We study the impact of exchange rate fluctuations and political risk on the risk premiums reflected in cross-sections of individual equity returns from Mexico, a country that has ex? perienced significant monetary and political turbulence. Indicators from Mexico's currency and sovereign debt markets are employed as proxies for exchange rate and political risks. We find some evidence of equity market premiums for exposure to these risks. The results suggest common factors in emerging market equity, currency, and sovereign debt markets, and have several implications for corporate and portfolio management and for the use of emerging market data by researchers.

We study the intraday impact of exchange rate news on emerging market American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and closed‐end country funds during the 1994 Mexican peso crisis. Peso exchange‐rate changes affect prices and trading volumes of Latin American equities, and some closed‐end fund behavior is consistent with “noise trader” theories of small investors. However, there is no evidence that peso depreciation triggers a significant sell‐off of non‐Mexican securities or that other non‐Mexican trading patterns change at times of high peso news flow. Thus, the “Tequila Effect” is largely confined to price changes.

While many studies find that option prices lead stock prices, Stephan and Whaley (1990) find that stocks lead options. We find no evidence that options, even deep out‐of‐the‐money options, lead stocks. After confirming Stephan and Whaley's results, we show their results can be explained as spurious leads induced by infrequent trading of options. We show that the stock lead disappears when the average of the bid and ask prices is used instead of transaction prices. Hence, we find no evidence of arbitrage opportunities associated with the stock lead.

If there is an economically important optimal capital structure, then firms that deviate too far from the optimum will face greater risk of failure or acquisition. Using data from the oil industry we find no significant evidence that capital structure policy affects acquisition or failure probability. Firms appear to increase leverage when they face attractive growth opportunities or when poor operating performance reduces equity value or compels borrowing. Firms are acquired when rapid growth has reduced financial slack. In a clinical examination, we address the question of how firms with persistently low leverage can operate and survive for many years without being targeted for acquisition. Our evidence supports the pecking-order hypothesis, including acquisition among potential financing sources.

Warren Bailey, Y. Peter Chung, Jun-koo Kang, Foreign Ownership Restrictions and Equity Price Premiums: What Drives the Demand for Cross-Border Investments?, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec., 1999), pp. 489-511