How MUCH DOES technological change in agriculture contribute to the nation's growth? How greatly will agriculture be affected by conditions making for growth in the national economy? Answers to questions like these pertaining to interactions between agriculture and the rest of the economy are needed perennially in formulating national economic policies and in formulating price support and other policies focusing on agriculture. Discussion of the questions has been fragmented, with not much attention to the overall set of relationships determining interactions between the two parts of the economy. The first contribution of the present study is to develop a model appropriate to explaining adjustments between agriculture and the rest of the economy implied by U.S. growth. We believe this study presents for the first time a formally complete model taking account of feedback effects involved in intersectoral equilibration and production function substitution between factors.' The model contains two sectors (agriculture and nonagriculture) and two productive factors (human resources and physical capital). Factor immobilities and other non-Pareto features are introduced, and there are special complications involving agriculture's purchased inputs which affect price measurement and production functions. Equilibrations determining prices and quantities of products and factors for each sector are explained within the model as responses to changes in the economy's major exogenous forces. These forces, reflected in the exogenous variables, include output per unit of input in the two sectors and total factor supplies available to the economy. The model permits quantitative estimates of how effects of changes in

Abstract The article informs that the purpose of this article is to discuss the viewpoints expressed in, "A Critical Study of Accounting for Business Combinations," AICPA Study No. 5, by Arthur R. Wyatt. This review will concentrate on the recommendations rather than the basic text. The role adopted will be, in a sense, that of "devil's advocate." Using Wyatt's criteria, most business combinations would fall under his recommendation 1 and therefore be classified as purchases. Stress is put on the independence of the contracting or combining parties. Thus, if the groups about to combine deal at arm's length and independently, the proposed combination will be a purchase unless the constituents are roughly the same size or were "formerly related entities." While two parties to a combination might be viewed as independent before the combination, they do not want to retain their independence after the transaction.

Abstract The modern business-oriented computer is an adaptation, with minor modifications, of the earlier and more general notion of a stored-program, digital computer. Business-oriented computers have been developed largely as a result of a concerted effort on the part of computer manufacturers to develop equipment, which would be suitable to the requirements of business data processing. For the most part, however, accountants have had very little to say about the kind of equipment which has been made available to the business firms. Consequently, each installation has been approached on an ad hoc basis, and there appears to be a wide divergence in accomplishment. Business-oriented computer should be taken as a frame of reference, and instead of superimposing the computer on the business information system of the firm, that the systems designer should build or rebuild the entire system based upon the theoretical concepts inherent in the computer itself. Business-oriented computer becomes an adequate frame of reference for exploring the possibilities and ramifications of a normative business information system for the firm.

Abstract One of the most important advances in the field of managerial accounting has been the development of the notion of the standard cost system. The use of such a system, however, has thus far been limited not because of any limitations inherent in the system itself, but because accountants have failed to appreciate its versatility and exploit it for managerial control and decision making. By definition costs that are not quantitatively traceable to products or operations for every unit of service used at a particular moment of time, are some type of joint costs. This implies complementarities between products and operations at any moment of time and over lime, and a lot of uncertainty in planning and control. The longer the time span over which such complementarities exist the greater the difficulty not only because one cannot predict as well, which is a great impediment to decision making, but also because the statistical population from which one needs to draw for generalizations is small. Furthermore, to the extent that these decisions are made discontinuously and infrequently, one cannot depend on the manager's memory for all the relevant inputs to subsequent decisions of similar nature.

Abstract To summarize, we have initially examined the implications and short-comings of two important deterministic models, that of the classical theory of the firm and Taylor's model of rationalization of operations. We have shown that under theft assumptions, neither one necessitates any internal control systems, because the individuals are unconsciously influenced to allocate their efforts optimally. Then we have examined an alternative model that emphasizes conscious co-ordination of activities for the accomplishment of common objectives. The firm according to this model is viewed as a group of resources (people usually) that are brought together for the accomplishment of a common goal or an array of goals. These people are considered as willful agents with different degrees of rationality and capable of making value judgments. Consequently one cannot automatically assume that theft behavior is "optimizing," but must find ways of guaranteeing that the behavior of each and every one of these willful agents is consistent with the overall objective or objectives. That is one important place where the necessity of conscious co-ordination and control of activities enters. If people are left alone they will attempt to maximize what they perceive to be in their own best interest. If this happened to coincide with the interests of the firm well and good, otherwise the objectives of the firm are superseded by the interests of the individuals which may in themselves be conflicting. No one can honestly claim that a firm will succeed in enforcing an absolute identity between its goals and those of its employees. This problem is not unlike the one that has been plaguing the economists in their efforts toward maximizing social welfare. There is no doubt, however, that the firm can influence the direction as well as the magnitude of its employee's efforts. It would be quite disappointing, not only to managers but also to us as educators of managers, if we were to find out that managerial skills as well as complicated control systems can do nothing to change the particular behavior and range of rationality of an individual.

Abstract The structure of an integrated information system is difficult to define, and practical tests for its boundaries are evidently needed. This paper considers the organizational limits of such a system with- out detailed consideration of mechanization and its effects. One purpose is to make possible some initial decisions as to what systems and what organizational units might be encompassed in an initial plan for integration. The configuration is shown to be irregular and its limits are shown to be decided by pragmatic considerations. No attempt is made to enumerate all possible sub-systems that might be considered, although examples familiar to accountants have been furnished. Criteria are expressed in general terms, due to the varying information needs and problems of individual enterprises. The legal definition of a corporation is not considered to be adequate for defining the area over which an integrated system might be imposed. In addition, an attempt is made to relate sub-systems, and to define requirements for their integration. These requirements essentially are in terms of data processing compatibility (the usual subject of papers on "total" systems) and compatibility of like and unlike sets of data. The latter is obviously important and is frequently overlooked. In analyzing the links between sets of data, a study of intersections is considered to be helpful. The intersections reveal lack of structural compatibility in the organizational dimension (if it exists) and in addition make possible the identification of redundancies in the vertical dimension. Further analysis is required in the latter case, if unwarranted redundancies are to be eliminated.

Abstract The article explains the position and activities of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) regarding education and the author's views regarding the proper kind of education for the profession. AICPA has long had a vital interest in the education of public accountants because its leaders appreciate that education helps to maintain and improve the standards of the profession. It has expressed this interest by engaging in a number of activities over the years that have resulted in the approval of educational policies by the Council of the Institute. The logical starting point for a description of the Institute's educational policies that are currently in effect is the report of the Commission on Standards of Education and Experience for CPAs, issued in 1956. Though the Commission was set up at the suggestion of the American Institute, it was an independent body made up of outstanding practitioners and educators who did not represent organized groups of accountants or educators.