The Dodd–Frank Act created differential regulatory requirements for banks above specified asset size thresholds. Event study results imply greater expected net regulatory costs for above-threshold banks. Consistent with hypotheses that near-below-threshold banks alter their behavior to attempt to avoid or delay the regulatory costs and/or to ensure growth that they do experience is highly beneficial, we find that near-below-threshold banks grow assets, risk-weighted assets, and total loans more slowly, and charge higher rates on commercial loans. The results suggest that the Dodd–Frank Act created costs that near-below-threshold banks attempt to avoid by altering their behaviors in economically important ways.

Although acquisitions are a popular form of investment, the link between rms' nancial constraints and acquisition policies is not well understood. We develop a model in which nancially constrained bidders approach targets, decide how much to bid and whether to bid in cash or in stock. In equilibrium, nancial constraints do not aect the identity of the winning bidder, but they lower bidders' incentives to approach the target. Auctions are initiated by bidders with low constraints or high synergies. The use of cash is positively related to synergies and the acquirer's gains from the deal and negatively to nancial constraints. (D44, G32,

Using data on publicly traded banks in 61 countries, we examine how the institutional environment affects the relationship between bank capital and system-wide fragility. Consistent with prior studies, we find that bank capital is associated with a reduction in the systemic risk contribution of individual banks. This effect is more pronounced for banks located in countries with less efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions and in countries with lower levels of information availability. Overall, our findings suggest that capital can act as a substitute for a weak institutional environment in reducing systemic risk.

We construct a measure of systemic vulnerability in selected EU banking systems using an indirect, time-varying measure of the system covariance. Systemic vulnerability indicates the extent to which a banking system as a whole is sensitive to a negative shock. We proceed to examine to what extent the resulting measures of systemic vulnerability provide a convincing narrative of events during the period January 2000 to April 2016. The results provide evidence of: (i) rising vulnerability prior to the outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2007/08 in countries with banks exposed to toxic assets; (ii) vulnerability associated with the euro area sovereign debt crisis from 2009/10; and (iii) continued concerns from 2013 onwards regarding the need for euro area banks to improve their balance sheets and raise new capital at a time of sluggish profitability.

We investigate the welfare effects of vertical integration of regional sports networks (RSNs) with programming distributors in U.S. multichannel television markets. Vertical integration can enhance efficiency by reducing double marginalization and increasing carriage of channels, but can also harm welfare due to foreclosure and incentives to raise rivals' costs. We estimate a structural model of viewership, subscription, distributor pricing, and affiliate fee bargaining using a rich data set on the U.S. cable and satellite television industry (2000?2010). We use these estimates to analyze the impact of simulated vertical mergers and divestitures of RSNs on competition and welfare, and examine the efficacy of regulatory policies introduced by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to address competition concerns in this industry.

Ferri, Zheng, and Zou test Fischer and Verrecchia's (2000) prediction that a reduction in investors’ uncertainty about managers’ financial reporting objectives leads to an increase in the valuation-relevance of earnings reports. They use mandatory CD&A disclosures as an arguably exogenous “shock” that provided investors with more precise information about managers’ contractual incentives and find that these enhanced disclosures increased the relation between firms’ unexpected earnings and stock returns. Using Ferri et al. as a backdrop, we discuss the implicit assumptions invoked in natural experimental research designs and the fundamental role of theory in drawing causal inferences from empirical evidence.

We analyze trading speed and fragmentation in asset markets. In our model, trading venues make technological investments and compete for investors who choose where and how much to trade. Faster venues charge higher fees and attract speed-sensitive investors. Competition among venues increases investor participation, trading volume, and allocative e ffi ciency, but entry and fragmentation can be excessive, and speeds are generically ine ffi cient. Regulations that protect transaction prices (e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission trade-through rule) lead to greater fragmentation. Our model sheds light on the experience of European and U.S. markets since the implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation National Markets System.

ABSTRACT When subject matter experts are consulted during an audit, the quality of the expert's advice depends upon their ability to fully understand and incorporate client‐specific facts into their advice. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports suggest that auditors are neglecting to perform the required work to assess the quality of experts' recommendations. This study examines how characteristics of the audit, notably staffing decisions, can impede auditors' ability to discern advice quality. In an experiment, we examine how receiving advice of different levels of quality (lower or higher incorporation of relevant client facts) and awareness at the planning stage of the use of a subject matter expert (a priori aware or unaware) impacts auditors' effort, utilization of the advice, and judgment accuracy. We find that awareness of an expert being employed led to a social facilitation effect such that auditors who were a priori aware put forth more effort prior to receiving the expert advice and were initially in less agreement with management's aggressive revenue recognition position than auditors who were unaware. Upon receiving the expert advice, auditors who were a priori aware were more accurate than auditors who were unaware. These results should interest both audit regulators and practitioners by demonstrating how the timing and communication of consulting decisions affect auditors' assessments of advice received from subject matter experts.

ABSTRACT Firms sometimes obtain soft private information about growth prospects along with hard information about current or past performance. In this environment, we find that optimizing disclosures over multiple periods yields nonlinear stock price reactions following both voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Further, we derive several predictions about distinct short‐run and long‐run effects of disclosures and nondisclosures on security prices. Under specified conditions, when the volatility of the firm's earnings increases, the average contemporaneous and prospective post‐mandatory‐disclosure market premia (for voluntary disclosures over nondisclosures) rise, while farther‐in‐future market discounts (for such voluntary disclosures) also become larger. Our analysis moreover predicts that both the disclosure probability and the information content of nondisclosures can increase in the persistence of earnings.

ABSTRACT This article examines whether ties to portfolio firms’ management via pension business relationships provide mutual funds with an informational advantage. Funds become related to portfolio companies when fund families serve as trustees for firms’ employee pension plans. Selling by related funds is more likely to be motivated by an information advantage than their buying, because the latter is heavily influenced by the desire to secure pension inflows. We find that stocks with larger net sales by related funds experience lower future returns. Information appears related to firm fundamentals, as the return predictability of related funds’ selling concentrates in stocks with negative future earnings surprises. Consistent with an information‐based explanation, the predictive power of related funds’ selling for future returns is more pronounced when information uncertainty about the stock is higher. Our results contribute to a growing literature that shows the sources of informed trading by institutions.