Using a sample of 856 management earnings forecasts, we provide evidence that managers release larger shock‐earnings forecasts in nontrading periods. Our results do not depend on whether the magnitude of the shock is measured exogenously (unexpected accounting earnings) or endogenously (security market reaction). The timing effects are more pronounced for less‐precise (i.e., open‐interval and closed‐interval) forecasts. Also, we provide evidence of an overnight reaction to closed‐period management forecast releases. Our results are consistent with explanations for voluntary disclosure that rely on a precommitted policy of information asymmetry reduction (see Diamond 1985; King, Pownall, and Waymire 1990). These explanations lead to predictions of strategic timing of greater shocks in the nontrading period in order to provide the less‐informed with a period for information evaluation. Résumé. À partir d'un échantillon de 856 prévisions de bénéfices publiées par la direction de diverses entreprises, les auteurs démontrent que les prévisions publiées par les gestionnaires en période où les titres ne sont pas négociés ont davantage d'impact. Les résultats qu'ils obtiennent ne dépendent pas du caractère exogène (bénéfices comptables inattendus) ou endogène (réaction du marché des valeurs mobilières) de la mesure de l'impact. L'effet du choix du moment est plus prononcé pour les prévisions moins précises (c'est‐à‐dire à intervalle ouvert et à intervalle fermé). Les auteurs démontrent aussi qu'il se produit une réaction à la publication de prévisions par la direction en période de fermeture, dans les vingt‐quatre heures qui suivent la publication. Les résultats de l'étude sont conformes au principe de la présentation facultative d'information dont l'explication repose sur une politique, préalablement adoptée, de réduction de l'asymétrie de l'information (voir Diamond, 1985; King, Pownall et Waymire, 1990). Cette explication mène à des prédictions voulant que l'on choisisse, à des fins stratégiques, les périodes de non‐négociation des titres pour publier les prévisions de bénéfices dont l'impact est plus grand, de manière à laisser aux investisseurs moins bien informés un certain laps de temps pour évaluer l'information.

ABSTRACT Managers often explain their earnings forecasts by linking forecasted performance to their internal actions and the actions of parties external to the firm. These attributions potentially aid investors in the interpretation of management forecasts by confirming known relationships between attributions and profitability or by identifying additional causes that investors should consider when forecasting earnings. We investigate why managers choose to provide attributions with their forecasts and whether the attributions are related to security price reactions to management earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 951 management earnings forecasts issued from 1993 to 1996, we find that attributions are more likely for larger firms, less likely for firms in regulated industries, less likely for forecasts issued over longer horizons, more likely for bad news forecasts, and more likely for forecasts that are maximum type. Furthermore, attributions are associated with greater absolute price reactions to management forecasts, more negative price reactions to management forecasts (forecast news held constant), and a greater price reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings. Our findings hold after control for the aforementioned determinants of attributions and after control for other firm‐ and forecast‐specific variables that are often associated with security prices.

This study examines the effects of management forecast precision (i.e., lack of uncertainty) on equity pricing and the assessment of earnings uncertainty. Kim and Verrecchia (1991) modeled the price reaction to the public release of information as a positive function of both the unexpected component of the information and the information's precision. We test these predictions with a sample of 868 management forecasts for 1983-1986 annual and interim earnings. The use of management forecasts rather than actual earnings to test the precision hypothesis has the distinct advantage that the level of forecast precision is not directly regulated and thus may vary across forecasts. Further, managers explicitly disclose their level of uncertainty. Both this study and Pownall et al. (1993) document that most forecasts are open-interval (minimums and maximums), closed-interval (ranges), or general impressions rather than point estimates. The method used to test the precision hypothesis removes restrictions on the traditional regression of unexpected returns on unexpected earnings. Specifically, the slope and intercept coefficients that map unexpected earnings into unexpected returns can vary in the cross-section as a function of forecast precision. Our results support a direct relation between forecast precision and the importance of management forecasts for security pricing. Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) and Morse et al. (1991) modeled a decrease in investors' consensus as a positive function of the magnitude of signal surprise and the dispersion of the perceived precision of the signal. We examine these predictions with a sample of 221 point and closed-interval (range) forecasts. We calculate whether the range of outcomes disclosed by a manager exceeds the range of Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) analyst forecasts. We find this variable and the magnitude of unexpected security returns (a proxy for signal surprise) to be positively associated with increases in the standard deviation of IBES analyst forecasts. Morse et al. (1991) found the hypothesized relation between signal surprise and increase in analyst forecast variance, but were unable to separate the precision effect from the signal surprise effect. Managers' explicit labeling of forecasts as more uncertain through range disclosure permits the direct calculation of management forecast precision relative to analyst forecast precision. Our tests involve joint hypotheses of the effects of forecast precision on security prices and the credibility of managers' disclosures of forecast precision. Ajinkya and Gift (1984) developed and tested the "expectations adjustment hypothesis" which posits sufficient incentives for credible, symmetric forecast disclosure. King et al. (1990) argued that expectations adjustment also suggests credible labeling of the precision of forecasts.

ABSTRACT We document the interrelationship of disclosure policy decisions among firms by providing evidence that the cessation of quarterly management forecast guidance by 656 firms (“stoppers”) during 2004–2009 is associated with a pursuant increase in quarterly forecasts by previously non-forecasting firms in the same industries (“free-riders”). Increased forecasting by free-riders is positively associated with the information loss in the industry (proxied by the number of stoppers in the industry, the strength of previously existing information transfer relations between stoppers and free-riders, and whether stoppers and free-riders are peer firms) and the importance of the information loss to the free-riders (proxied by analyst following and the existence of new share issues). Following the cessation event, free-riders' cost of capital decreases as a function of the extent to which free-riders immediately initiate quarterly forecasting. JEL Classifications: M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources indicated in the text.

