Errors and bias are both inherent features of accounting. In theory, while errors discourage bias by lowering the value relevance of accounting, they can also facilitate bias by providing camouflage. Consistent with theory, we find a hump‐shaped relation between a firm's propensity to engage in intentional misstatement and the prevalence of unintentional misstatements in the firm's industry for the whole economy and a majority of the industries. The result is robust to using firms’ number of items in financial statements and exposure to complex accounting rules as alternative proxies for errors and to using the restatement amount in net income to quantify the magnitude of bias and errors. To directly test for the two effects of errors, we show that when errors are more prevalent, the market reacts less to firms’ earnings surprises and bias is more difficult to detect. Our results highlight the imperfectness of accounting, advance understanding of firms’ reporting incentives, and shed light on accounting standard setting.

This paper demonstrates a positive effect of stock liquidity on blockholder governance. Liquidity increases the likelihood of block formation. Conditional upon acquiring a stake, liquidity reduces the likelihood that the blockholder governs through voice (intervention)—as shown by the lower propensity for active investment (filing Schedule 13D) than passive investment (filing Schedule 13G). The lower frequency of activism does not reflect the abandonment of governance, but governance through the alternative channel of exit (selling one's shares): A 13G filing leads to positive announcement returns and improvements in operating performance, especially in liquid firms. Moreover, taking into account the increase in block formation, liquidity has an unconditional positive effect on voice as well as exit. We use decimalization as an exogenous shock to liquidity to identify causal effects.

During 2005 to 2007, the SEC ordered a pilot program in which one‐third of the Russell 3000 index were arbitrarily chosen as pilot stocks and exempted from short‐sale price tests. Pilot firms’ discretionary accruals and likelihood of marginally beating earnings targets decrease during this period, and revert to pre‐experiment levels when the program ends. After the program starts, pilot firms are more likely to be caught for fraud initiated before the program, and their stock returns better incorporate earnings information. These results indicate that short selling, or its prospect, curbs earnings management, helps detect fraud, and improves price efficiency.

This paper explores U.S. public firms’ cryptocurrency holdings and accounting practices from 2013 to 2022 against the backdrop of the recently enacted crypto accounting rule, ASU 2023‐08. Descriptive analyses suggest exponential growth in corporate crypto holdings and significant variation in crypto accounting practices, underscoring the rule's necessity. Hypothesis tests using the pre‐rule data reveal three insights with direct relevance to the rule. First, firms appear to view crypto assets more akin to investments than intangible assets, consistent with the rule's mandate of the fair value model. Second, Big 4 auditors steer firms toward the impairment model and less detailed presentation choices. This conservative approach is unlikely to meet the new rule's goal of providing the most decision‐useful information. Third, increased liquidity of crypto markets prompts the use of the fair value model and a more detailed presentation, consistent with the rule's focus on more actively traded tokens. However, within our sample, we find some evidence consistent with fair value reporting increasing stock return volatility and no evidence that it enhances earnings informativeness.