We study whether social media can play a negative information role by impeding price discovery in the presence of highly speculative rumors. We focus on merger rumors, where most do not materialize. We find that merger rumors accompanied by greater Twitter activity elicit greater immediate market reaction even though rumor-related Twitter activity is unrelated to the probability of merger realization. The price distortion associated with tweet volume persists weeks after a rumor and reverses only after eight weeks. The price distortion is more pronounced for rumors tweeted by Twitter users with greater social influence, for target firms with low institutional ownership, and for rumors that supply more details. Our evidence suggests that social media can be a rumor mill that hinders the market's price discovery of potentially false information.

ABSTRACT We explore whether managers’ strong desire for good performance distorts their expectations and, consequently, corporate investment efficiency. We find that managers overweight favorable information and underweight unfavorable information, resulting in optimistic earnings guidance. We construct an ex ante measure of optimism and show that greater optimism is associated with a lower inventory investment efficiency: Managers overinvest in inventory, resulting in lower inventory turnover and increased incidence and severity of inventory writedowns. We also find motivational optimism influences firms’ financial reporting and is associated with an increased incidence of financial misreporting. Our results are consistent with the psychology theory of motivated reasoning, which emphasizes the distortive effects of preferences on beliefs and judgments. JEL Classifications: M41; D91; G41; G31.

ABSTRACT We examine whether the media can act as a friction that hampers the efficiency of corporate labor investment, a decision that attracts significant media attention. We develop a new measure of media exposure that takes into account the circulation and geographic proximity of a comprehensive set of media outlets. We show media exposure leads to greater labor investment inefficiency. Closer examination reveals that media exposure is associated with firms underhiring, but not underfiring. This underinvestment in labor by managers helps avoid future layoffs but is inefficient in that firms are left understaffed relative to their economic fundamentals. Further, we find that managers’ concerns about their personal reputation, but not the firm’s reputation, primarily drive our results. Our findings illustrate that the media can serve as a friction for, in addition to being a facilitator or monitor of, corporate labor investment decisions. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: D25; G31; M51.