liquidity by investigating stocks with high analyst disagreement. Previous research finds that these stocks tend to be overpriced, but that prices correct downwards as uncertainty about earnings is resolved. Our analysis suggests that one reason mispricing has persisted through the years is that analyst disagreement coincides with high trading costs. We also show that in the cross‐section, the less liquid stocks tend to be more severely overpriced. Additionally, increases in aggregate market liquidity accelerate the convergence of prices to fundamentals. As a result, returns of the initially overpriced stocks are negatively correlated with the time series of innovations in aggregate market liquidity.

We test whether momentum strategies remain profitable after considering market frictions induced by trading. Intraday data are used to estimate alternative measures of proportional and non‐proportional (price impact) trading costs. The price impact models imply that abnormal returns to portfolio strategies decline with portfolio size. We calculate break‐even fund sizes that lead to zero abnormal returns. In addition to equal‐ and value‐weighted momentum strategies, we derive a liquidity‐weighted strategy designed to reduce the cost of trades. Equal‐weighted strategies perform the best before trading costs and the worst after trading costs. Liquidity‐weighted and hybrid liquidity/value‐weighted strategies have the largest break‐even fund sizes: $5 billion or more (relative to December 1999 market capitalization) may be invested in these momentum strategies before the apparent profit opportunities vanish.

Using a parsimonious measure of investor protection constructed from fund organizational characteristics, this paper documents that companies targeted by activists with better investor protection structures outperform those targeted by those with poor investor protection structures by roughly 10% per year. The outperformance is observed only for active targets for which Schedule 13Ds are filed, not for passive Schedule 13G investments, indicating that the effect is not explained by a superior target-selection ability. The evidence suggests that funds with better investor protection achieve increased profitability and valuation ratio of their targets by reducing agency costs, improving corporate governance, and collaborating with other large institutional investors.

This paper demonstrates that value-relevant information about a firm appearing in regulatory disclosures of other firms is overlooked by investors. Firms highly mentioned in the 10-K competition section of other firms tend to outperform with risk-adjusted returns of up to 9% annually. Outperformance is concentrated in firms whose competition references are made in the context of targeting rather than admiration. Consistent with investor inattention, abnormal returns stem from cross-sector competition mentions as well as firms with low-analyst coverage. Moreover, highly mentioned firms exhibit improved fundamentals in subsequent years, further signifying they are underpriced.

The literature documents heterogeneity in the delay of stock price reaction to systematic shocks, implying that asset risk depends on investment horizon. We study the pricing of risk factors across investment horizons. Value (liquidity) risk is priced over intermediate (short) horizons. Conditioning horizon-factor exposures on firm characteristics indicates that characteristics, with the exception of momentum, are not priced beyond their contribution to systematic risk. Long-horizon institutional investors overweight assets with high intermediate-horizon exposures to value risk and high short-horizon exposures to liquidity risk. The results highlight the importance of investment horizon in determining risk premia.

A principal‐components analysis demonstrates that common earnings factors explain a substantial portion of firm‐level earnings variation, implying earnings shocks have substantial systematic components and are not almost fully diversifiable as prior literature has concluded. Furthermore, the principal components of earnings and returns are highly correlated, implying aggregate earnings risks and return risks are related. In contrast to previous studies, the correlation we report between the systematic components of earnings and returns is stable over time. We also show that the earnings factors are priced, in the sense that the sensitivities of securities' returns to the earnings factors explain a significant portion of the cross‐sectional variation in returns, even controlling for return risk. This suggests earnings performance is an underlying source of priced risk. Our evidence that the information sets of returns and earnings are jointly determined implies cash flow risk and return risk are not fully separable, and raises the possibility that it is the common variation of earnings and returns that is priced.

This paper documents that short-term options achieve significantly lower returns during months with 4 versus 5 weeks between expiration dates. The average return differential ranges from 16 to 29 basis points per week for delta-hedged portfolios, and from 101 to 187 basis points per week for straddles, over 1996–2017. Evidence based on earnings announcements and institutional holdings suggests that investor inattention to exact expiration date rather than underlying risk exposures or transaction costs can explain the mispricing. Market makers seem to adjust prices accordingly, and tend to over-trade mispriced options against less sophisticated investors.

Motivated by the literature on investment flows and optimal trading, we examine intraday predictability in the cross‐section of stock returns. We find a striking pattern of return continuation at half‐hour intervals that are exact multiples of a trading day, and this effect lasts for at least 40 trading days. Volume, order imbalance, volatility, and bid‐ask spreads exhibit similar patterns, but do not explain the return patterns. We also show that short‐term return reversal is driven by temporary liquidity imbalances lasting less than an hour and bid‐ask bounce. Timing trades can reduce execution costs by the equivalent of the effective spread.