We show that the reported tendency for performance pay to be associated with greater wage inequality at the top of the earnings distribution applies only to white workers. This results in the white-black wage differential among those in performance pay jobs growing over the earnings distribution even as the same differential shrinks over the distribution for those not in performance pay jobs. We show that this remains true even when examining suitable counterfactuals that hold observables constant between whites and blacks. We explore reasons behind our finding focusing on the interactions between discrimination, unmeasured ability, and selection.

We find that lower ex ante earnings volatility leads to higher Post–Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD). PEAD is a function of both the magnitude of an earnings surprise and its persistence. While prior research has largely investigated market reactions to the magnitude of the earnings surprise, in this study we show that the persistence of the earnings surprise is equally important. A unique feature of the anomalous PEAD returns documented here concerns the association between abnormal returns and trading frictions. Besides demonstrating that firms with lower earnings volatility have higher abnormal returns, we also find that lower earnings volatility firms have lower trading frictions. Taken together, these findings imply that higher abnormal returns are associated with lower trading frictions. We exploit this implication to empirically demonstrate that PEAD returns due to earnings volatility are not concentrated in the firms with the largest trading frictions, which is in contrast to the findings in prior anomaly studies.

Aggregate stock return volatility is both persistent and countercyclical. This paper tests whether it is possible to improve volatility forecasts at monthly and quarterly horizons by conditioning on additional macroeconomic variables. I find that several variables related to macroeconomic uncertainty, time-varying expected stock returns, and credit conditions Granger cause volatility. It is more difficult to find evidence that forecasts exploiting macroeconomic variables outperform a univariate benchmark out-of-sample. The most successful approaches involve simple combinations of individual forecasts. Predictive power associated with macroeconomic variables appears to concentrate around the onset of recessions.

This paper studies the long-run properties of intertemporal distortions in a broad class of second-best economies. Our unified framework encompasses and extends many well-known models, such as variants of the Ramsey taxation model with aggregate or idiosyncratic risk, and economies with incentive compatibility constraints due to limited commitment, political economy, self-enforcement or private information, or combinations of these. We identify a sufficient condition that rules out permanent intertemporal distortions: if there exists an allocation that satisfies all constraints and eventually converges to the limiting first-best allocation, then intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second best. This result uncovers a common optimality principle linking the intertemporal allocation of resources with the ability to front-load distortions for this broad class of environments. A series of applications illustrates the significance of these findings.

This article investigates the predictability of jump arrivals in U.S. stock markets. Using a new test that identifies jump predictors up to the intraday level, I find that jumps are likely to occur shortly after macroeconomic information releases, such as the Federal Reserve announcements, nonfarm payroll reports, and jobless claims, as well as market index jumps. I also find firm-specific jump predictors related to earnings releases, analyst recommendations, past stock jumps, and dividend dates. Evidence suggests that distinguishing systematic jumps from idiosyncratic jumps is possible using the characteristics of jump predictors. Finally, I present a short-term jump size clustering. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We study elections that simultaneously decide multiple issues, where voters have independent private values over bundles of issues. The innovation is in considering nonseparable preferences, where issues may be complements or substitutes. Voters face a political exposure problem: the optimal vote for a particular issue will depend on the resolution of the other issues. Moreover, the probabilities that the other issues will pass should be conditioned on being pivotal. We prove that equilibrium exists when distributions over values have full support or when issues are complements. We then study large elections with two issues. There exists a nonempty open set of distributions where the probability of either issue passing fails to converge to either 1 or 0 for all limit equilibria. Thus, the outcomes of large elections are not generically predictable with independent private values, despite the fact that there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding fundamentals. While the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the outcome of a multi-issue election, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the implementation of the Condorcet winner.

This paper studies gender interactions within hierarchical organizations using a large data set on the duration of Italian municipal governments elected between 1993 and 2003. A municipal government can be viewed as a hierarchy, whose stability over time depends on the degree of cooperation between and within ranks. We find that in municipalities headed by female mayors, the probability of early termination of the legislature is higher. This result persists and becomes stronger when we control for municipality fixed effects as well as for non-random sorting of women into municipalities using regression discontinuity in gender-mixed electoral races decided by a narrow margin. The likelihood that a female mayor survives until the end of her term is lowest when the council is entirely male and in regions with less favourable attitudes towards working women. This evidence is suggestive that group dynamics are an important factor in driving the gender difference. Other interpretations receive less support in the data. Our results may provide an alternative explanation for the underrepresentation of women in leadership positions.

This paper provides an overview of the analysis of the term structure of interest rates with a special emphasis on recent developments at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance. The topic is important to investors and also to policymakers, who wish to extract macroeconomic expectations from longer-term interest rates, and take actions to influence those rates. The simplest model of the term structure is the expectations hypothesis, which posits that long-term interest rates are expectations of future average short-term rates. In this paper, we show that many features of the configuration of interest rates are puzzling from the perspective of the expectations hypothesis. We review models that explain these anomalies using time-varying risk premia. Although the quest for the fundamental macroeconomic explanations of these risk premia is ongoing, inflation uncertainty seems to play a large role. Finally, while modern finance theory prices bonds and other assets in a single unified framework, we also consider an earlier approach based on segmented markets. Market segmentation seems important to understand the term structure of interest rates during the recent financial crisis.

A central issue in corporate governance research is the extent to which “good” governance practices are universal (one size mostly fits all) or instead depend on country and firm characteristics. We report evidence that supports the second view. We first conduct a case study of Brazil, in which we survey Brazilian firms' governance practices at year-end 2004, construct a corporate governance index, and show that the index, as well as subindices for ownership structure, board procedure, and minority shareholder rights, predicts higher lagged Tobin's q. In contrast to other studies, greater board independence predicts lower Tobin's q. Firm characteristics also matter: governance predicts market value for nonmanufacturing (but not manufacturing) firms, small (but not large) firms, and high-growth (but not low-growth) firms. We then extend prior studies of India, Korea, and Russia, and compare those countries to Brazil, to assess which aspects of governance matter in which countries, and for which types of firms. Our “multi-country” results suggest that country characteristics strongly influence both which aspects of governance predict firm market value, and at which firms that association is found. They support a flexible approach to governance, with ample room for firm choice.