International differences in the demand for accounting income predictably affect the way it incorporates economic income (change in market value) over time. We characterize the `shareholder’ and `stakeholder’ corporate governance models of common and code law countries respectively as resolving information asymmetry by public disclosure and private communication. Also, code law directly links accounting income to current payouts (to employees, managers, shareholders and governments). Consequently, code law accounting income is less timely, particularly in incorporating economic losses. Regulation, taxation and litigation cause variation among common law countries. The results have implications for security analysts, standard-setters, regulators, and corporate governance.

This study examines the behavior of spreads paid in firm underwritten seasoned common stock offerings and straight bond offerings. Estimates indicate that up to 85% of the spread is variable cost and that the marginal spread is rising. Further, offerings that are likely to require greater underwriting services encounter higher marginal spreads. These findings are consistent with there being a family of U-shaped spreads, with lower quality offerings priced on higher spreads, unlike the economies of scale view of spreads. They agree with the views that underwriters provide valuable services and that the marginal cost of external finance is rising.

This study compares the market value of firms that reorganize in bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management's published cash flow projections. We estimate firm values using models that have been shown in other contexts to generate relatively precise estimates of value. We find that these methods generally yield unbiased estimates of value, but the dispersion of valuation errors is very wide - the sample ratio of estimated value to market value varies from less than 20% to greater than 250%. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that the variation in these errors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders' incentives to overstate or understate the firm's value.

Mounting nuclear plant decommissioning costs and utility deregulation focused attention on accounting for decommissioning liabilities. FASB's Exposure Draft 158-B proposes balance sheet recognition of the projected future decommissioning cost liability at initial plant commission. We expect market valuation of each dollar of decommissioning cost apportioned to utilities to vary with utility-specific factors related to the probability of cost recovery via rates. We find a more negative decommissioning cost/firm value association for utilities with higher business or financial risk. Also, equity value is significantly associated with total decommissioning cost across all nuclear units in which a utility has ownership interest.

We investigate the reliability of mandatory annual fair value estimates for UK investment property. We find that appraisal estimates understate actual selling prices and are considerably less biased and more accurate measures of selling price than respective historical costs. Investigations of managerial discretion over fair value reporting reveal that managers select among permissible accounting methods to report higher earnings, time asset sales to smooth reported earnings changes, smooth reported net asset changes and boost fair values prior to raising new debt. Finally, we find that the reliability of appraisal estimates increases when monitored by external appraisers and Big 6 auditors.

This study examines the effect of ongoing deregulation in the electric utility industry on the relation between market value, book value, and earnings. We predict that deregulation decreases (increases) the relative importance of book value (earnings) in explaining price. We test this prediction by examining changes in the value relevance of book value and earnings during the 1988–1996 time period for a sample of large, investor-owned electric utilities. We find that the regression coefficients and incremental explanatory power related to book value (earnings) have decreased (increased) over this time period. These results are generally robust in sensitivity analysis.

In a recent paper, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) introduce a new test of the Pecking Order Model. This comment shows that their elegantly simple test generates misleading inferences when evaluating plausible patterns of external financing. Our results, coupled with the power problem with the Static Tradeoff Model documented by Shyam-Sunder and Myers, indicate that their empirical evidence can evaluate neither the Pecking Order nor Static Tradeoff Models. Alternative tests are needed that can identify the determinants of capital structure and can discriminate among competing hypotheses.

We provide clinical evidence of corporate restructuring at Sears, Roebuck & Co., beginning with the firm's 1981 diversification into financial services by acquiring Coldwell, Banker & Co. and Dean Witter, Reynolds Inc. The initial purchases resulted in a wealth gain to shareholders of approximately $400 million. Anticipated synergies did not materialize, however, and Sears’ retail performance deteriorated. Coincident with pressure from institutional investor activists in 1992, Sears announced the divestiture of financial services and a refocusing on retail operations. This led to a $1.113 billion gain for shareholders. Despite more than $1.5 billion in gains over the entire diversification/divestiture period, Sears’ shareholders suffered a significant opportunity loss when compared with a portfolio of focused firms.

This article develops a model for evaluating alternative hedging strategies for financially constrained firms. A key advantage of the model is the ability to capture the intertemporal effects of hedging on the firm's financial situation. We characterize the optimal hedge. A wide range of alternative hedging strategies can be specified and the model allows us to determine in each case if the hedging strategy raises or lowers firms value and by how much. We show that hedging firm value, hedging cash flow from operations and hedging sales revenue are not optimal. The article highlights the fact that every hedging strategy comes packaged with a borrowing strategy which requires careful consideration.