ABSTRACT This paper investigates the effect on bank equity values of the Comptroller of the Currency's announcement that some banks were “too big to fail” and that for those banks total deposit insurance would be provided. Using an event study methodology, we find positive wealth effects accruing to TBTF banks, with corresponding negative effects accruing to non‐included banks. We demonstrate that the magnitude of these effects differed with bank solvency and size. We also show that the policy to which the market reacted was that suggested by the Wall Street Journal and not that actually intended by the Comptroller.

This paper investigates the effect on bank equity values of the Comptroller of the Currency's announcement that some banks were "too big to fail" and that for those banks total deposit insurance would be provided. Using an event study methodology, the authors find positive wealth effects accruing to too-big-to-fail banks, with corresponding negative effects accruing to nonincluded banks. They demonstrate that the magnitude of these effects differed with bank solvency and size. The authors also show that the policy to which the market reacted was that suggested by the Wall Street Journal and not that actually intended by the Comptroller.

[The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced individual income tax rates below that of corporations. The fear that this would lead to a systematic disincorporation has not apparently materialized since the major stock exchanges report that only about 100 partnerships were traded during the next five years. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) suggest that this result is predictable because of the additional nontax costs of operating as a partnership, which include increased transactions costs, more restricted access to capital markets, and less control over management. Guenther (1992) and Terando and Omer (1992) provide evidence that firms must have considered both tax and nontax costs when choosing organizational form. This study examines whether the factors taken into consideration in organizational form choice also affected the market value of a sample of firms in the oil and gas industry during the period 1985-1988. We chose for our tests a valuation model used by Harris and Ohlson (1987) and others since many of the publicly traded (master limited) partnerships (MLPs) were created in the oil industry. The studies by Guenther (1992) and Terando and Omer (1992) show that MLPs generally had only one line of business, less debt, and higher dividend yields than their corporate counterparts. These differences are predictable in view of the tax consequences of operating in the partnership form. Guenther also finds MLPs to be less profitable, which is consistent with higher nontax costs of the partnership form. We show that MLPs invested significantly less in exploration for new deposits. The combination of the lower exploration expenditures, higher dividend yields, and poor financial performance suggests that MLPs may have been set up as limited-life entites to distribute assets to their unit holders in a tax-efficient manner. We extend the Harris and Ohlson (1987) valuation model by adding dividends and exploration levels. Exploration levels are found significant for both MLPs and corporations, but dividends are relevant only in the MLP model. We also find that dividend levels are significantly explained by asset values only for the MLPs. These valuation differences are consistent with tax-motivated organizational form choice and the perceived passive nature of the MLPs.]

Abstract The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced individual income tax rates below that of corporations. The fear that this would lead to a systematic disincorporation has not apparently materialized since the major stock exchanges report that only about 100 partnerships were traded during the next five years. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) suggest that this result is predictable because of the additional nontax costs of operating as a partnership, which include increased transactions costs, more restricted access to capital markets, and less control over management. Guenther (1992) and Terando and Omer (1992) provide evidence that firms must have considered both tax and nontax costs when choosing organizational form. This study examines whether the factors taken into consideration in organizational form choice also affected the market value of a sample of firms in the oil and gas industry during the period 1985-1988. We chose for our tests a valuation model used by Harris and Ohlson (1987) and others since many of the publicly traded (master limited) partnerships (MLPs) were created in the oil industry. The studies by Guenther (1992) and Terando and Omer (1992) show that MLPs generally had only one line of business, less debt, and higher dividend yields than their corporate counterparts. These differences are predictable in view of the tax consequences of operating in the partnership form. Guenther also finds MLPs to be less profitable, which is consistent with higher nontax costs of the partnership form. We show that MLPs invested significantly less in exploration for new deposits. The combination of the lower exploration expenditures, higher dividend yields, and poor financial performance suggests that MLPs may have been set up as limited-life entities to distribute assets to their unit holders in a tax-efficient manner. We extend the Harris and Ohlson (1987) valuation model by adding dividends and exploration levels. Exploration levels are found significant for both MLPs and corporations, but dividends are relevant only in the MLP model. We also find that dividend levels are significantly explained by asset values only for the MLPs. These valuation differences are consistent with tax-motivated organizational form choice and the perceived passive nature of the MLPs.

