The asymptotic refinements attributable to the block bootstrap for time series are not as large as those of the nonparametric iid bootstrap or the parametric bootstrap. One reason is that the independence between the blocks in the block bootstrap sample does not mimic the dependence structure of the original sample. This is the join-point problem. In this paper, we propose a method of solving this problem. The idea is not to alter the block bootstrap. Instead, we alter the original sample statistics to which the block bootstrap is applied. We introduce block statistics that possess join-point features that are similar to those of the block bootstrap versions of these statistics. We refer to the application of the block bootstrap to block statistics as the block–block bootstrap. The asymptotic refinements of the block–block bootstrap are shown to be greater than those obtained with the block bootstrap and close to those obtained with the nonparametric iid bootstrap and parametric bootstrap.

This paper reviews the extant empirical studies of financial innovation. Adopting broad criteria, the authors found just two dozen studies, over half of which (fourteen) had been conducted since 2000. Since some financial innovations are examined by more than one study, only fourteen distinct phenomena have been covered. Especially striking is the fact that only two studies are directed at the hypotheses advanced in many broad descriptive articles concerning the environmental conditions (e.g., regulation, taxes, unstable macroeconomic conditions, and ripe technologies) spurring financial innovation. The authors offer some tentative conjectures as to why empirical studies of financial innovation are comparatively rare. Among their suggested culprits is an absence of accessible data. The authors urge financial regulators to undertake more surveys of financial innovation and to make the survey data more available to researchers.

This paper reviews the extant empirical studies of financial innovation. Adopting broad criteria and spanning a long time horizon, we found surprisingly few studies (39), with most (23) having been conducted since 1998. Especially striking is that only two studies test hypotheses advanced in many descriptive articles as to the economic/environmental conditions that encourage financial innovation. We offer conjectures as to why empirical studies of financial innovation are comparatively rare, including as a culprit the absence of accessible data. We urge financial regulators to undertake more surveys of financial innovation and to make the resulting data available to researchers.

This study contributes to the literature on the role of the board by investigating the effect of board composition on the practice of earnings management in Canada. We find that earnings are managed upward to avoid reporting losses and earnings declines. While outside directors, as a whole, do not reduce abnormal accruals, directors from financial intermediaries reduce earnings management, and the board representation of active institutional shareholders reduces it further. We do not find that monitoring of abnormal accruals by outside directors, as a whole, or by directors from financial institutions is more effective after the issuance of the Toronto Stock Exchange's Corporate Governance Guidelines of 1994. Finally, we do not find that earnings management decreases with the average tenure of outside directors as board members of the firm, either. Our findings suggest that adding outside directors to the board may not achieve improvement in governance practices by itself, especially in jurisdictions where ownership is highly concentrated and the outside directors' labor market may not be well developed.

We investigate external and internal corporate governance activity observed at Japanese banks over 1985–1996. External governance appears to be inactive, and even after the onset of the banking crisis of the 1990s there are few mergers, failures, and other changes in ownership and control. Prior to the banking crisis we do not find a relation between bank performance and executive turnover. In contrast, non-routine turnover of bank presidents is inversely related to both stock returns and profitability in the 1990s. Consequently, internal governance activity is observable following the onset of the Japanese banking crisis, a period otherwise characterized by inactive external governance and regulatory forbearance.

Asian initial public offerings (IPOs) require investors to pay subscription funds up-front upon submission of applications, and these funds are locked-up for 1–3 weeks without interest. Hence, the IPO process entails an explicit financing cost (opportunity cost) whether investors borrow funds or use their own funds to apply for IPO shares. The IPO subscription costs are not trivial, especially in a high interest rate environment or when an IPO is highly oversubscribed. These costs should be considered in any comparison of IPO returns across countries.

Institutional investors' demand for a security this quarter is positively correlated with their demand for the security last quarter. We attribute this to institutional investors following each other into and out of the same securities ("herding") and institutional investors following their own lag trades. Although institutional investors are "momentum" traders, little of their herding results from momentum trading. Moreover, institutional demand is more strongly related to lag institutional demand than lag returns. Results are most consistent with the hypothesis that institutions herd as a result of inferring information from each other's trades. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.