We use supervisory data to investigate the ex-ante credit risk taken by different types of lenders in the U.S. syndicated term loan market during the LSAPs period. We find that nonbank lenders, mutual funds and structured-finance vehicles, take higher risk when longer-term interest rates decrease. The results are stronger for mutual funds that charge higher fees. Banks accommodate other lenders’ investment choices by originating riskier loans and selling them off. These results are consistent with “search for yield” by nonbanks and with a risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Over the sample we study, lower longer-term interest rates appear to have only a minimal effect on loan spreads.

This paper examines the demand- and supply-side factors associated with audit partner selection and assignment in the United States. First, we examine whether audit partner gender and experience are associated with board and management gender and experience. Second, we investigate whether engagement audit quality varies with audit partner gender and experience, controlling for selection effects. The results indicate that companies with more gender-diverse boards of directors and top management teams are more likely to have a female lead audit partner. In addition, the experience of the client's board is positively associated with the experience of the lead audit partner. In terms of audit quality, we find that higher audit fees are positively associated with female and more experienced audit partners. Our results shed light on the important role that partner characteristics play in the demand and supply sides of audit quality.

We study the effects of U.S. interest rates and other factors on risk-taking in the global market for U.S. dollar syndicated term loans. We find that, before the Global Financial Crisis, both U.S. and non-U.S. lenders originated ex ante riskier loans to non-U.S. borrowers in response to a decline in short-term U.S. interest rates and, after the crisis, in response to a decline in longer-term U.S. interest rates. After the crisis, this behavior was more prominent for shadow banks and less prominent for banks with relatively low capital. Separately, before the crisis, lenders originated less risky loans in response to U.S. dollar appreciation. Across the periods, the responses to risk appetite and economic uncertainty varied. To the extent that the Federal Reserve affects U.S. interest rates, we provide evidence of global risk-taking spillovers of U.S. monetary policy, which are important but not dominant factors for risk-taking in the market.

We examine whether firms' ESG performance is influenced by bondholder preferences. We argue that insurance companies have unique incentives to monitor bond issuers' ESG performance because insurers face enhanced exposures to ESG shocks in their balance sheets and trading operations. Consistent with this argument, we find that firms with higher bond ownership by insurance companies are associated with higher future ESG ratings. To address potential identification concerns, we test changes in bond issuers' ESG ratings following the initial bond investment by insurance companies. We find that firms' ESG performance improves after insurance companies' initial bond investment. We also find that this improvement in ESG performance is concentrated in firms with greater reliance on bond financing and investment capital from insurance companies. Our study underscores the importance of bond ownership structure in influencing corporate ESG performance.

This study finds a positive, economically meaningful impact of generalist chief executive officers (CEOs) on shareholder value using 164 sudden deaths and 345 non-sudden exogenous turnovers. The higher a departing CEO’s general ability index (GAI), independently and relative to her successor, the lower is the abnormal stock return to turnover announcements. Returns reflect post-turnover changes in operating performance. Further, CEOs’ and successors’ GAIs are significantly positively related, but only for non-sudden turnovers. Consistently, for sudden deaths, we find positive stock returns to appointments of generalist successors. The results provide a market-based explanation for the generalist pay premium.

We provide a framework for assessing the build-up of vulnerabilities to the U.S. financial system. We collect forty-six indicators of financial and balance-sheet conditions, cutting across measures of valuation pressures, nonfinancial borrowing, and financial-sector health. We place the data in economic categories, track their evolution, and develop an algorithmic approach to monitoring vulnerabilities that can complement the more judgmental approach of most official-sector organizations. Our approach picks up rising imbalances in the U.S. financial system through the mid-2000s, presaging the financial crisis. We also highlight several statistical properties of our approach: most importantly, our summary measures of system-wide vulnerabilities lead the credit-to-GDP gap (a key gauge in Basel III and related research) by a year or more. Thus, our framework may provide useful information for setting macroprudential policy tools such as the countercyclical capital buffer.

We investigate whether firm-level political connections affect the allocation of exemptions from tariffs imposed on $US 550 billion of Chinese goods imported to the United States annually beginning in 2018. Evidence points to politicians not only rewarding supporters but also punishing opponents: Past campaign contributions to the party controlling (in opposition to) the executive branch increase (decrease) approval likelihood. Our findings point to quid pro quo arrangements between politicians and firms, as opposed to the “information” channel linking political access to regulatory outcomes.