ABSTRACT We show that characteristics of stock issuers can be used to forecast important common factors in stocks' returns such as those associated with book‐to‐market, size, and industry. Specifically, we use differences between the attributes of stock issuers and repurchasers to forecast characteristic‐related factor returns. For example, we show that large firms underperform after years when issuing firms are large relative to repurchasing firms. While our strongest results are for portfolios based on book‐to‐market (i.e., HML ), size (i.e., SMB ), and industry, our approach is also useful for forecasting factor returns associated with distress, payout policy, and profitability.

We develop a model of government portfolio choice in which the government chooses the scale of risky projects in the presence of market failures and tax distortions. These frictions motivate the government to manage social risk and fiscal risk. Social risk management favors programs that ameliorate market failures in bad times. Fiscal risk management makes unattractive programs involving large government outlays when other government programs also require large outlays. These two risk management motives often conflict. Using the model, we explore how the attractiveness of different financial stability programs varies with the government’s fiscal burden and characteristics of the economy. Received December 19, 2016; editorial decision June 28, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Citation: Greenwood, Robin, Samuel G. Hanson, and Gordon Y. Liao. "Asset Price Dynamics in Partially Segmented Markets." Review of Financial Studies 31, no. 9 (September 2018): 3307–3343. (Internet Appendix Here: http://www.people.hbs.edu/shanson/smc_IA_20170910.pdf.) Link to publisher's version: https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article-abstract/31/9/3307/4985215?redirectedFrom=fulltext Keywords: System Shocks, Asset Pricing

ABSTRACT We argue that time variation in the maturity of corporate debt arises because firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself with more short‐term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long‐term debt, and vice versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: (1) when the ratio of government debt to total debt is higher and (2) by firms with stronger balance sheets. Our theory sheds new light on market timing phenomena in corporate finance more generally.

Abstract We develop a model in which specialized bond investors must absorb shocks to the supply and demand for long-term bonds in two currencies. Since long-term bonds and foreign exchange are both exposed to unexpected movements in short-term interest rates, a shift in the supply of long-term bonds in one currency influences the foreign exchange rate between the two currencies, as well as bond term premia in both currencies. Our model matches several important empirical patterns, including the comovement between exchange rates and term premia, and the finding that central banks’ quantitative easing policies affect exchange rates. An extension of our model links spot exchange rates to the persistent deviations from covered interest rate parity that have emerged since 2008.

We develop and test a model in which swap spreads are determined by end users' demand for and constrained intermediaries' supply of long-term interest rate swaps. Swap spreads reflect compensation both for using scarce intermediary capital and for bearing convergence risk—i.e., the risk spreads will widen due to a future demand-and-supply imbalance. We show that a proxy for the intermediated quantity of swaps—dealers' net position in Treasuries—flipped sign during the Global Financial Crisis when swap spreads turned negative and that this variable predicts the excess returns on swap spread trades. Exploiting our model's sign restrictions, we identify shifts in demand and supply and find that both contribute significantly to the volatility of swap spreads.

Many have argued that overoptimistic thinking on the part of lenders helps fuel credit booms. We use new micro-data on mutual funds’ holdings of securitizations to examine which investors are susceptible to such boom-time thinking. We show that firsthand experience plays a key role in shaping investors’ beliefs. During the 2003–2007 mortgage boom, inexperienced fund managers loaded up on securitizations linked to nonprime mortgages, accumulating twice the holdings of more seasoned managers. Moreover, inexperienced managers who personally experienced severe or recent adverse investment outcomes behaved more like seasoned managers. Training and institutional memory can serve as partial substitutes for personal experience.

ABSTRACT We study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless short‐term securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with short‐term debt against the refinancing risk implied by the need to roll over its debt more often. We extend the model to allow private financial intermediaries to compete with the government in the provision of short‐term money‐like claims. We argue that, if there are negative externalities associated with private money creation, the government should tilt its issuance more toward short maturities, thereby partially crowding out the private sector's use of short‐term debt.

Abstract Long-term nominal interest rates are surprisingly sensitive to high-frequency (daily or monthly) movements in short-term rates. Since 2000, this high-frequency sensitivity has grown even stronger in U.S. data. By contrast, the association between low-frequency changes (at 6- or 12-month horizons) in long- and short-term rates, which was also strong before 2000, has weakened substantially. This puzzling post-2000 pattern arises because increases in short rates temporarily raise the term premium component of long-term yields, leading long rates to temporarily overreact to changes in short rates. The frequency-dependent excess sensitivity of long-term rates that we observe in recent years is best understood using a model in which (i) declines in short rates trigger “rate-amplifying” shifts in investor demand for long-term bonds, and (ii) the arbitrage response to these demand shifts is both limited and slow. We study, theoretically and empirically, how such rate-amplifying demand can be traced to mortgage-refinancing activity, investors who extrapolate recent changes in short rates, and investors who “reach for yield” when short rates fall. We discuss the implications of our findings for the validity of event study methodologies and the transmission of monetary policy.

We examine the business model of traditional commercial banks when they compete with shadow banks. While both types of intermediaries create safe “money-like” claims, they go about this in different ways. Traditional banks create money-like claims by holding illiquid fixed-income assets to maturity, and they rely on deposit insurance and costly equity capital to support this strategy. This strategy allows bank depositors to remain “sleepy”: they do not have to pay attention to transient fluctuations in the market value of bank assets. In contrast, shadow banks create money-like claims by giving their investors an early exit option requiring the rapid liquidation of assets. Thus, traditional banks have a stable source of funding, while shadow banks are subject to runs and fire-sale losses. In equilibrium, traditional banks have a comparative advantage at holding fixed-income assets that have only modest fundamental risk but are illiquid and have substantial transitory price volatility, whereas shadow banks tend to hold relatively liquid assets.