In this paper we theoretically and empirically examine the interaction between hedging, financing, and investment decisions. A simple equilibrium model with costly financial distress suggests that as firms become more efficient at risky investments vis a vis low risk investments, they will borrow less, invest more in risky assets, and hedge more. The model also predicts a positive relationship between hedging and leverage – a result consistent with debt capacity arguments. We test the model empirically using a simultaneous equations framework to investigate the determinants of firm-level hedging, financing and investing decisions. The results strongly support the hypothesis that the hedging, financing and investment decisions are jointly determined. In addition, we find strong support for the central hypothesis that firms more efficient investing in risky technologies more aggressively hedge and use less debt financing in order to maximize their comparative advantage.

The minimum cost output configuration for a firm may change as the result of a variety of factors, including changes in market structure. In this paper we test this structural change hypothesis with savings and loan data. We find support for the hypothesis that separable, constant returns to scale production functions characterize the average savings and loan in our sample in 1983. This is in contrast to the cost complementarities found in 1978. We argue that this result may be the result of regulatory changes that allowed savings and loans to alter their production mix to fully capture the benefits of joint production.

The minimum cost output configuration for a firm may change as the result of a variety of factors, including changes in market structure. In this paper we test this structural change hypothesis with savings and loan data. We find support for the hypothesis that separable, constant returns to scale production functions characterize the average savings and loan in our sample in 1983. This is in contrast to the cost complementarities found in 1978. We argue that this result may be the result of regulatory changes that allowed savings and loans to alter their production mix to fully capture the benefits of joint production.

In this paper, we extend earlier work on hedging models so that uncertainty about both deposit supply and loan demand is incorporated as well as random rates of return on loans and CD's. Our model suggests that the optimal forward position is the sum of three ratios that should be estimated simultaneously. Using bank-specific data, the optimal hedge ratios are estimated in both the pre-deregulation and deregulation subperiods. Our results show that previous studies of bank hedging with interest rate futures have greatly overstated (a) the volume of short futures positions that banks should take and (b) the degree of homogeneity of optimal hedge ratios across the banking system. Similarly, deregulation has not uniformly affected the interest rate risk borne by different institutions.

In this paper, we extend earlier work on hedging models so that uncertainty about both deposit supply and loan demand is incorporated as well as random rates of return on loans and CD's. Our model suggests that the optimal forward position is the sum of three ratios that should be estimated simultaneously. Using bank‐specific data, the optimal hedge ratios are estimated in both the pre‐deregulation and deregulation subperiods. Our results show that previous studies of bank hedging with interest rate futures have greatly overstated (a) the volume of short futures positions that banks should take and (b) the degree of homogeneity of optimal hedge ratios across the banking system. Similarly, deregulation has not uniformly affected the interest rate risk borne by different institutions.

While it has been known for some time that, under uncertainty, the original version of the Fisher hypothesis is not precisely correct, empirical researchers have largely ignored this fact. Such an omission has possibly resulted in erroneous conclusions concerning other hypotheses; most notably the impact of prices on the real economy. This paper clarifies some of the previous interpretations of the existing empirical literature and provides a theoretical version of the relation between prices and interest rates. Empirical tests based on both the Livingston survey data and data from time-series forecasting models provide support for the Fisher effect and the hypothesis that only covariance risk is priced in the Treasury bill market.

While it has been known for some time that, under uncertainty, the original version of the Fisher hypothesis is not precisely correct, empirical researchers have largely ignored this fact. Such an omission has possibly resulted in erroneous conclusions concerning other hypotheses; most notably the impact of prices on the real economy. This paper clarifies some of the previous interpretations of the existing empirical literature and provides a theoretical version of the relation between prices and interest rates. Empirical tests based on both the Livingston survey data and data from time‐series forecasting models provide support for the Fisher effect and the hypothesis that only covariance risk is priced in the Treasury bill market.

We investigate the relation between derivatives use and corporations’ cost of equity capital. Using a large sample of non-financial firms, we compute and analyze (i) the relative cost of equity of firms that use derivatives and those that do not; and (ii) the change in cost of equity experienced by firms initiating derivatives programs. We find that the cost of equity of derivatives users is lower than non-users by 24–78 basis points. Our results are robust to specifications that account for potential endogeneity related to a firm’s derivatives use and capital structure decisions. We further find that the reduction in the cost of equity is attributable to both lower market beta and SMB beta, suggesting that firms use derivatives to reduce their financial distress risk and that this distress risk has a systematic component that is priced in the market. Finally, the observed reductions in the cost of equity tend to be largest for smaller firms and for firms utilizing currency and interest rate derivatives.

Introduction: Multinational Enterprise and Multinational Financial Management. PART ONE: ENVIRONMENT OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT. The Determination of Exchange Rates. The International Monetary System. The Balance of Payments and International Economic Linkages. The Foreign Exchange Market. Currency Futures and Options Markets. Parity Conditions in International Finance and Currency Forecasting. PART TWO: FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT. Measuring Accounting Exposure. Managing Accounting Exposure. Measuring Economic Exposure. Managing Economic Exposure. PART THREE: MULTINATIONAL WORKING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT. Financing Foreign Trade. Current Asset Management. Managing the Multinational Financial System. PART FOUR: FINANCING FOREIGN OPERATIONS. International Financing and International Financial Markets. Special Financing Vehicles. International Banking Trends and Strategies. The Cost of Capital for Foreign Investments. PART FIVE: FOREIGN INVESTMENT ANALYSIS. International Portfolio Investment. Corporate Strategy and Foreign Direct Investment. Capital Budgeting for the Multinational Corporation. The Measurement and Management of Political Risk. Glossary of Key Words and Terms in International Finance.

[We study the problem of optimal pricing for a bundle of services characterized by two attributes (e.g., quantity and quality) and subject to capacity limitations or peakloading. An application is to services that take the form of a load-duration curve. Using separability assumptions on the demand and cost functions, we derive the optimal pricing policy for a monopolist seller. An example is solved completely.]