We examine the sophistication of analysts' cash flow forecasts to better understand what accrual adjustments, if any, analysts make when forecasting cash flows. As a preliminary step, we first demonstrate that prior empirical tests used to evaluate the sophistication of analysts' cash flow forecasts are not diagnostic. We then present three sets of evidence to triangulate our conclusion that analysts' cash flow forecasts incorporate meaningful accrual adjustments. First, we review a stratified random sample of 90 analyst reports and find that the majority of these analysts include explicit adjustments for working capital and other accruals in their cash flow forecasts. Second, using a large sample of analysts' cash flow forecasts from 1993–2008, we find that these forecasts outperform time‐series cash flow forecasts in correctly predicting the sign and magnitude of accruals. Finally, we find a significant market reaction to analysts' cash flow forecast revisions, suggesting that investors find these revisions informative. Collectively, our findings demonstrate that analysts' cash flow forecasts are not simply naïve extensions of their own earnings forecasts, but that they reflect meaningful and useful accrual adjustments. These findings are relevant to researchers who examine analysts' cash flow forecasts in a variety of settings, and to investors and practitioners who employ these forecasts for valuation purposes.

We study whether, and more importantly, through what mechanisms, quasi-indexers affect portfolio firms’ tax planning by employing the discontinuity in quasi-indexer ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 index cutoff. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that higher quasi-indexer ownership leads to greater tax saving. With respect to the mechanisms, we find that the greater tax saving is a result of a focus on improved overall firm performance, not a specific focus on improved tax planning. We further find that the documented tax saving effect is partially due to quasi-indexers’ influences on executive equity incentives, corporate governance, and information environment.

We examine the voluntary disclosure behavior of peer firms of hostile takeover targets. We find that peer firms under control threat use a disclosure strategy that emphasizes bad news: they provide more bad news forecasts, tend to bundle bad news forecasts with earnings announcements, use more negative tone in conference call presentations, and more evenly distribute negative tonal words throughout the presentation to heighten the visibility of bad news. This asymmetric disclosure of bad news is concentrated in firms whose managers have greater incentives to mitigate the control threat—firms with younger CEOs, CEOs with higher total compensation, and firms with weaker anti-takeover provisions. Further tests show that peer firms also manage accruals downward. We contribute to the sparse literature on the impact of corporate control contests on voluntary disclosure by demonstrating that peer firms under control threat emphasize bad news to preempt control threat.

Taxes represent a significant cost to the firm and shareholders, and it is generally expected that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness. However, this argument ignores potential non-tax costs that can accompany tax aggressiveness, especially those arising from agency problems. Firms owned/run by founding family members are characterized by a unique agency conflict between dominant and small shareholders. Using multiple measures to capture tax aggressiveness and founding family presence, we find that family firms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts, ceteris paribus. This result suggests that family owners are willing to forgo tax benefits to avoid the non-tax cost of a potential price discount, which can arise from minority shareholders’ concern with family rent-seeking masked by tax avoidance activities [Desai and Dharmapala, 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 145–179]. Our result is also consistent with family owners being more concerned with the potential penalty and reputation damage from an IRS audit than non-family firms. We obtain similar inferences when using a small sample of tax shelter cases.