This paper evaluates the information content of the treasury stock method for computing diluted earnings per share (EPS). We demonstrate that the treasury stock method decreases the annual association between earnings changes and stock returns and explain why this is the case. Further, we show that the treasury stock method leads to a dilutive adjustment that biases the random walk model of annual earnings in a predictable direction. Finally, we demonstrate that using the treasury stock method appears to confuse both analysts and investors: analysts' forecast errors increase with the size of the dilutive adjustment, and the association between unexpected earnings and stock returns at the earnings announcement date weakens as the dilutive adjustment increases.

This paper investigates whether the accrual pricing anomaly documented by Sloan (1996. The Accounting Review 71(3), 289–316) for annual data holds for quarterly data and whether this form of market mispricing is distinct from the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly. We find that the market appears to overestimate the persistence of the accrual component of quarterly earnings and, therefore, tends to overprice accruals. Moreover, the accrual mispricing appears to be distinct from post-earnings announcement drift. A hedge portfolio trading strategy that exploits both forms of market mispricing generates abnormal returns in excess of those based on either unexpected earnings or accruals information alone.

Workers paid by the piece should be happy to introduce new techniques that increase output, but firms always seem to reduce the piece rate when workers start earning too much money. Workers respond by restricting output and keeping good new ideas to themselves. We show that this outcome is inevitable in a competitive environment. However, there are noncompetitive situations where firms can use piece rates to get cooperation from their workers. These predictions are consistent with case history evidence from the cotton spinning industry in England in the nineteenth century and the Lincoln Electric Company in the United States even today. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.

We show that concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios may be ineffective in controlling risk taking. We propose, instead, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the FDIC insurance premium scheme incorporates incentive features of top-management compensation. With this scheme, we show that bank owners choose an optimal management compensation structure that induces first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank's management. We explicitly characterize the parameters of the optimal management compensation structure and the fairly priced FDIC insurance premium in the presence of a single or multiple sources of agency problems.

We show that concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios may be ineffective in controlling risk taking. We propose, instead, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the FDIC insurance premium scheme incorporates incentive features of top-management compensation. With this scheme, we show that bank owners choose an optimal management compensation structure that induces first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank's management. We explicitly characterize the parameters of the optimal management compensation structure and the fairly priced FDIC insurance premium in the presence of a single or multiple sources of agency problems.

Kevin C. W. Chen, Michael P. Schoderbek, The 1993 Tax Rate Increase and Deferred Tax Adjustments: A Test of Functional Fixation, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), pp. 23-44

Abstract This paper evaluates the information content of the treasury stock method for computing diluted earnings per share (EPS). We demonstrate that the treasury stock method decreases the annual association between earnings changes and stock returns and explain why this is the case. Further, we show that the treasury stock method leads to a dilutive adjustment that biases the random walk model of annual earnings in a predictable direction. Finally, we demonstrate that using the treasury stock method appears to confuse both analysts and investors: analysts' forecast errors increase with the size of the dilutive adjustment, and the association between unexpected earnings and stock returns at the earnings announcement date weakens as the dilutive adjustment increases.

"We examine the implications of portfolio theory for the cross-sectional behavior of equity trading volume. Two-fund separation theorems suggest a natural definition for trading activity: share turnover...We find strong evidence against two-fund separation, and a principal-components decomposition suggests that turnover is well approximated by a two-factor linear model" -- Abstract.