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Corporate Risk Management and the Incentive Effects of Debt.
This paper demonstrates how the incentive of manager-equityholders to substitute toward riskier assets, commonly referred to as the "asset substitution problem," is related to the level of observable risk in the firm. When observable and unobservable risks are sufficiently positively correlated, increases (decreases) in observable risk generate the incentive for manager-equityholders to increase (decrease) unobservable risk. Thus, credible commitments to hedge observable risk can benefit the firm's manager-equityholders by reducing the incentive to shift risk and the associated agency cost of debt. This provides a positive rationale for hedging diversifiable risk at the firm level.
Bank Funding Risks, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Futures Hedging Instrument: A Comment.
Stock Market Returns and Real Activity: A Note
Stock Market Returns and Real Activity: A Note
Information Production, Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation: A Reply
Information Production, Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation: A Reply
Information Production, Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation
Information Production, Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation
Corporate takeovers, firm performance, and board composition
This paper examines the relation between corporate takeovers and the board of directors as alternative control mechanisms to discipline top management. Previous research shows that CEO turnover subsequent to corporate takeovers is inversely related to pre-takeover market-related performance. We find this relation is concentrated in targets with inside-dominated boards of directors. Our results support the notion that, as an alternative control device, takeovers serve as a “substitute” for outside directors. Further, we show that the discipline associated with corporate takeovers extends beyond top management to effect restructuring of the entire board. The nature of the discipline depends on the composition of the target board prior to the takeover. Disciplinary takeovers result in two general effects: (1) for inside-dominated targets, the number of inside directorships decreases while the number of outside directorships remains about the same; and (2) for outside-dominated boards, the number of inside directorships increases while the number of outside directorships decreases. As a result, the board is recomposed toward a more even balance between inside and outside directorships.