This article studies how corporate tax hikes transmit across countries through multinationals’ internal networks of subsidiaries. We build a parsimonious multicountry model to highlight two opposing spillover effects: while tax competition between countries generates positive investment spillover, intra-firm production linkages predict negative spillover. Using subsidiary-level data and exogenous corporate tax hikes, we find that local business units cut investment by 0.5 percent for a 1 percent increase in foreign corporate tax. This result highlights the importance of production linkages in propagating foreign tax shocks, as the supply-chain-induced negative spillover dominates the positive spillover effect suggested by the conventional wisdom of tax competition.

Investors in financial markets are often uncertain about the relationship intensity between firms and have to rely on firms’ disclosure of such relationship intensity. We analytically study the asset pricing implications of this relationship intensity uncertainty and how such uncertainty affects firms’ incentives to form and disclose their relationship intensities (i.e., the real implications). We find that while such disclosure has a positive price impact by increasing the expected cash flow, it also has a negative impact by reducing the diversification benefit of investing in multiple firms that have more correlated cash flows. The price impact upon relationship intensity disclosure is therefore not monotone: it increases with the expected benefit of relationship and decreases with the risk of the underlying relationship. Our analysis implies that mandatory disclosure of firm relationship intensities may both destroy relationship development and reduce investor welfare, i.e., has adverse real consequences.

Using rapid expansion of the Beijing subway from 2000 to 2018, we analyze its impact on collaborative matches in innovations. We find that an hour reduction in travel time between a pair of locations in Beijing brought 14.85% to 37.69% increase in collaborated patents. Far-apart location pairs were more affected, and the local average causal response is approximately 34.92% to 82.29%. The effect is mainly driven by increased matches among highly productive innovators. The entry of new innovators, relocation of existing innovators, and collaborations among low-productive innovators also contribute to the increase in collaborative matches, especially in the long run.

We propose a fiscal policy expectations mechanism. When bad macro news arrives (in our study, when initial jobless claims (IJC) are higher than expected), investors may expect more generous government spending and drive up aggregate stock prices through the expected cash flow channel. Using a time-series sample from January 2013 to March 2021, we find that this phenomenon emerges when newspapers mention fiscal policy more. In the cross section, firms expected to receive more government spending – through stimulus supports during COVID-19 or procurement contracts before 2020 – exhibit higher individual stock returns when bad IJC shocks arrive.

In the United States, a significant number of criminal defendants are held in pretrial detention and face substantial financial burdens. Matching individual-level criminal case records to household-level financial data, we exploit the quasi-random assignment of court commissioners to study how pretrial detention affects household solvency. We find that pretrial detention results in higher rates of household insolvency, driven by higher rates of chapter 7 bankruptcies and judgment liens, and higher foreclosure rates during periods of decreasing house prices. We document that the effects spill over to family members and show that home equity can cushion households from insolvency.

Despite the significance of social networks in influencing firm behavior, research on their impact on corporate tax behavior is limited. In this paper, we construct social networks of CFOs from U.S. companies based on their employment history, education, and non-professional activities. We find that firms with more socially connected CFOs have lower effective tax rates (ETR) compared to firms with less socially connected CFOs. This effect is more pronounced when corporate governance is weaker and managers have higher incentives. Furthermore, a firm's ETR decreases as CFO centrality increases. We do not observe similar results regarding the connectedness of boards of directors. Additionally, firm pairs exhibit similar ETRs when their CFOs are socially connected, suggesting an exchange of tax-related information among CFOs through their social networks. We also find that the past ETRs of firms with central CFOs predict the ETRs of firms with non-central CFOs. This indicates that less socially connected CFOs tend to follow the tax planning strategies of their more socially connected counterparts. Overall, our findings indicate that more socially connected CFOs possess more relevant information and resources regarding tax planning, leading to the adoption of more aggressive tax strategies compared to their less socially connected counterparts.

Using real-time data, we show that currency excess return predictability is in part due to mispricing. First, the risk-adjusted profitability of systematic trading strategies decreases after dissemination of the underlying academic research, suggesting that market participants learn about mispricing from publications. Moreover, the decline is greater for strategies with larger in-sample profits and lower arbitrage costs. Second, the effect of comprehensive risk adjustments on trading profits is limited, and signal ranks and alphas decay quickly. The finding that analysts’ forecasts are inconsistent with currency predictors implies that investors’ trading contributes to mispricing and suggests biased expectations as a possible explanation.

We study the impact of social connections between judges and executives on the outcomes of Securities Class Action Litigation (SCAL). Judges who are socially connected to a firm's executives are significantly more likely to dismiss lawsuits against the firm. There is also evidence of faster resolution and lower payout amounts in connected cases. The favorable outcomes cannot be explained by the lower severity of connected cases, or by court, judge, or firm characteristics. Our results are more pronounced when executives connected to the judge are named defendants in the lawsuits, when connected cases involve less visible lawsuits or firms, and when connections between judges and executives are likely more direct. Our evidence indicates that social connections influence judge impartiality and meaningfully alter SCAL outcomes.

We investigate the real effects of tail risk on firm-level capital investment. Using an option-implied tail measure, we find that tail risk impedes investment, controlling for investment opportunities and existing uncertainty measures. This relation is stronger for firms with higher tail exposure and crash risk. The tail risk effect is more pronounced for firms with higher investment irreversiblility and demand uncertainty, consistent with the real options mechanism. Corporate resilience built by hedging activities attenuates the effect, while stressed debt financing conditions weaken the resilience and amplify the effect. Tail risk also delays investment spikes. Two instrumental variables enhance the causal interpretation. Overall, we highlight the distinctive role of tail risk in shaping real investment.