[This paper develops and tests a new theoretical explanation for stock repurchases. Investors may disagree with the manager about the firm's investment projects. A repurchase causes a change in the investor base as investors who are most likely to disagree with the manager tender their shares. Therefore, a firm is more likely to buy back shares when the level of investor-management agreement is lower, and agreement improves as a consequence. Moreover, dispersion of opinion among investors cannot explain repurchase activity once the stock price and investor-management agreement are controlled for. Overall, the evidence is consistent with firms strategically using repurchases to improve alignment between management and shareholders.]

We examine market behavior of the stock and option markets upon the arrival of noisy information in the form of CNBC’s Mad Money recommendations. If stock and option markets are not equally efficient, they should respond differently to noisy information, with the less efficient market more susceptible to noise. We find that the stock market is less efficient than the option market. The abnormal difference between option-implied and actual stock returns is negative and significant upon exposure to noisy information. This difference may yield an economically significant monthly trading profit of up to 5%. We conclude that the stock market is more susceptible to noisy information than the option market and is therefore less efficient.

In a recent contribution, Mark Walker and John Wooders (2001) analyzed serve choices in Grand Slam tennis matches to provide an empirical test of the mixed strategy equilibrium. They argued convincingly that unlike subjects in laboratories, professional players have sufficient experience to play games well, and that they are also highly motivated to win these games. Their results indicated that there were no statistical differences in win rates for male players across various strategies, which is consistent with the equilibrium prediction. They fairly noted, however, that even the top male players tended to switch from one strategy to another too often, resulting in serial dependence. This paper reexamines the results of Walker and Wooders (2001) by collecting and analyzing a broader dataset, including men’s, women’s, and juniors’ matches. We find that the support of the minimax hypothesis is stronger. The plays in our data pass all of the tests in Walker and Wooders (2001) and therefore are more consistent with the theory of equilibrium than those in Walker and Wooders (2001). In short, the two hypotheses implied by the equilibrium, i.e., the equal probability of winning serve directions and the serial independence of serves, are borne out in our data.

Using a Supreme Court ruling that rejected the use of “bright-line” rules previously relied upon in evaluating materiality claims, this study examines how heightened materiality uncertainty impacts audit pricing. We expect the heightened uncertainty to make it more difficult for auditors and clients to assess materiality and to reach a consensus on materiality assessment, which increases audit effort and engagement risk, leading to higher audit fees. Consistent with this prediction, we find that after the ruling, audit fees increase significantly for treatment firms in the circuits using bright-line rules in the pre-ruling period, relative to control firms not affected by the ruling. This effect is stronger when auditors have lower quality or lower industry expertise, and when investors have more diverse opinions. We also find that for firms audited by low-expertise auditors, auditor turnover due to auditor-client disagreement on materiality-related issues increases significantly for treatment firms relative to control firms. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

We exploit a one-month period when SEC activity largely stopped during a U.S. government shutdown to examine whether variation in SEC scrutiny affects its ability to enforce insider trading. Difference-in-differences analyses suggest insiders earn abnormal profits during the shutdown, and the findings are robust to using different control periods and groups. We estimate that it takes roughly one week before the abnormally profitable trading begins, consistent with insiders updating their beliefs regarding the duration and disruption of the shutdown. Supporting the claim that SEC regulatory activity drops with the shutdown and does not fully recover afterward, we find a decline in the frequency of insider trading enforcement releases, investigations, and comment letter issuances after the SEC resumes operations. Our study speaks to the SEC insider trading enforcement literature and economic consequences of a regulatory discontinuity in a divisive political climate. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.