Empirical accounting research provides surprisingly little evidence on whether accounting earnings numbers capture cross-sectional differences in risk that are associated with cross-sectional differences in share prices. We address two questions regarding the risk-relevance of accounting numbers: (1) Are accounting-related risk measures (i.e., the systematic risk and total volatility in a firm's time-series of residual return on equity) associated with the market's assessment and pricing of equity risk? (2) If so, then are these accounting-related risk measures incrementally associated with the market's assessment and pricing of equity risk beyond other observable factors, such as those in the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model? We develop an accounting-fundamentals-based measure of the market's pricing of risk—the difference between actual share price and a residual income valuation model estimate of share value using risk-free rates of return. Our results show that both systematic risk and total volatility in residual return on equity partially explain this pricing differential, and that the explanatory power of total volatility is incremental to the Fama and French (1992) factors—market beta, firm size, and the market-to-book ratio.

The vast majority of managers’ earnings forecasts are issued concurrently (i.e., bundled) with their firm’s current earnings announcement. We document a predictable bias in these forecasts—the forecasts fail to fully reflect the persistence of the current earnings surprise. Specifically, we find that managers issue (1) optimistically biased forecasts alongside negative earnings surprises and (2) pessimistically biased forecasts alongside large positive earnings surprises. Bayesian updating implies this bias could be unintentional, but we find that the bias is stronger when managers have greater incentives and fewer constraints to issue biased forecasts, suggesting that, to some extent, the bias might be intentional. Relatedly, although managers typically have better information about their firm’s earnings than analysts, we show that analyst reliance on these biased management forecasts represents a mechanism (and an alternative interpretation) for a similar analyst underreaction to current earnings attributed in the literature to analysts’ cognitive bias. We also find that, on average, investors do not appear to initially understand the bias in these forecasts but do unravel it over longer windows. However, investors more quickly unravel the bias when the manager has a history of issuing biased forecasts and when the firm has more sophisticated investors. Overall, we document that managers’ forecasts appear to repeatedly underweight the persistence of current earnings surprises, are biased in ways that improve investors’ perceptions of managers’ ability, and that this behavior concentrates in subsamples where outsiders have a harder time recognizing any bias.

Citing fear of legal liability as a partial explanation, prior research documents (1) managers' reluctance to voluntarily disclose management earnings forecasts, and (2) greater forecast disclosure frequencies in periods of bad news. We provide evidence on how management earnings forecast disclosure differs between the United States (U.S.) and Canada, two otherwise similar business environments with different legal regimes. Canadian securities laws and judicial interpretations create a far less litigious environment than exists in the U.S. We find a greater frequency of management earnings forecast disclosure in Canada relative to the U.S. Further, although U.S. managers are relatively more likely to issue forecasts during interim periods in which earnings decrease, Canadian managers do not exhibit that tendency. Instead, Canadian managers issue more forecasts when earnings are increasing, and their forecasts are of annual rather than interim earnings. Also consistent with a less litigious environment, Canadian managers issue more precise and longer-term forecasts. These findings hold after controlling for other determinants of management earnings forecast disclosure that might differ between the two countries—firm size, earnings volatility, information asymmetry, growth, capitalization rates, and membership in high-technology and regulated industries.

Management-issued linguistic tone is, on average, positively associated with future earnings and incrementally priced by the market. However, prior capital markets research also shows that linguistic tone is difficult to process, while lab-based findings establish that less sophisticated investors are more susceptible to the use of heuristics in their interpretation of tone. Taken together, these findings motivate us to examine whether investors disagree on the valuation implications of linguistic tone and whether small investors are subject to differential, and notably less efficient, trading in response to the linguistic tone in these corporate announcements. We measure “residual tone” (i.e., that portion of linguistic tone that is not associated with contemporaneous economic news or current valuation fundamentals) for a sample of publicly-released management forecasts. We find that abnormal trading volume is increasing in the residual tone of management forecasts after controlling for the price reaction to forecasts, suggesting that there is significant investor disagreement over the implication of this tone for firm value. Further tests show that the net buying behavior of small investors is positively associated with residual tone, while larger investors tend to sell on this signal. The negative relation between residual tone and future stock returns found in prior work on earnings announcements holds in our sample of management forecasts as well, implying that this differential buying behavior involves an economically significant wealth transfer from small to large investors. We show in an extended analysis that any success that might accrue to small investors from trading positions taken during the event period is decreasing in residual tone.

Accounting researchers (and potentially others) generally select rather simple, lower-order, time-series models to develop proxies for earnings persistence. However, measures of persistence produced by such models are not related to characteristics of the firm's economic environment that are expected to influence earnings persistence. Using a sample of 162 calendar year-end New York Stock Exchange firms, we document the cross-sectional relations between a set of relatively constant, firm-specific, economic characteristics that are theoretical determinants of persistence and measures of earnings persistence derived from both lower-order and higher-order Autoregressive, Integrated, Moving-Average (ARIMA) models. When lower-order ARIMA models are used to generate measures of earnings persistence, the cross-sectional regression models measuring the association between persistence and economic determinants of persistence yield very low adjusted R2s. In sharp contrast, when differenced, higher-order ARIMA models are used to measure earnings persistence, adjusted R2s are in the 10–12 percent range. Moreover, independent variables such as capital intensity, barriers-to-entry, and product-type are all significant in the directions suggested by economic theory. Our results are consistent with Lipe and Kormendi (1994) who argue that higher-order ARIMA models do a better job of capturing the valuerelevance of current period earnings than lower-order models.