ABSTRACT: In 1981, Congress enacted a "safe harbor" lease law that permitted firms to sell unneeded tax depreciation deductions and tax credits to other firms. During the effective life of the law, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) did not establish reporting or disclosure requirements for firms entering the safe harbor transactions. Because of this, many policies were followed. This paper examines the impact of this lack of reporting and disclosure guidance on the comparability and Interpretability of financial statements across firms involved in leasing. This study provides examples of problems the FASB might need to address when analyzing changes under the new tax bill.

In the mid-1990s, 30% of firms completing an SEO within three years of their IPO switched lead underwriter. This article provides evidence on why they switched. Contrary to predictions of prior research, there is little evidence that firms switch due to dissatisfaction with underwriter performance at the time of the IPO. A surprising result is that switchers’ IPOs were significantly less underpriced than non-switchers’ IPOs. However, switchers raised fewer proceeds than expected, compared to the mid-point of the filing range, while non-switchers raised significantly more proceeds. There are two main reasons for switching. Firms graduate to higher reputation underwriters, and they strategically buy additional and influential analyst coverage from the new lead underwriter. Survey results support these conclusions.

Valuation, Intangible assets, Components of Goodwill, Acquisitions

We test the empirical implications of several models of IPO underpricing. Consistent with the winner’s-curse hypothesis, we show that in markets where investors know a priori that they do not have to compete with informed investors, IPOs are not underpriced. We also show that IPOs underwritten by reputable investment banks experience significantly less underpricing and perform significantly better in the long run. We do not find empirical support for the signaling models that try to explain why firms underprice. In fact, we find that (1) firms that underprice more return to the reissue market less frequently, and for lesser amounts, than firms that underprice less, and (2) firms that underprice less experience higher earnings and pay higher dividends, contrary to the models’ predictions.

Prior studies have examined whether audit opinions have incremental explanatory power over financial statement data in predicting bankruptcy filings. However, recent regulatory pronouncements indicate that the auditor should attempt to predict impending financial distress (going‐concern difficulties), not whether a firm will file for bankruptcy. This study compares the audit opinion to the resolution of a bankruptcy filing to determine whether prior claims of audit failures might be due to the auditor's focus on financial distress resolution rather than the act of filing for bankruptcy. We find that the audit opinion is a significant variable in a model explaining the resolution of a bankruptcy filing. However, the audit opinion did not predict resolution of bankruptcy proceedings with any greater accuracy than did a naive mechanical model. Résumé. Des chercheurs se sont déjà demandé si l'opinion des vérificateurs avait un pouvoir explicatif marginal par rapport aux données des états financiers dans la prédiction des dépôts de bilan. Or, les règlements récemment promulgués prévoient que les vérificateurs doivent tenter de prédire les difficultés financières imminentes (menaces à la permanence de l'entreprise), et non pas les dépôts de bilan. Les auteurs mettent en parallèle l'opinion du vérificateur et l'issue des dépôts de bilan afin de déterminer si les allégations formulées d'inaptitude des vérificateurs peuvent être attribuables à l'intérêt porté par le vérificateur à la résolution des difficultés financières de l'entreprise plutôt qu'à l'acte du dépôt de bilan. Les auteurs concluent que l'opinion du vérificateur est une variable importante dans un modèle explicatif de l'issue des dépôts de bilan, maís qu'elle ne permet pas de prédire l'issue du déroulement de la faillite avec davantage d'exactitude qu'un modèle mécanique simple.

This paper examines underwriters' pricing errors and the information content of first‐day trading activity in IPOs. We show that first‐day winners continue to be winners over the first year, and first‐day dogs continue to be relative dogs. Exceptions are “extra‐hot” IPOs, which provide the worst future performance. We also demonstrate that large, supposedly informed, traders “flip” IPOs that perform the worst in the future. IPOs with low flipping generate abnormal returns of 1.5 percentage points per month over the first six months beginning on the third day. We show that flipping is predictable and conclude that underwriters' pricing errors are intentional.

This paper examines underwriters' pricing errors and the information content of first‐day trading activity in IPOs. We show that first‐day winners continue to be winners over the first year, and first‐day dogs continue to be relative dogs. Exceptions are “extra‐hot” IPOs, which provide the worst future performance. We also demonstrate that large, supposedly informed, traders “flip” IPOs that perform the worst in the future. IPOs with low flipping generate abnormal returns of 1.5 percentage points per month over the first six months beginning on the third day. We show that flipping is predictable and conclude that underwriters' pricing errors are intentional.

[In this article, we examine the information content of announcements of increased reserves for loan loss by Citicorp and other banks, and the later write-off announcement made by the Bank of Boston. During 1987, most major U.S. banks, led by Citicorp on 19 May 1987, announced large increases in their loan loss reserves because of problem loans in lesser developed countries (LDC). With substantial flexibility in accounting rules for determining loss exposure, the banks announced varying levels of reserve increases. On 14 December 1987, the Bank of Boston began a second round of activity relating to LDC debt by announcing a $200 million write-off of LDC loans and further increase in loan loss reserves. Financial reporters suggested that these events could be interpreted differently. Because Citicorp was a leading money-center bank, its announcement could be interpreted favorably as a signal of willingness to deal with the LDC debt problem. This interpretation could similarly apply to other banks, especially the more exposed money-center banks. In comparison, the Bank of Boston announcement was portrayed in the press as detrimental to the money-center banks for two reasons. First, unlike a reserve increase, a write-off reduces a bank's capital adequacy ratio. Capital adequacy ratios are used by bank regulators in determining the need for, and the level of, supervisory intervention. Second, the write-off was construed as an effort by regional banks to exploit their relatively limited exposure to LDC loans as a competitive advantage in the domestic banking market. We find evidence consistent with the expectations of the financial press. The strongest stock-price increases associated with both the Citicorp announcement and the subsequent announcements of reserve increases by other banks were found for the banks with the greatest exposure to LDC debt. In contrast, those banks with the greatest exposure to LDC debt and with the largest reserves sustained the largest stock-price decreases at the Bank of Boston write-off announcement. The larger money-center banks sustained, on average, a three-day decline in value of 5 percent around the Bank of Boston announcement date.]

This paper extends prior studies that attempt to explain the existence of unique securities, particularly Engel, Erickson, and Maydew [1999], by investigating why firms issue non‐voting, non‐convertible preferred stock (PS) instead of other securities. We find that the choice of PS is influenced by tax and regulatory changes imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and the 1989 Basle Banking Accord as well as various firm specific incentives. We find that industrials issue PS to preserve tax attributes by avoiding an ownership change and to maximize foreign tax credit utilization. In addition, we find that the regulatory requirements of the Basle Accord influence the choice by banks to issue PS. Finally, we show that although firms could have issued alternative securities that would have allowed them to achieve the same tax or regulatory goals, firm specific factors limit their ability to do so. For example, firms can also avoid triggering an ownership change by issuing straight debt, however, financial distress considerations may constrain their ability to issue additional debt. Therefore, we demonstrate that the final choice of PS is influenced by a combination of tax, regulatory, and firm specific incentives.