Abstract ABSTRACT: In 1981, Congress enacted a "safe harbor" lease law that permitted firms to sell unneeded tax depreciation deductions and tax credits to other firms. During the effective life of the law, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) did not establish reporting or disclosure requirements for firms entering the safe harbor transactions. Because of this, many policies were followed. This paper examines the impact of this lack of reporting and disclosure guidance on the comparability and Interpretability of financial statements across firms involved in leasing. This study provides examples of problems the FASB might need to address when analyzing changes under the new tax bill.

In the mid-1990s, 30% of firms completing an SEO within three years of their IPO switched lead underwriter. This article provides evidence on why they switched. Contrary to predictions of prior research, there is little evidence that firms switch due to dissatisfaction with underwriter performance at the time of the IPO. A surprising result is that switchers’ IPOs were significantly less underpriced than non-switchers’ IPOs. However, switchers raised fewer proceeds than expected, compared to the mid-point of the filing range, while non-switchers raised significantly more proceeds. There are two main reasons for switching. Firms graduate to higher reputation underwriters, and they strategically buy additional and influential analyst coverage from the new lead underwriter. Survey results support these conclusions.

Valuation, Intangible assets, Components of Goodwill, Acquisitions

Abstract. Prior studies have examined whether audit opinions have incremental explanatory power over financial statement data in predicting bankruptcy filings. However, recent regulatory pronouncements indicate that the auditor should attempt to predict impending financial distress (going‐concern difficulties), not whether a firm will file for bankruptcy. This study compares the audit opinion to the resolution of a bankruptcy filing to determine whether prior claims of audit failures might be due to the auditor's focus on financial distress resolution rather than the act of filing for bankruptcy. We find that the audit opinion is a significant variable in a model explaining the resolution of a bankruptcy filing. However, the audit opinion did not predict resolution of bankruptcy proceedings with any greater accuracy than did a naive mechanical model. Résumé. Des chercheurs se sont déjà demandé si l'opinion des vérificateurs avait un pouvoir explicatif marginal par rapport aux données des états financiers dans la prédiction des dépôts de bilan. Or, les règlements récemment promulgués prévoient que les vérificateurs doivent tenter de prédire les difficultés financières imminentes (menaces à la permanence de l'entreprise), et non pas les dépôts de bilan. Les auteurs mettent en parallèle l'opinion du vérificateur et l'issue des dépôts de bilan afin de déterminer si les allégations formulées d'inaptitude des vérificateurs peuvent être attribuables à l'intérêt porté par le vérificateur à la résolution des difficultés financières de l'entreprise plutôt qu'à l'acte du dépôt de bilan. Les auteurs concluent que l'opinion du vérificateur est une variable importante dans un modèle explicatif de l'issue des dépôts de bilan, maís qu'elle ne permet pas de prédire l'issue du déroulement de la faillite avec davantage d'exactitude qu'un modèle mécanique simple.

We test the empirical implications of several models of IPO underpricing. Consistent with the winner’s-curse hypothesis, we show that in markets where investors know a priori that they do not have to compete with informed investors, IPOs are not underpriced. We also show that IPOs underwritten by reputable investment banks experience significantly less underpricing and perform significantly better in the long run. We do not find empirical support for the signaling models that try to explain why firms underprice. In fact, we find that (1) firms that underprice more return to the reissue market less frequently, and for lesser amounts, than firms that underprice less, and (2) firms that underprice less experience higher earnings and pay higher dividends, contrary to the models’ predictions.