The adoption of the incentive-signalling framework gives a reasonably good explanation of the corporate dividend decision. The equilibrium optimal dividend decision under such a framework is presented and analyzed, assuming a reward-penalty managerial incentive scheme is used. It is shown that the size of the declared dividend is an increasing function of expected cash flow. However, there exists a trend that points out that the higher the level of expected cash flow, the lower the marginal effects of cash flow on dividends. A similar relationship is observed with respect to changes in expected cash flows. These conclusions are in harmony with “real world” behavior as reported by several empirical studies. The effects of uncertainty and interest rates on dividends are also analyzed. It is shown, in agreement with observed phenomena, that the higher the uncertainty, the lower the dividend/payout ratio.

Argues that investors choose an inventory accounting method to optimize the trade-off between incentive effect and tax gain. Role of manager in choosing the accounting policy; Description of setting; Analysis of cost trade-off between incentive effect and tax gain; First in, first out (FIFO) versus last in, first out (LIFO).

The purpose of this paper is to empirically test the relationships between corporate earnings and investment. In particular, the study investigates whether knowledge of past investments improves the prediction of future earnings beyond predictions that are based on past earnings alone. Similarly, it investigates whether knowledge of past earnings improves the prediction of future investments beyond knowledge of past investments alone. This is the empirical definition of Granger causality. The empirical results show that the bivariate past series of earnings and investments is superior to the univariate series in predicting future investments but not in predicting future earnings.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically test the relationships between corporate earnings and investment. In particular, the study investigates whether knowledge of past investments improves the prediction of future earnings beyond predictions that are based on past earnings alone. Similarly, it investigates whether knowledge of past earnings improves the prediction of future investments beyond knowledge of past investments alone. This is the empirical definition of Granger causality. The empirical results show that the bivariate past series of earnings and investments is superior to the univariate series in predicting future investments but not in predicting future earnings.

This paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at-the-money. Hall and Murphy [Hall, Brian, Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. American Economic Review 90 (2), 209–214] claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance. However, they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort-averse into their model. We revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages, options, and stock grants. We simulate the manager’s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders’ equity under alternative compensation schemes, and identify schemes that are optimal. Our simulations indicate that, when abstracting from tax considerations, it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable (i.e., substantially in-the-money) on their expiration date. Prior to 2006, the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations. Recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006.