In recent years the model of capital asset valuation (CAPM) proposed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966) has become the predominant representation of capital markets for empirical work and in the development of normative financial theory. In light of the model's popularity, the contradictory empirical evidence contained in studies of capital market behavior is disturbing. Researchers report findings of deviations of estimated parameters from theoretical values (Black et al., 1972; Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Miller and Scholes, 1972), non-linear rather than linear riskreturn relationships (Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Jensen, 1972), and indications of the incompleteness of the model's measure of risk (Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Rao and Miller, 1968). Further, the observed results have not been attributed to the econometric problems known to exist (Miller and Scholes, 1972). In this paper we argue that the conventional approach to testing the CAPM is subject to a peculiar in variables problem and cannot be expected to be successful even if the underlying model is valid. The CAPM is an equilibrium condition with equilibrium asset prices implicitly deflating the risk and the return measures denominated in rates of return. If disequilibrium observations are employed, then erroneous prices deflate both regressor and regressand in the regression model of the CAPM. As Casson (1973) has shown, estimated model parameters will not be consistent. The effect of this problem is difficult to relate to previous empirical evidence. The ,B estimates employed in these studies were produced by -a method that exhibits an equivalent errors in deflating variable problem. Our findings, however, indicate that reported results cannot be considered inconsistent with the validity of the hypothesized relationship. Finally, we show that the CAPM regression model can be recast in terms of asset prices rather than rates of return in order to produce consistent estimates of the parameters of interest.

This paper is concerned with the problem of price regulation when demand is uncertain. Uncertainty gives rise to substantial difficulties in determining both the return a firm's owners should be provided and a set of prices capable of producing that return. We argue that conventional approaches to price regulation are incapable of attaining the economically desirable objectives of efficiency and an equitable return to investors. The deficiencies in current practices are attributable to the separation of the risk measurement‐return determination and price setting activities in the conventional approach. We present a model of the regulated firm that synthesizes contemporary financial market theory and the theory of the firm under uncertainty. 1 In our approach, the income stream produced by the firm is valued ex ante in the financial market according to investors' perceptions and preferences over riskreturn characteristics. We portray the firm as producing risk and return by choosing among available production technologies to maximize its market value, given the prices set by regulators. Within this framework, it is shown that regulators can choose the lowest prices consistent with an equitable return to investors. We also show that prices so chosen induce the choice of the optimal technology by the firm.

This paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions. Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect two key components: the goals or preferences of individuals (here, representatives seeking reelection) and the relevant transactions costs. The authors present three conclusions. First, they show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators. Second, they explain why, given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures, specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange. Third, their approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue.

In this paper we extend the recent work on the choice of input mix under uncertainty. In particular, we demonstrate that the qualitative nature of the disturbance term, along with the decision sequence, is a crucial determinant of the overall effect of uncertainty on the optimal input mix of a firm. Using general demand and production functions in conjunction with a mean-variance framework for financial valuation, we demonstrate the differential effects of systematic and non-systematic risk on the firm's choice of an optimal input mix. Consistent with earlier work in economics, this analysis demonstrates that uncertainty, regardless of the source, has important implications for the firm's choice of technology.