We consider optimal capital accumulation in a nonlinear activity analysis model in which production and primary resource supplies are affected by a stationary stochastic process of exogenous shocks; the optimality criterion is the sum of discounted expected future social utilities. Under various neoclassical conditions on technology and preferences, (i) there exists an optimal policy of investment and consumption expressible as a continuous time-invariant function of the capital stocks and the history of stochastic shocks, and (ii) there is a stationary stochastic process of capital stocks that is consistent with the optimal policy.

We examine the proposition that competitive firms must behave as if they were maximizing profits; otherwise they would go bankrupt, or even fail to be financed in a competitive capital market. We investigate a model in which an entrepreneur raises funds for a risky enterprise on a competitive capital market, by offering a “dividend policy” based on the realized (stochastic) flow of earnings. We show that an entrepreneur who maximizes the expected sum of discounted dividends is sure to fail in finite time. On the other hand, many other behaviours yield positive expected profits and are able to attract investment funds, and yet result in a positive probability of surviving forever. As a consequence, if new firms have sufficiently diverse behaviours, then even if there is a constant stream of new entrants, after a long time practically all of the surviving firms will not have been maximizing profits.

[This is the second part of a paper concerning an iterative decentralized1 process designed to allocate resources optimally in decomposable environments that are possibly characterized by indivisibilities and other non convexities. Important steps of the process involve randomization. In Part I we presented the basic models and results, together with examples showing that certain assumptions can be satisfied in both classical and non convex cases. Part II goes further with such examples in showing that our process yields optimal allocations in environments in which the competitive mechanism fails, and also shows how abstract conditions used in Part I can be verified in terms of properties of preferences and production functions that are familiar to economists.]

In this note we present an example of a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring in which all supergame equilibria with positive discount rates are bounded away from full efficiency uniformly in the discount rate, provided the latter is strictly positive. On the other hand, if the players do not discount the future, then every efficient one-period payoff vector that dominates the one-period equilibrium payoff vector can be attained by an equilibrium of the repeated game. Thus the correspondence that maps the players' discount rate into the corresponding set of repeated-game equilibrium payoff vectors is discontinuous at the point at which the discount rate is zero.