We examine the relation between cross-sectional earnings dispersion and the banking sector's performance. Theory suggests that cross-sectional earnings dispersion will lead to greater loan losses and higher interest rates. We confirm this hypothesis by showing a robust association between earnings dispersion and bank performance. Dispersion in earnings explains more of the overall bank performance than macroeconomic indicators for business cycles. We also find that banks tighten their lending standards and increase interest rates to partially compensate for future loan losses. Finally, we find that cross-sectional earnings dispersion is associated with dispersion in bank performance. The relation between dispersion in bank performance and earnings dispersion is declining over time suggesting that systematic risk is rising in the banking sector.

ABSTRACT We examine the relationship between disclosure of nonfinancial information and analyst forecast accuracy using firm-level data from 31 countries. We use the issuance of stand-alone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports to proxy for disclosure of nonfinancial information. We find that the issuance of stand-alone CSR reports is associated with lower analyst forecast error. This relationship is stronger in countries that are more stakeholder-oriented—i.e., in countries where CSR performance is more likely to affect firm financial performance. The relationship is also stronger for firms and countries with more opaque financial disclosure, suggesting that issuance of stand-alone CSR reports plays a role complementary to financial disclosure. These results hold after we control for various factors related to firm financial transparency and other potentially confounding institutional factors. Collectively, our findings have important implications for academics and practitioners in understanding the function of CSR disclosure in financial markets. Data Availability: The data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Abstract The IRS administers tax laws enacted by Congress. As part of the IRS's duties, they often consider taxpayers' financial statements to help ensure accurate tax reporting and payments. We posit that enhanced financial statement disclosures of tax information under FASB Interpretation Number 48 (FIN 48) lead to more IRS scrutiny and alter the incentives for corporate innovation. Using patent applications as a measure of corporate innovation, we employ a difference‐in‐differences research design with publicly listed US firms as the treatment group and privately held US firms not subject to the disclosure requirements as the control group. We find robust evidence that, following the onset of FIN 48, the number of patent applications by publicly listed firms decreased between 15.4% and 24.3% relative to private firms. This decline in patent applications is attributable to incremental innovation, suggesting that firms lower innovation related to projects with tax benefits that are more likely to be scrutinized by the taxing authorities. These findings suggest that there are real effects of IRS scrutiny and, in particular, real effects of tax disclosures under FIN 48 on corporate innovation.