This study investigates Arthur Andersen’s audit quality in the decade before the collapse of Enron. Andersen’s involvement in the Waste Management audit failures — which relate to audits of the company’s 1992- 1996 financial statements — led the SEC to accuse Andersen of issuing false and misleading audit reports and resulted in a permanent injunction that prohibited Andersen from further violation of securities laws. We examine whether the Waste Management audit failures were symptomatic of widespread audit deficiencies at Andersen. Using three empirical measures of audit quality — discretionary accruals, clients’ propensity to meet or just beat analyst forecasts, and accounting misconduct identified by Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) — we find no overall evidence suggesting lower average audit quality at Andersen relative to the Big 4 during the period 1992-2001 for a sample of S&P 1500 firms. Focusing on high litigation risk firms, however, we find larger absolute and income-increasing accruals and a greater propensity to meet or just beat analyst forecasts for Andersen clients relative to the Big 4 clients in the period August 7, 2000 to December 31, 2001, after Andersen’s divorce from Andersen Consulting. These findings provide some evidence that, after the divorce, Andersen was not able to constrain aggressive accounting where it may have mattered most, that is, among its clients with the highest litigation risk.

On January 1, 2010, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China launched an online interactive platform named “Hudongyi.” This platform enables individual investors to communicate directly with executives of firms listed on the SZSE, under the supervision of the SZSE, thereby providing a quasi-natural experiment to study the impact of individual investors on corporate governance. Employing a difference-in-differences design, we document that the investor-firm interactions on Hudongyi deter real earnings management by firms listed on the SZSE through reducing information asymmetry and raising reputational costs. This effect varies with posting specificity, interaction effectiveness, and firm features. These findings suggest that individual investors can effectively engage in corporate governance when their right to speak up is facilitated by proper technology and regulatory scrutiny.

This study examines whether after Arthur Andersen's demise, successor auditors required more conservative accounting for their ex-Andersen clients in order to minimize litigation risk. We use unadjusted and performance-adjusted measures of abnormal accruals, and we examine the level of and changes in the abnormal accruals of ex-Andersen clients in 2002 relative to a control sample of clients that were audited by a Big 4 auditor in 2001 and 2002. We conduct univariate and multivariate tests. In our multivariate tests, we control for other factors that may affect litigation risk crosssectionally. Our results indicate that the ex-Andersen clients had lower levels of and larger decreases in abnormal accruals in 2002. This is consistent with auditor conservatism and suggests the successor auditors viewed an Andersen audit as a unique source of litigation risk.

This study examines whether and how linguistic information quality (measured by readability) of customer firms' management earnings forecast reports (MEFRs) affects supplier firms' investment quality (measured by investment efficiency). Our analyses reveal that supplier investment efficiency is positively associated with the average linguistic information quality of customers' prior MEFRs, and the positive association between supplier investment efficiency and customer MEFRs' numerical information quality is stronger in supplier firms with more readable customer MEFRs. Our analyses also reveal that higher linguistic information quality of customer MEFRs improves the monitoring of supplier firms by their outside stakeholders, such as institutional investors and financial analysts, and ameliorates the negative impact of suppliers' customer‐dependence on their investment efficiency. Our results suggest that greater linguistic information quality of a customer firm's forward‐looking disclosures is associated with higher‐quality investments made by its suppliers along the supply chain.

In a comprehensive sample of mergers and acquisitions, we find a reference price effect: acquirers earn higher (lower) announcement-period returns when their pre-announcement stock prices are well below (near) their 52-week highs. This reference price effect is stronger in acquisitions of private targets, deals involving greater uncertainty, and acquirers with greater individual investor ownership, and it is reversed in the subsequent year. Further, acquirer reference prices affect bid premia and target announcement-period returns in deals with greater uncertainty in acquirer valuation. The overall evidence is consistent with investors irrationally using 52-week high prices as a measure of acquirer valuation.

Regulatory economics suggests that one benefit of public enforcement is the deterrence of improper conduct. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) design, we investigate whether a deterrence effect follows the revelation of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) enforcement. We find that large audit firm offices improve audit quality following enforcement naming another office within their firm while small firm offices improve following enforcement of local small firm competitors, with these responses varying by enforcement type. To understand potential mechanisms for the geographic deterrence effect, we examine the first occurrence of a revoked PCAOB registration within a market and find that results are stronger if there is greater news coverage or if nonsanctioned firms are in closer proximity to the sanctioned auditor. Supplemental tests reveal that results are stronger when nonsanctioned auditor clients are similar to the sanctioned firm’s clientele. Our findings suggest a positive but varied deterrence effect following PCAOB enforcement.

We examine how the shifting of legal liability between auditors and clients affects financial reporting quality. We exploit the state-level adoption and rejection of a common law doctrine, the Audit Interference Rule (AIR), which shifts legal liability between auditors and clients, while not affecting total legal liability. The likelihood of restatements declines following staggered rejections of the AIR that shift risk to clients. Path analysis indicates that audit fees increase following AIR rejections, suggesting that relatively greater liability exposure for clients leads to a greater demand for assurance services that, in turn, reduces the likelihood of restatements. We further find greater improvements in financial reporting quality following the rejections of the AIR among clients with higher litigation risk and larger clients. Broadly, we provide novel evidence that clients’ incentives relating to increased liability exposure appear to dominate auditors’ disincentives relating to decreased liability exposure on financial reporting quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

This paper investigates whether investors can earn higher profits by holding cryptocurrencies with higher downside risk. Both portfolio-level analyses and cryptocurrency-level cross-sectional regressions suggest a positive cross-sectional relation between downside risk and future returns in the cryptocurrency market. In addition to the risk-return tradeoff theory, the limits-to-arbitrage theory also has some explanatory power for these results. Moreover, we examine the source of downside risk premium, the existence of upside risk premium, as well as the intertemporal relation between downside risk and future returns. Collectively, our findings highlight the important role of downside risk in determining cryptocurrency prices.

Using the Regulation SHO program as a quasi-experiment, we document that the threat of short selling has a negative effect on the volume of opportunistic insider selling and a positive effect on its profitability for each transaction. These effects are stronger among firms with higher litigation risk, greater media coverage, and executives who have more of their firms' stock-related holdings. We further find robust evidence when we extend the analyses to short selling deregulations in the Chinese and Hong Kong stock exchanges. Overall, our findings suggest that short sellers play a disciplinary role in opportunistic insider selling. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.