[This article presents a model that provides insights about various measures of portfolio performance. The model explores several criticisms of these measures. These include the problem of identifying an appropriate benchmark portfolio, the possibility of overestimating risk because of market-timing ability, and the failure of informed investors to earn positive risk-adjusted returns because of increasing risk aversion. The article argues that these need not be serious impediments to performance evaluation.]

This paper explores the linkages between stock price efficiency, the choice between private and public financing, and the development of capital markets in emerging economies. Generally, the advantage of public financing is high if costly information is diverse and cheap to acquire, and if investors receive valuable information without cost. The value of public firms generally depends on public market size, which implies that there can be a positive externality associated with going public, so that an inferior equilibrium can exist where too few firms go public. The model is consistent with empirical observations on financial market development.

This paper finds that, on average, targets that terminate takeover offers significantly increase their leverage ratios. Targets that increase their leverage ratios the most reduce capital expenditures, sell assets, reduce employment, increase focus, and realize cash flows and share prices that outperform their benchmarks in the five years following the failed takeover. Our evidence suggests that leverage‐increasing targets act in the interests of shareholders when they terminate takeover offers and that higher leverage helps firms remain independent not because it entrenches managers, but because it commits managers to making the improvements that would be made by potential raiders.

Firm sizes and book-to-market ratios are both highly correlated with the average returns of common stocks. Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French (1993) argue that the association between these characteristics and returns arise because the characteristics are proxies for nondiversifiable factor risk. In contrast, the evidence in this article indicates that the return premia on small capitalization and high book-to-market stocks does not arise because of the comovements of these stocks with pervasive factors. It is the characteristics rather than the covariance structure of returns that appear to explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns.

This paper documents that strategies that buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that hav e performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns o ver three- to twelve-month holding periods. The authors find that the profitability of these strategies are not due to their systematic risk or to delay ed stock price reactions to common factors. However, part of the abnorm al returns generated in the first year after portfolio formation dissipates in the following two years. A similar pattern of returns around the earnings announcements of past winners and losers is also documented.

This paper investigates the determinants of leveraged buyout activity by comparing firms that have implemented leveraged buyouts to those that have not. Consistent with the free cash flow theory, the authors find that firms that initiate leveraged buyouts can be characterized as having a combination of unfavorable investment opportunities (low Tobin's q) and relatively high cash flow. Leveraged buyout firms also tend to be more diversified than firms that do not undertake leveraged buyouts. In addition, firms with high expected costs of financial distress (e.g, those with high research and development expenditures) are less likely to do leveraged buyouts.

This paper analyzes how mutual fund performance relates to past performance. These tests are based on a multiple portfolio benchmark that was formed on the basis of securities characteristics. The authors find evidence that differences in performance between funds persist over time and that this persistence is consistent with the ability of fund managers to earn abnormal returns.

This paper presents a model of tender offers in which the bid perfectly reveals the bidder's private information about the size of the value improvement that can be generated by a takeover. We argue that bidders with greater improvements will offer higher premia to ensure that sufficient shares are tendered to obtain control. The model relates announcement date returns and takeover success or failure to the amount bid, the initial shareholdings of the bidder, the number of shares the bidder attempts to purchase, the dilution of minority shareholders, and managerial opposition. We show that managerial defensive measures will sometimes increase the probability of the offer's success, either by raising the incentive to bid high or by decreasing the asymmetry of information about the improvement.

This paper demonstrates that the various market imperfections that have been suggested to explain observed portfolio choices and capital structures can be circumvented if securities (e.g., options) can be traded that simulate forward contracts on stock. It is shown that if the risk-adjusted returns to bondholders exceed the returns to stockholders (to reflect personal tax differences) tax-exempt investors will prefer a combination of these synthetic forward purchases and corporate bonds to purchasing stock directly. They will not, as has been suggested, include stock in their portfolios for diversification purposes when they can alternatively purchase securities that simulate forward contracts. It is also shown that firms that can sell synthetic forward positions on their own stock can essentially guarantee that sufficient funds will be available to meet their bond obligations. This gives firms the opportunity to increase their debt levels without increasing the possibility of bankruptcy and the corresponding administrative and agency costs.

A firm's liquidation can impose costs on its customers, workers, and suppliers. An agency relationship between these individuals and the firm exists in that the liquidation decision controlled by the firm (as the agent) affects other individuals (the customers, workers, and suppliers as principals). The analysis in this paper suggests that capital structure can control the incentive/conflict problem of this relationship by serving as a pre-positioning or bonding mechanism. Appropriate selection of capital structure assures that incentives are aligned so that the firm implements the ex-ante value-maximizing liquidation policy.