ABSTRACT Using the relationship between institutional trades and sequential public information, this study provides a systematic way to identify institutional trades that are informative about future equity returns. By studying the US financial institutions from 1994 to 2016, I show that institutional trades initiated by managers responding proactively to upcoming informational signals strongly predict future stock returns. The predictability of informed institutions is more evident for stocks with higher information asymmetry and in periods of higher profit opportunities. The informed institutions outperform the uninformed ones by 2% on an annualized basis and their performance gap is persistent. Importantly, the return predictability of informed institutional trades is not subsumed by the return‐predictive signals documented in prior research, computed either from institutional holdings or from financial statements. Further analyses show that the informed institutional investors derive their superior ability to forecast future stock returns from processing corporate fundamentals and acquiring private information. This study derives a novel return predictor using the institutions' proactive trading behavior and identifies various informational sources of informed traders.

Abstract Traditional finance theories typically treat leases and debt as substitutes. However, the empirical findings on the relation between leases and debt are mixed. This paper reinvestigates this relation. I present a model to incorporate different theories on the substitutability and complementarity between leases and debt, and I test the model implications empirically in a GMM framework that simultaneously controls for endogeneity problems and firms' fixed effects. The findings suggest that leases and debt are substitutes instead of complements. I also investigate the variation in the substitutability between leases and debt, and find that in those firms with more growth options or larger marginal tax rates, or in those firms paying no dividends, the substitutability is more pronounced, i.e., the cost of new debt increases to a larger degree with extra leases.

By exploiting state-level variations in mortgage broker licensing regulations, we examine how licensing requirements affect mortgage loan performances and the mortgage origination market. Using data on private label securitized loans, we find that loans in states with a toughened broker licensing had a smaller increase in default rates. This effect is larger in the years leading up to the financial crisis, for borrowers with lower credit scores, cash-out-refinance loans, high-minority neighborhoods, and loans originated by nonbanks. The improved performance with toughened broker licensing is only partially reflected in loan pricing. Stronger broker licensing requirements have slightly positive effects on the mortgage approval rates, and are associated with overall less risky borrowers and loan characteristics in applications and in originations.

In the presence of jump risk, expected stock return is a function of the average jump size, which can be proxied by the slope of option implied volatility smile. This implies a negative predictive relation between the slope of implied volatility smile and stock return. For more than four thousand stocks ranked by slope during 1996–2005, the difference between the risk-adjusted average returns of the lowest and highest quintile portfolios is 1.9% per month. Although both the systematic and idiosyncratic components of slope are priced, the idiosyncratic component dominates the systematic component in explaining the return predictability of slope. The findings are robust after controlling for stock characteristics such as size, book-to-market, leverage, volatility, skewness, and volume. Furthermore, the results cannot be explained by alternative measures of steepness of implied volatility smile in previous studies.

We analyze a model in which traders have different trading opportunities and learn information from prices. The difference in trading opportunities implies that different traders may have different trading motives when trading in the same market—some trade for speculation and others for hedging—and thus they may respond to the same information in opposite directions. This implies that adding more informed traders may reduce price informativeness and therefore provides a source for learning complementarities leading to multiple equilibria and price jumps. Our model is relevant to various realistic settings and helps to understand a variety of modern financial markets.

[We show that Treasury security prices in the secondary market decrease significantly in the few days before Treasury auctions and recover shortly thereafter, even though the time and amount of each auction are announced in advance. These results are linked to dealers' limited risk-bearing capacity and end-investors' imperfect capital mobility, highlighting the important role of frictions even in very liquid financial markets. Our results imply a hidden issuance cost to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, estimated to be 9 to 18 bps of the auction size, or over half a billion dollars for the issuance size in 2007.]

[We test several hypotheses on how takeover premium is related to investors' divergence of opinion on a target's equity value. We show that the total takeover premium, the preannouncement target stock price run-up, and the post-announcement stock price markup are all higher when investors have higher divergence of opinion. We obtain identical results with higher market-level investor sentiment. When divergence of opinion is higher, a firm is less likely to be a takeover target, although takeover synergy in successful takeovers is higher. Our results suggest that takeovers may play a role in explaining high contemporaneous stock prices in the presence of high divergence of investor opinion.]

[When a firm exercises discretion to disclose or withhold information (strategic disclosure), risk-averse investors command higher expected returns when expected cash flows decrease, producing a negative correlation between these expectations. Moreover, stock returns exhibit stronger reversal than they do when full disclosure is enforced. We propose a model that makes these predictions and provide consistent evidence using a panel of foreign firms that list American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). We find significant shifts in the time-series properties of stock returns for firms that undergo large changes in disclosure environments, such as those cross-listing on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ and those from less-developed/emerging markets and code-law countries]

[This paper examines the relationship between default probability and stock returns. Using the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) of Moody' s KMV, we document that higher default probabilities are not associated with higher expected stock returns. Within a model of bargaining between equity holders and debt holders in default, we show that the relationship between default probability and equity return is (i) upward sloping for firms where shareholders can extract little benefit from renegotiation (low "shareholder advantage") and (ii) humped and downward sloping for firms with high shareholder advantage. This dichotomy implies that distressed firms with stronger shareholder advantage should exhibit lower expected returns in the cross section. Our empirical evidence, based on several proxies for shareholder advantage, is consistent with the model's predictions.]