This paper focuses on funds of funds (FOFs) as a form of financial intermediation in private equity (both buyout and venture capital). After accounting for fees, FOFs provide returns equal to or above public market indices for both buyout and venture capital. While FOFs focusing on buyouts outperform public markets, they underperform direct fund investment strategies in buyout. In contrast, the average performance of FOFs in venture capital is on a par with results from direct venture fund investing. This suggests that FOFs in venture capital (but not in buyouts) are able to identify and access superior performing funds.

The persistence of returns is a critical issue for investors in their choice of private equity managers. In this paper, we analyse buyout performance persistence in new ways, using a unique database containing cash flow data on 13,523 portfolio company investments by 865 buyout funds. We focus on unique realized deals and find that persistence of fund managers has substantially declined as the private equity sector has matured and become more competitive. Private equity has, therefore, largely conformed to the pattern found in most other asset classes in which past performance is a poor predictor of the future.

ABSTRACT We study the performance of nearly 1,400 U.S. buyout and venture capital funds using a new data set from Burgiss. We find better buyout fund performance than previously documented—performance has consistently exceeded that of public markets. Outperformance versus the S&P 500 averages 20% to 27% over a fund's life and more than 3% annually. Venture capital funds outperformed public equities in the 1990s, but underperformed in the 2000s. Our conclusions are robust to various indices and risk controls. Performance in Cambridge Associates and Preqin is qualitatively similar to that in Burgiss, but is lower in Venture Economics.

ABSTRACT This paper uses evidence from a data set of 27 European IPOs to analyze how investors bid and the factors that influence their allocations. We also make use of a unique ranking of investor quality, associated with the likelihood of flipping the IPO. We find that investors perceived to be long‐term holders of the stock are consistently favored in allocation and in out‐turn profits. In contrast to Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) , we find little evidence that more informative bids receive larger allocations or higher profits. Our results cast doubt upon the extent of information production during the bookbuilding period.

Unlike in the U.S., the initial price range for European IPOs is seldom revised, although issues are often priced at the upper bound. We develop a model that explains this seemingly inefficient pricing behavior. As in Europe, but not in the U.S., underwriters in the model obtain information from investors before establishing the indicative price range. A commitment to stay within the range is necessary to extract private information from investors. Ours is therefore the first treatment in which the bookbuilding range has a clear economic role. The model has important implications for empirical research based on European primary market data.

We examine the costs and benefits of the global integration of initial public offering (IPO) markets associated with the diffusion of U.S. underwriting methods in the 1990s. Bookbuilding is becoming increasingly popular outside the United States and typically costs twice as much as a fixed-price offer. However, on its own, bookbuilding only leads to lower underpricing when conducted by U.S. banks and/or targeted at U.S. investors. For most issuers, the gains associated with lower underpricing outweighed the additional costs associated with hiring U.S. banks or marketing in the United States. This suggests a quality/price trade-off contrasting with the findings of Chen and Ritter, particularly since non-U.S. issuers raising US$20 million–US$80 million also typically pay a 7% spread when U.S. banks and investors are involved.

Abstract Individuals increasingly buy mutual funds via online platforms, whose “best-buy” recommendations heavily influence flows. As intermediaries of mutual funds, platforms provide none of the unobservable interaction or intangible benefits of brokers, and so allow clean tests of the determinants, influence, and value of their fund recommendations. Using unique U.K. data, we find that platforms favor “own-brand” funds and those paying them a higher commission share. Investors discount own-brand recommendations, but not those paying high commission shares (which were not observable in the United Kingdom). A regulatory ban on commission sharing lowered costs and improved the informativeness of platform recommendations.

ABSTRACT Using data from all of the leading international investment banks on 220 initial public offerings (IPOs) raising $160 billion between January 2010 and May 2015, we test the determinants of IPO allocations. We compare investors’ IPO allocations with proxies for their information production during bookbuilding and the broking (and other) revenues they generate for bookrunners. We find evidence consistent with information revelation theories. We also find strong support for the existence of a quid pro quo whereby broking revenues are a significant determinant of investors’ IPO allocations and profits. The quid pro quo remains when we control for unobserved investor characteristics and investor‐bank relationships.

ABSTRACT We compare fees charged by investment banks for conducting IPOs in the United States and Europe. In recent years, the “7% solution,” as documented by Chen and Ritter (2000) , has become even more prevalent in the United States, and is now the norm for IPOs raising up to $250 million. The same banks dominate both markets, but European IPO fees are roughly three percentage points lower, are much more variable, and have been falling. We review explanations for the gap in spreads and find the evidence consistent with strategic pricing. U.S. issuers could have saved over $1 billion a year by paying European fees.

When investors commit capital to a private equity fund, the money is not immediately invested but is called by the fund manager throughout an investment period of up to five years. The private equity business model allows fund managers to invest and divest the committed capital during the fund's lifetime at their own discretion, which gives them the flexibility to time the markets. Based on 7,591 private equity deals, which are benchmarked against 14,390 M&A transaction multiples, we find evidence that on average private equity funds are able to create value by timing the financial markets. Market timing ability is not captured by performance measures such as the PME, yet it is a potential source of returns for investors.